The Philosophical Roots of Individuals and Persons. Personalism and Individualism against the Background of Kant

Diametros 46:1-29 (2015)
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Abstract

In the paper I argue that Kant’s philosophy underlies both contemporary individualism and personalism. The Kantian categorical imperative may be, in my opinion, interpreted in an anti-egotistical way and in an entirely individualistic one. The first kind of interpretation not only made a contribution to the emergence of numerous and manifold kinds of personalism, but it also inspired many critics of individualism. The second kind of interpretation, together with the Kantian analyses of human self, became essential to the conceptualization of modern individualism. I argue that Kantian tradition in many respects appears to be close to Thomism as far as the conception of person and human individual is concerned. As the dispute between American Thomists, discussed in the paper, reveals, Thomistic personalists found, in Kant’s philosophy issues which filled some gaps in the scholastic heritage, especially in anthropology, ethics, and social problems

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