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Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency?
In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)
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Citations of this work
Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:173-214.
Accidentally factive mental states.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
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