Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):283-297 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance with one’s apparent reasons. Dispositionalism about rational abilities will be vindicated, since it helps to see why and how these two-way abilities entail an ability to decide otherwise and, thus, free will.

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10.1007/s10677-022-10278-9

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Citations of this work

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rational Belief, Reflection, and Undercutting Defeat.Frank Hofmann - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (3):354-373.

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References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom Within Reason.Susan R. Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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