Some problems for reductive physicalism [Book Review]

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654 (2002)
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Abstract

I examine and discuss Jaegwon Kim's arguments against non-reductive physicalism in his book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine the supervenience argument and then the multiple realization argument. Finally, I raise some questions about Kim's overall attitude towards mental realism, i.e., realism about mental properties.

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Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod

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