Abstract

The question of personal identity lies in the question: In virtue of what is a person correctly considered the same person throughout a life‐course? This chapter shows that this question is central to the thought of Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Hans‐Georg Gadamer, Ricoeur, as well as other thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition. Despite the deep differences among hermeneutic thinkers on the topic of personal identity, there are areas of common ground that enable us to formulate a general view that is distinctively hermeneutic. Heidegger rejects the conception of the self as a substance. Gadamer asks about the nature of understanding and how it is possible, and addresses these questions by drawing on the fundamental ontological approach of Heidegger's question of the being of Dasein. Ricoeur goes beyond the proto‐narrative accounts of identity by distinguishing different levels at which life can be seen as having a narrative structure.