Abstract

The solution is that there can be no justification of induction, "the rule we use to make inferences about unknown events from a sample of data drawn from experience." A principle may be justified either by validation or by vindication; Hume's argument showed conclusively that no validation of induction is possible, but left open the possibility of a vindication. Reichenbach explored this possibility within the framework of a frequency theory of probability. Katz now explores Reichenbach's treatment in detail, finding that it ultimately fails to produce either a "preferability vindication" or an "expediency vindication." Katz then argues that it is in principle impossible ever to modify Reichenbach's account in a way which would allow such vindication-for the inductive rule or, in fact, any convergent rule whatever, whether on a "frequency" or a "degree of confirmation" interpretation of probability. But if no vindication is possible, then no justification of any kind is possible, providing we have correctly reduced the problem; so the problem of induction has received its solution. This in no way calls for skepticism or conventionalism concerning empirical knowledge; we can certainly criticize various inductive procedures and show that one canon is better than another. We can "convince those who are in agreement about basic standards but are interested in more precise versions and their proper application to particular cases"; these are quite different issues from the general "problem of induction." A boldly-outlined argument, drawing upon a good deal of complex material, and handled very skillfully.--B. H.