A Metaphysics for Freedom

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.

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Helen Steward
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.

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