Bank Cases, Stakes and Normative Facts

In Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 5. Oxford University Press (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases.Logan Paul Gage - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1):57-70.
Subject-sensitive invariantism, high-stakes/low-stakes cases, and presupposition suspension.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):249-254.
Anti-intellectualism, egocentrism and bank case intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2841-2857.
You always have a reason to check! A new take on the bank cases.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1007-1018.
Does MITE Make Right?: On Decision-Making under Normative Uncertainty.Brian Hedden - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:102-128.
Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - 2020 - Erkenntnis (4):1501-1519.
Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism.Justin Morton - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):173-196.
The “Just Too Different” Objection to Normative Naturalism.Hille Paakkunainen - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12473.
Czy wiedza jest zależna od kontekstu? Kontekstualizm a inwariantyzm praktyczny.Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (4).
Celano on normative facts.Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido - 2016 - Revus.
Stanley and the Stakes Hypothesis.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - The Reasoner 11:73-74.
A Remark on the Bank Cases.Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):519-529.
Grounding and Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):155-178.
On pre-conventions as ‘normative facts’.Luís Duarte D’Almeida - 2017 - Revus.
Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:427--487.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-13

Downloads
289 (#69,323)

6 months
138 (#26,436)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

N. Ángel Pinillos
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references