Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by (...) seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists. (shrink)

Can we know anything for certain? There are those who think we can (traditionally labeled the "dogmatists") and those who think we cannot (traditionally labeled the "skeptics"). The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is the great debate between the two. This book is an introductory and historically-based survey of the debate. It sides for the most part with the skeptics. It also develops out of skepticism a third view, fallibilism or critical rationalism, which incorporates an uncompromising realism about perception, science, (...) and the nature of truth. (shrink)

The book's essays represent an important contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate concerning Realism and Rationalism. The author defends in a clear and consistent fashion a fallibilist, realistic, and rationalist position in opposition to the idealistic and relativistic viewpoint characteristic of present postmodern philosophy.

Roger Jones asks what Newtonian realists should be realists about, given that there are four empirically equivalent formulations of Newtonian mechanics which have different ontological commitments and explanatory mechanisms. A realist answer is sketched: Newtonians should be realists about what the best metaphysical considerations dictate, where the best metaphysical considerations are those which have yielded the best physics. Metaphysical considerations are required within physics, just as they are required to eliminate idealist and surrealist theories which are empirically equivalent to realist (...) ones. Realists must reject the positivist assumption that empirically equivalent theories are explanatory and evidential equivalents, too. (shrink)

Popper famously claimed that he had solved the problem of induction, but few agree. This paper explains what Popper's solution was, and defends it. The problem is posed by Hume's argument that any evidence-transcending belief is unreasonable because (1) induction is invalid and (2) it is only reasonable to believe what you can justify. Popper avoids Hume's shocking conclusion by rejecting (2), while accepting (1). The most common objection is that Popper must smuggle in induction somewhere. But this objection smuggles (...) in precisely the justificationist assumption (2) that Popper, as here undestood, rejects. Footnotes1 Invited address at the Karl Popper 2002 Centenary Conference, Vienna, 3–7 July 2002. (shrink)

Roger Jones asks what Newtonian realists should be realists about, given that there are four empirically equivalent formulations of Newtonian mechanics which have different ontological commitments and explanatory mechanisms. A realist answer is sketched: Newtonians should be realists about what the best metaphysical considerations dictate, where the best metaphysical considerations are those which have yielded the best physics. Metaphysical considerations are required within physics, just as they are required to eliminate idealist and surrealist theories which are empirically equivalent to realist (...) ones. Realists must reject the positivist assumption that empirically equivalent theories are explanatory and evidential equivalents, too. (shrink)

Why do scientists do experiments? What do their experiments reveal? Scientifically, can we decide what to believe? Is evolution a scientific theory? Such apparently simple questions are brilliantly investigated by celebrated philosopher and professor Alan Musgrave in order to interrogate the worldviews we inhabit - and their consequences. Musgrave brings to these questions an expansive historical knowledge, provoking readers to enter the now-discredited belief-systems of earlier ages in order to compare these with their own beliefs. Discursive, entertaining, and provocative, Secular (...) Sermons contains fourteen essays by Musgrave - New Zealand's leading contemporary philosopher - examining the basic assumptions of science, religion, and mathematics. The book is an insightful introduction to the philosophical thought of Aristotle, Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Herschel, Darwin, and Einstein, among others. It puts modern science in a broader historical perspective and offers an entertaining introduction to the philosophical paradigm of Critical Rationalism. (shrink)

Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by (...) seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists. (shrink)

For centuries tradition had it that knowledge is justified true belief. Then Edmund Gettier produced cases that refute that traditional view – or so most philosophers think. I disagree. The widespread intuition lying behind the so-called ‘Gettier Cases’ is that there is epistemic bad luck (we can unluckily fail to know), but no epistemic good luck (we cannot luckily know). I reject this puritanical intuition. I also question the externalist or reliabilist views of knowledge and/or justification that the Gettier Cases (...) have spawned. (shrink)

... THIRD WORLD EPISTEMOLOGY L. Jonathan Cohen . Sir Karl Popper's striking hypothesis about a third world of objective knowledge deserves careful scrutiny ...

Colin Cheyne's ‘paradox of reasonable believing’ poses a problem for both internalist and externalist theories of rationality. Cheyne suggests that externalists will more easily solve it. I argue the opposite.

It is difficult to say in a few words how much I owe to Hans Albert. It all began with invitations to the wonderful Alpbach European Forum, where for many years Hans helped to organize [i. e. organized] the regular Philosophy Seminar. He first invited me there in 1975, and again in 1980, 1987, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2001. Hans really was the ‘Spirit of Alpbach’, as somebody once described him to me, and these were all memorable occasions in many (...) ways. I also met Gretl there, and their sons. I played tennis with Gretl and had wonderful walks and talks with all of them. (shrink)

John Fox argued that deductivism must be supplemented with ‘epistemic syllogisms’, non-deductive arguments whose vindication is trivial if deductivism is correct. I resist this attempt to surpass deductivism.