Abstract

Industry reputation crises trigger producers and consumers to switch to certification as a signal of quality, especially in a weak institutional environment. In this paper, we posit that firm certification as a signaling mechanism involves the co-evolution of firms and consumers. We investigate the impact of industry reputation crises on firm certification as a response strategy. Feedback between producers and consumers causes producers to seek more certifications over time to differentiate themselves from competitors. However, the proliferation of certifications may dilute their credibility and reduce the effectiveness of the signal. Competition from imports that command higher trust from consumers exacerbates the problem in developing countries. We conduct empirical tests using firms in China’s dairy industry after an industry reputation crisis. The findings support our hypotheses. This study provides insights on the certification mechanisms through which producers and consumers interact and the effect of institutional environments on this interaction. It also offers implications for managers on how to better respond to industry crises and for policymakers on how to manage the certification market.