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Putnam's Multiple Realization Argument against Type‐Physicalism
In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 311–313 (2011-09-16)
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Putnam's multiple realization argument against type‐physicalism Putnam's multiple realization argument undermining “type‐physicalism” argument, simple in structure P1 exposing real meaning of type‐physicalism type–physicalism, single realization of mental properties P2, expressing multiple realization thesis type‐physicalism, single realizability of mental properties type‐physicalism (most probably) false Putnam's argument, way for functionalist view of the mind “brain states” and “mental states” rather than to properties
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