Abstract
Certain philosophers have attacked the problem of defining omnipotence by arguing that the following provides at least the core of a successful definition:(Dl) x is omnipotent = df. (s)(it is possible for some agent to bring about s->-x has the ability to bring about s).In Dl, x ranges over agents and s over states of affairs.Despite the intuitive plausibility of Dl, it has been argued that certain conjunctive states of affairs provide counterexamples to Dl, for example:(si) A ball moves at t and no omnipotent agent brings it about that a ball moves at t.First, we show that if states of affairs like si are genuine counterexamples to Dl, then certain strategies which have been employed in the literature to provide an analysis along the lines of Dl do not succeed. Second, we argue that despite appearances, states of affairs like si are not genuine counterexamples to Dl.