Partial belief as a solution to the logical problem of holding simultaneous, contrary beliefs in self-deception research

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):115-116 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
'Strong' self‐deception.David Pugmire - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):339-346.
Hypnotic responding and self-deception.Irving Kirsch - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):118-119.
Self-deception as pseudo-rational regulation of belief.Christoph Michel & Albert Newen - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Belief and self-deception.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):387-410.
The product of self-deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
418 (#49,248)

6 months
7 (#486,539)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references