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Alternate Accounts of Rationality Invalidate Kaposy's Argument
American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4):43-44 (2010)
Abstract
Kaposy (2010) argues that contemporary neuroscience cannot provide rational reasons for abandoning folk psychological concepts like self, personhood, or free will because these concepts are necessa...Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory.Amartya Sen - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):317-344.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.Mary Hesse - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):372-374.
Laudan's Progress and Its ProblemsProgress and Its Problems. Larry Laudan.Ernan McMullin - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (4):623-644.
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