Abstract

The primary aim of the dissertation is to establish that supererogation is impossible in Kantian moral theory. Thomas Hill Jr. has argued that it is possible for Kant's theory to recognize supererogatory acts as among the sort of acts which fulfill some imperfect duties. I have tried to show that, although Kant's theory recognizes the moral worth of these acts, and recognizes furthermore that they are not specifically required, the theory cannot truly recognize their supererogatory character. Essentially, I try to show that contrary to its widespread use, the characterization "morally good but not required" is too rough a characterization of the supererogatory, and respect for the moral law requires so great a disinterestedness in one's own happiness that no morally worthy act could involve a self-sacrifice that could truly be considered supererogatory. ;I try to show what it costs a modern moral theory like Kant's, and secondarily utilitarianism, to accommodate the ordinary idea that there are self-sacrifices so great that, all things equal, they could not have been required. I try to show that what Kantian, and secondarily utilitarian, theories have done is eliminate the special merit we grant to certain extraordinary self-sacrifices for the good. ;In general then I have tried to show what commitments are at the root of the elimination, by modern moral theory, of an ordinary and pervasive moral concept. The secondary literature has tended to obscure certain things crucial to the issue of the possibility in Kantian moral theory. Also, interpretation of Kant has suffered from a 'traditional' but doubtful sort of criticism, akin to the criticism of this dissertation. And a lot of the recent secondary literature on supererogation has not been precise enough about supererogation to show what is really at stake. ;Thus, as regards the interpretation of Kant, I discuss the more recent, and promising views of, for example, Korsgaard and Herman. And, I critically discuss some main recent work on supererogation by, for example, Heyd and Baron