Meaning: Truth-referential or use?

Abstract

In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argued for a certain truth-referential theory of meaning and against various other theories, both truth-referential and not.[1] In this paper I shall consider some subsequent developments. I shall start by summarizing my theory. I will then consider some of the latest from direct-reference theorists, particularly from Scott Soames. Finally, I will consider the use theory proposed by Paul Horwich

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,674

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives.Timothy Williamson - 2010 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 137--159.
Meaning and use.Michael Devitt - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):106-121.
Weak and strong theories of truth.Michael Sheard - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):89-101.
Truth and meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.
Harman on self referential thoughts.Christopher S. Hill - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.
Theories of meaning.Wang Lu - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):83-98.
Editorial introduction.Volker Halbach - 2001 - Studia Logica 68 (1):3-20.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
29 (#563,601)

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Devitt
CUNY Graduate Center

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references