The project on formulating axioms of efficient causality by means of the prepositional variables calculus

Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 7 (1):153-168 (1970)
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Abstract

The simplest axioms, formulated by medieval scholastics as rules of inference between potency and act, are also axioms concerning causality as they express some potency-act relations. These are: Ab esse ad posse valet illatio. A non posse ad non esse valet illatio. A posse ad esse non valet illatio. A non esse ad non posse non valet illatio. The project on formulating axioms of efficient causality by means of the prepositional variables calculus does not mean of course that we try to create a complete theory of causality. We will, for the moment show that the quantification of the concepts „potency-act" by means of the concepts „set-element" or „parameter-specific numerical value" is very useful. We will also point out, intuitively, as an experiment, the logical operators which are linked very closely with such concepts as implication, potentiality, act, set, specific numeric value.

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