The Problem of Finitude in Phenomenology

Colloquy 6 (2002)
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Abstract

The problem of history and, more precisely, the historicity of history constitutes one of the greateststumbling blocks for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. If one confines oneself to thecriticisms levelled against Husserlian phenomenology by Martin Heidegger, those concepts developed asa result all operate in a dialogue with historicity. Perhaps the first step beyond Husserl arrives with theconcept of 'facticity,' a concept which recognises the essential temporality or historicity of the ego - thatbeing which attempts to enact the phenomenological epoche. The phenomenological epoche, taken in itsstrictest Husserlian sense, is that which enables the step into the field of transcendental experiencewhere access is gained to the fundamental determinations of any operation of givenness whatsoever.The undetermined determinations of thought and of Being here become manifest. With Heidegger'sconcept of facticity, however, the element of history and historicity is introduced into what was previouslyassumed as absolutely fundamental. Nonetheless, historicity is not to be taken simply as that which isprior to all other philosophical determinations. As will become clear, it is not without a particularlyproblematic concept that history can itself become manifest. The intention of this brief study is to bringthe concept of the 'finite' to some degree of authentic intuition from within the domain of aphenomenological philosophy guided by the thought of Heidegger

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