For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?

Theory and Decision 54 (2):105-123 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to computational limitations. If these agents agree that their estimates are consistent with certain easy-to-compute consistency constraints, then they can agree to disagree about any random variable only if they also agree to disagree, to a similar degree and in a stronger sense, about an average error. Yet average error is a state-independent random variable, and one agent's estimate of it is also agreed to be state-independent. Thus suggests that disagreements are not fundamentally due to differing information about the state of the world

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
113 (#158,026)

6 months
5 (#646,314)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robin Hanson
George Mason University

Citations of this work

Shall We Vote on Values, But Bet on Beliefs?Robin Hanson - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):151-178.
Are disagreements honest.Tyler Cowen & Robin Hanson - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Methodology.
Enhancing our truth orientation.Robin Hanson - 2009 - In Julian Savulescu & Nick Bostrom (eds.), Human Enhancement. Oxford University Press. pp. 357--372.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Impossible possible worlds vindicated.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):475 - 484.
Consensus By Identifying Extremists.Robin D. Hanson - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (3):293-301.

Add more references