Abstract

I first argue that Socrates says less than he knows because he wants to stimulate philosophical activity: he simultaneously destroys cherished beliefs and withholds replacements in order to produce a heartfelt pathos of distance between ignorance and wisdom. Yet, in the Gorgias Plato thematizes and repudiates this pedagogy. At least for some pupils, the philosopher should employ rhetoric as an ally of the elenchus to cultivate right opinion and right habit. This more protreptic pedagogy is ramified and expanded in the Phaedrus and Republic as all of the resources of the city are to be put to the service of moral education. Moreover, these dialogues explain why Socrates' elenctic sting frequently fails to engender desire for wisdom in terms of a new moral psychology. Since most souls are dominated by their irrational parts, they are little affected by Socrates' destructive and intellectually demanding pedagogy. Thus, my project is largely historical in focus as I present a reading of various early dialogues together with the Gorgias, Phaedrus, and Republic, that focuses on changes in pedagogy resulting from changes in psychology. Moreover, I will argue in two way that Plato's writings have contemporary pertinence. First, I try to develop and defend core Platonic ethical ideas that are both pertinent to contemporary discussions, and that do not require elements of Plato's metaphysics which we can no longer brook. Here I defend elements of his pedagogy and psychology. Second, I examine and defend an account of practical rationality, the elenchus "writ large," that I use throughout my project and which I argue is derived from Plato's texts.