Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’s Why We Doubt

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-9 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In these brief remarks, I describe the author’s Bayesian explication of the narrow function of the meta-cognitive, heuristic algorithm (pbs) that is at the heart of his psychological explanation of why we entertain skeptical doubts. I provide some critical remarks, and an alternative Bayesian approach that is (to my mind) somewhat more elegant than the author’s.

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

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References found in this work

Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Counterfactual Probability.Ginger Schultheis - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):581-614.
Skepticism and Contextualism.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.
Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.

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