Reevaluating scientific progress as a problem resolution

Azafea: Revista de Filosofia 16:133-147 (2014)
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Abstract

“Problem-solving” as a criterion of scientific progress defended by Thomas S. Kuhn and Larry Laudan, respectively, has been criticized by several authors. Recently, Alexander Bird has suggested that problem-solving as a criterion of scientific progress is regressive and anti-intuitive. In this text I reassess Kuhn, Laudan and Bird’s positions and I show that Bird’s arguments are untenable.

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Damian Islas
National Autonomous University of Mexico

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References found in this work

A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1980 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 211.
What is scientific progress?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):64–89.
Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism.Larry Laudan - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1):19 - 31.

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