A new argument against compatibilism

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Analysis (1):ant095 (2013)
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Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced: 1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powersTherefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false

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2014

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10.1093/analys/ant095

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Author Profiles

Stephen Mumford
Durham University
Rani Anjum
University of Tromsø (PhD)

Citations of this work

Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.
A plenitude of powers.Barbara Vetter - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 6):1365-1385.
Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties.Alexander Bird - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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