Abstract

To thymoeides, the spirited part of the soul in Plato's Republic has been largely ignored. Chapter One notes how previous commentators fail to account for spiritedness. ;Thymos, spiritedness, is found in writers before Plato as an aspect of the person, related to anger, honor, and excelling. In the Republic, Plato roots this in a part of the soul. Chapters Two and Three examine thymos in Homer and four other poets and thymos and to thymoeides in Plato. ;Spiritedness is the part of the soul between the calculative and the desiring, characterized by love of victory and of honor. Its virtue is courage; its vices are harshness, cowardice, or enslavement to flattery. It is problematic because it can, if badly educated, be a major cause of dissension in soul and in the city. Chapter Four lays out the need to educate spiritedness. ;Chapter Five analyses the dialogue's dramatic framework and the participants and then rereads the Republic as attempting to educate spirited persons, not by force but by persuasive means, to move them to justice and to prevent tyranny. ;Republic I presents the problem of justice, especially Thrasymachus' defense of tyranny, indicating that sophistry's persuasive power must be undercut. ;In Republic II-IV, Socrates answers the challenge to justice by creating a city in speech and educates spiritedness in courage, moderation, and adherence to the good of the city. ;In Republic V-VII, Socrates shows that philosophy and political power must be combined. Spiritedness must recognize the authority of reason to rule. The discussions of the philosopher-king, the Good, and the philosopher's education are meant to ally the spirited with the calculative. ;In Republic VIII-X, Socrates shows the pathologies of to thymoeides, judges the just man happier than the unjust, and, in an appeal to spiritedness' love of honor, restores to justice its rewards. ;Chapter Six summarizes the conclusions of the dissertation and suggests areas for future research