Abstract

Throughout his life Ludwig Wittgenstein claimed that the apparent grammatical form of a sentence is a source of philosophical error. This thesis investigates that claim, and the role it played in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. ;The thesis investigates, first, the theory of words, grammar, and grammatical categories found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and it shows how those theories reappear, in a modified form, in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. It also considers an opposing theory, the "classical theory". According to the classical theory, natural language reflects the world, with nouns standing for objects, and verbs and adjectives for their attributes. Proponents of the classical theory include Aristotle, medieval philosophers, and contemporary philosophers. In this thesis the classical theory is taken to be the theory Wittgenstein was objecting to, when he said that grammar is the source of philosophical error. ;It is shown that one of Wittgenstein's objections to the classical theory is that it misleadingly suggests that certain nonsensical strings of words make sense, i.e., that they represent possible situations. The classical theory countenances too many possibilities, so to speak. ;Among the situations that the classical theory mistakenly holds to be possible are situations which would be, by their very nature, unknowable. It would be impossible to describe such situations, according to Wittgenstein, because sentences describing them could never be understood. The existence of such situations is an illusion, one resulting from the fact that the classical theory suggests too many possibilities. Wittgenstein's critique of the classical theory thus has a verificationist component. ;Wittgenstein believed that the classical theory's superficial interpretation of the grammatical forms of sentences leads to philsophical error. The thesis discusses examples of such errors involving solipsism and sensations