Abstract

The problem which structures this dissertation is the consistency of omnipotence and free choice. I take the Paradox of Omnipotence to be the apparent inconsistency of the freewill defense with the existence of an omnipotent deity. In chapter I, I propose, defend, and tentatively accept a general definition of omnipotence which is expressed in terms of the effective choice of an agent. The definition states that an agent is omnipotent iff it is not possible that there be a logically contingent state of affairs such that the agent wills it to obtain and it does not obtain, and for any possible world, that world obtains iff the agent chooses it to obtain. This definition rules out the possibility of a plurality of nonconcurring omnipotent agents and its analysis exhibits the triviality of the traditional paradoxes of omnipotence having to do with what God can do. Paradoxes concerning what God can or cannot do are not about omnipotence per se, but are rather problems revolving around the distinction between the logically contingent and the logically necessary or impossible. In chapter II, I outline the libertarian conception of free choice. The theory of free choice contains two major theses. The first is the claim to radical contingency, whereby an action is free only if it is causally contingent under any description. The second thesis is the principle of the rationality of action, whereby it is claimed that an action is free only if it is in accord with practical reasoning. I argue that such a conception of freedom is not problematic. Chapter III contains the central argument of the dissertation; that omnipotence and free choice are not inconsistent. This argument involves an explication of the notion of divine concurrence by showing that it is possible that God chooses the actual world, which is entailed by the definition of omnipotence, even though the obtaining of some of the states of affairs in the world is not necessitated by His will, which is demanded by the freedom of creatures. In chapter IV, I analyze the concept of the eternity of God, which is implied by the definition of omnipotence and, I argue, is essential to any theological libertarianism. In this chapter the relation between the eternity of God and predestination and foreknowledge is also explored. The conclusion I draw from this dissertation is that free choice and omnipotence are consistent.