Myself and "I"

In Marcelo Stamm (ed.), Philosophie in Synthetischer Absicht. pp. 83--103 (1998)
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Abstract

In this essay I distinguish three kinds of self-knowledge. I call these three kinds agent-relative knowledge, self-attached knowledge and knowledge of the person one happens to be. These aspects of self-knowledge dier in how the knower or agent is represented. Most of what I say will be applicable to beliefs as well as knowledge, and to other kinds of attitudes and thoughts, such as desire, as well.1 Agent-relative knowledge is knowledge from the perspective of a particular agent. To have this sort of knowledge, the agent need not have an idea of self, or a notion of himself or herself. This sort of knowledge can be expressed by a simple sentence containing a demonstrative for a place or object, and without any term referring to the speaker. For example, “There is an apple” or “that is a toaster”. Ideas of specic objects I call notions. Ideas of properties and relations I just call ideas. A judgement involves an idea being associated with a notion. A.

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John Perry
University of California, Riverside

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