Abstract

Since Nietzsche it has been a commonplace of social and philosophical thought that modernity suffers from a historical sickness. A cure for this historical sickness requires not just a productive relation of knowledge to action, but also an understanding of how the historicity of the human situation is compatible with truth and morality. The fundamental question addressed by this dissertation is: What is history such that it can be the site and source of normativity? I pursue this question through an analysis of the role history plays in the work of a variety of contemporary political theorists and a critical exposition of Heidegger. In successive chapters I examine the place of historicity in Being and Time, and explore the idea of a history of Being developed in Heidegger's later works. In considering the relevance of historicity for political philosophy I address three questions each of which reflects an influential approach to the problem of the normative status of history: Is historicity simply a radicalized form of historicism? Does historicity provide a transcendental horizon that is indifferent to the particular content that falls under that horizon? Does historicity entail a view of freedom as spontaneous, unencumbered human action? In arguing that no is the answer to all three of these questions I am suggesting that historicity provides a coherent and responsible measure for human thought and action