Abstract

In the history of metaphysics the position of John Duns Scotus is of major significance. Scotus argues that a univocal concept of being qua being serves as the subject of metaphysics. But the question remains whether this ought to be a concept of being which is so common that it even includes both real and mental being. Scotus himself opts for metaphysics as a real science by excluding the ens rationis from it. How did his pupils receive this doctrine? Do they conform with the interpretation of metaphysics as a real science or do they consider being to be «supertranscendental», i.e., as being common to real as well as mental being and even transcending the transcendentals in the sense of a mere something? For these questions, the position of the Franciscan Nicolaus Bonetus , probably a pupil of Scotus’, is of great importance because he indeed defends the innovative position — almost completely unknown today — that ‘being’ is univocal to real and mental being. Here I present and interpret this metaphysical thesis of Bonetus, his sources and consequences. For this purpose I also draw on by John P. Doyle’s studies on the supertranscendental, which are dedicated to finding the missing link between medieval and Kantian conceptions of metaphysics