Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy

Analysis 50 (1):1-9 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/analys/51.1.1

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,674

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Redundancy and Frege's chosen object theory.William Ulrich - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (3):313 - 319.
Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency?Harold W. Noonan - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
On an argument of Segal’s against singular object-dependent thoughts.Teresa Marques - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):19-37.
Two concepts of truth.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):35 - 58.
Information theory and redundancy.Derek Partridge - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):308-316.
Object dependent thoughts, perspectival thoughts, and psychological generalization.Max F. Adams, R. Stecker & G. Fuller - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (1):47–59.
The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanation.Sarah Sawyer - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):181-192.
In defence of object-dependent thoughts.Sean Crawford - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
181 (#110,647)

6 months
14 (#199,681)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Harold Noonan
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Getting a Thing into a Thought.Kent Bach - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 39.
Singular Thought and Mental Files: An Introduction.Rachel Goodman & James Genone - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.
The nature of content: a critique of Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne.Sarah Sawyer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Moderate modal realism.Richard B. Miller - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):3-38.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references