Socrates' Question: An Essay on Plato's Early Dialogues
Dissertation, Princeton University (
1996)
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Abstract
The topic of my dissertation is the nature and presuppositions of Socrates' philosophical activity in Plato's early dialogues, in particular the 'What is X?' question and the 'method of refutation' . I argue that answering Socrates' question is a matter of 'constructive interpretation' . The question arises within a particular situation as a precondition for solving a practical problem which is generated within the context of the traditional conception of the relevant virtue, or moral standard. The problem is that this conception proves insufficient for an adequate solution to the practical problem: it is unclear and internally inconsistent. By pressing his question, Socrates challenges the interlocutor to clarify the standard involved, i.e. to define the nature of the relevant virtue. This process of defining the virtue takes the character of constructive interpretation: articulating the rationale underlying the concept of the virtue, i.e. its place and role within the good human life, and working out what the implications of this rationale are, i.e. how it should be interpreted in the light of the particulars of practical life. ;The elenchus is Socrates' peculiar way of leading his interlocutor into a search for an answer to the 'What is X?' question. This search takes the form of a question-and-answer exchange, with Socrates playing the role of Questioner. Socrates' role frequently leads the interlocutor to despair, but Socrates shows, in the famous interrogation of the slave-boy in the Meno, that progress is indeed possible even though they do not know the right answer. This episode can thus function as a model for the elenchus, which I demonstrate through a close reading of the Euthyphro. I finally indicate the direction in which Socrates might lead his interlocutor's constructive interpretation of a virtue, by introducing the notion of a 'basic concern' as something every rational agent would have to acknowledge as binding on him, and as something of which the virtue should be seen as a specification