Delusion and affective framing

Dissertation, University of Birmingham (2018)
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Abstract

Clinically significant delusion is a symptom of a number of mental illnesses. We rely on what a person says and how she behaves in order to identify if she has this symptom and it is clear from the literature that delusions are heterogeneous and extremely difficult to define. People with active delusions were interviewed to explore what it is like to develop and experience delusion. The transcribed interview data was analysed to identify themes and narrative trajectories that help to explain the phenomenon. Results showed that delusions can sometimes provide pragmatic benefits and that the genesis of some delusions can be characterised in terms of the enactivist notion of affective framing. Affective framing is a term that captures the background emotions that enable know-how in terms of goal directed action and cognition. If a person’s affective frame alters the world is no longer understood and know-how is lost. The way in which a person relates to her environment can be highly anomalous thus requiring her to find an extraordinary explanation. I argue that delusions arise as a result of a breakdown in affective framing and offer a conceptualisation of delusion supported by empirical findings.

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