A Present Like Ours

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1):75-90 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper seeks to refute Don Marquis’s well-known “future like ours” argument against abortion (1989) by offering an alternative explanation for why killing people is prima facie morally wrong, one which overall is at least as good as Marquis’s. That alternative is in part that what makes killing “us” wrong is not primarily that it denies us a future (as Marquis would have it) but that it ends our present. Of course, Marquis has dismissed other present-state explanations for what may seem good reasons. To avoid a similar dismissal, I fit my explanation into a larger theory, one I believe plausibly explains the moral status of a wide range of beings, both human and non-human, better than Marquis’s. Ironically, that larger theory recognizes Marquis’s “future like ours” as a relevant consideration for protecting the (normal) fetus against killing but not as the decisive consideration that Marquis claims it to be. Marquis’s ultimate mistake is treating a relevant consideration as the sole consideration.

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