Degrees of finality and the highest good in Aristotle

Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (3):327-352 (1992)
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Abstract

This article develops a uniform interpretation of "pursuit for the sake of an end", explaining what an "unqualified final" end (sought solely for its own sake) offers that a (merely) final one does not and providing an improved account of what Aristotle means by an "ultimate end". This interpretation sheds light on (1) the regress argument at the outset of "N.E." I.2, (2) the way Aristotle argues for the existence of a highest good, (3) the special contribution of "self-sufficiency" (autarkeia) within that good, and (4) the potential flexibility of Aristotle's view about the content of the highest good

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Citations of this work

Truth and Ends in Dewey's Pragmatism.Henry S. Richardson - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):109-147.
How Narrow is Aristotle's Contemplative Ideal?Matthew D. Walker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):558-583.

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