Abstract
According to Hudson, belief in hyperspace can provide the resources for buttressing one of two traditional responses to what might be called the Best World Problem. Moreoever, if he is right, it turns out that an unadvertised side-benefit is that belief in hyperspace provides an answer to an argument for atheism that arises in connection with the Best World Problem and that has received a great deal of recent attention. In this paper, however, I shall argue that belief in hyperspace in fact provides neither of these benefits. I'll begin by briefly sketching the Best World Problem and the argument for atheism that arises in connection with it; I'll then explain who belief in hyperspace is supposed to help solve the Best World Problem and to answer the atheistic argument. I will then argue--in the familiar tradition of trying to show respect and affection for one's friends by objecting vigorously to their arguments and conclusions--that belief in hyperspace in fact offers no help with respect to either the Best World Problem or the atheistic argument, and that even if it did, this fact would not count as reason to believe in hyperspace.