Abstract

Plato's Republic is often interpreted as a systematic argument in which Socrates sets forth his defense of the just life. This argument is taken to be basically complete by the end of Book IV where Socrates defines justice as a kind of health of the soul. The discussion of metaphysics in the middle books is thus rendered a mere digression, not essential to the defense. ;In opposition to this dominant interpretation, I argue that the account of the just individual in Book IV is incomplete in two important ways. First, in developing his account of the ordered soul, Socrates says that the rational part is ruled by virtue of its wisdom, but he does not in Book IV specify the content of that wisdom, the standards which reason must discern if it is to govern properly. Second, Socrates has not yet elaborated why we should care about achieving justice or psychic harmony. One might grant that Socrates' account of justice is correct, and yet decide that living unjustly and enduring some disorder of the soul still leaves one with a more worthwhile life than living justly, and achieving psychic harmony. ;Furthermore, I argue that if we treat the work as a dialogue in which Socrates is leading Glaucon and Adeimantus to think for themselves then we will see that the discussion of metaphysics in the middle books becomes crucial for his defense of the just life. For here he endeavors to "complete" the account of the just individual. The discussion of the philosopher and the Forms in Book V indicates the nature of the standards which reason must know if it is to perform its function. The consideration of the Form of the Good reveals why we should care about justice. The Good is what we truly desire to possess. But we can possess the Good only by imitating it, and we imitate the Good by bringing about an ordering of the soul. Hence, in being just, we are doing what we truly want insofar as it brings us closer to the Good