Abstract

Philosophical dialogue is a curious activity. Arguments are expected to be rigorous, but no demand is made that there must be evidence for the premisses. Terminology is expected to be precise, but its appropriateness to the subject matter under discussion can be left unexplored. Officially, nothing is conceded; but, in fact, a great deal is taken for granted. Ad argumentum mingles indiscriminately with ad hominem; and, above all, the evidential warrant for one’s philosophical claims is, like the topics of sex and religion to the less enlightened, one of those delicate issues never to be discussed in mixed company.Such conventions as these that are associated with contemporary philosophical exchange make it difficult to have a balanced discussion about Progress and Its Problems. That work is, in the first instance, a descriptive model of theory change in science. It purports to establish what sorts of factors have in fact influenced scientific decision-making.