Paradoxical self-deception: Maybe not so paradoxical after all

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):109-110 (1997)
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Abstract

The simultaneous possession of conflicting beliefs is both possible and logical within current models of human cognition. Specifically, evidence of lateral inhibition and state-dependent memory suggests a means by which conflicting beliefs can coexist without requiring “mental exotica.” We suggest that paradoxical self-deception enables the self-deceiver to store important information for use at a later time.

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