Ancient critics reproached Xenocrates for beginning his work on the dialectic with a discussion of voice, and until now the question why he did so has never been systematically explored. Neither do we know why Xenocrates counted syllables, as Plutarch reports, and how he arrived at such an implausibly high number. In the first part of this paper, I show that Xenocrates’ interest in voice was suggested by Plato’s discussion of letters in his later dialogues, such as the Theatetus, the (...) Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philebus. Second, a fragment from Sextus attributed to Xenocrates confirms that Xenocrates allowed for various ‘levels’ of elements, and that explains why Theuth’s method, recommended in the Philebus, is applied to syllables. Finally, I address the very possibility of knowing the actual number of syllables and words, and address some of the problems connected to the reconstruction of the mathematical argument. (shrink)

This paper argues that Protagoras’ great myth depicts human nature as both Promethean and Epimethean: human foresight depends on the condition of oversight. If Protagoras’ praise of foresight betrays his desire to overcome this condition, Socrates embraces it. While Protagoras repeats Epimetheus’ mistake of forgetting his own nature by aiming to overcome the risks of oversight, Socrates’ foresight recognizes that oversight and perplexity are intrinsic to human nature.

Aristotle and Eudemus report a Speusippean argument to the effect that defining anything requires knowing everything. Scholars have failed to make sense of this argument. This paper argues that the main preoccupations to which the Puzzle is meant to respond are: (i) to ensure the co-extensiveness of the definition with the definiendum; (ii) to rule out a particular definitional mistake—underdivision. The implications of the Puzzle for Speusippus’ conception of knowledge are further explored.

A methodological statement that occurs at Nicomachean Ethics vii 1 and its implementation in the subsequent discussion has widely been called ‘the method of endoxa’. According to the received interpretation, this method follows some strict steps and epitomizes the dialectical method of inquiry. I question the received interpretation and argue for a deflationary and non-dialectical account which, I believe, conforms with Aristotle’s scientifically oriented general methodology.

This is an impressive and important book about perception in Plato’s Timaeus, but most of its readers will probably be researchers who are interested in much broader questions about the dialogue. There is nothing deficient or lacking about this treatment of perception, but this book should be put alongside Thomas Johansen’s Plato’s Natural Philosophy and Sarah Broadie’s Nature and Divinity in the sense that this is, for all intents and purposes, a monograph about the whole Timaeus, even though it is (...) pitched as being focused on perception. There are only a few topics missing, such as the nature of the cosmic receptacle and psychic diseases. Virtually everything else, including the status of Timaeus’ so-called likely story, the generation of the lower gods, and the nature of bone, is discussed at length. (shrink)

This article examines whether vision in Plato’s Timaeus can realize its primary function of permitting humans to stabilize their misaligned orbits of intelligence by getting to know the universe’s orbits as revealed through the heavenly bodies’ movements. I consider a concern that Timaeus, while seemingly requiring nocturnal vision for this purpose, appears to preclude its possibility, thereby threatening the dialogue’s internal coherence. I then argue that Timaeus has the resources to overcome this worry and to provide a philosophically cogent account (...) of nocturnal vision. (shrink)

I re-examine the starting point of the Philebus’ description of the ‘divine method’ and argue that the vexed phrase τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι at 16c9 refers to sensibles only. In doing so, I especially stress the significance of the phrase τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων at 16d1. The proposed interpretation fits the rest of the description of the ‘divine method’, preserves the Forms’ unmixed nature and the consistency of the Philebus.

Cicero distinguishes between two forms of divination: natural and artificial divination. Most contemporary scholars assume that Cicero presents a Stoic division and some even draw far-reaching conclusions about the scientific status of divination based on this distinction. However, his justification for the division is apparently contradictory and neither fits with Stoic nor Peripatetic claims that are found elsewhere. This paper examines the exact meaning of the division and sheds light on its Stoic and Peripatetic origin. In this way, we will (...) not only be able to better understand the overall argument of Cicero’s De divinatione, but also to assess his real achievement as a philosophical author. (shrink)

This paper examines Della Rocca’s critique of Aristotle’s conception of substance. The key point of the paper is that Aristotle’s homonymy principle and concept of enformed matter undermine Della Rocca’s claim that Aristotle is subject to a John Wayne moment. (To undergo a John Wayne moment is to propose an unilluminating or empty explanation, as in Wayne’s statement ‘A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do’.).

There have been several attempts to identify what Aristotle holds as distinctive to magnificence. The most common interpretation is that magnificence is generosity of large wealth. Irwin proposes an alternative where magnificence is generosity applied to complicated common-good projects while Curzer’s alternative is that magnificence is heroic generosity. My position is that these three positions misinterpret Aristotle’s magnificence by explicitly or implicitly rejecting some of the claims that Aristotle makes.

I critically examine developmental approaches to the notion of habituation in the Nicomachean Ethics. Such approaches conceive of habituation in terms of upbringing. I challenge this view. Developmental approaches provide a restrictive view of habituation. I argue that it is possible for the habituation of character to occur after upbringing. My interpretation avoids the charge that Aristotle only granted the possibility of virtue to those who have had a good upbringing.

This paper investigates the Democritean account of human nature and sociability. After briefly discussing what the claim that human beings are social animals means, the paper analyzes two culture stories, preserved in Diodorus of Sicily and John Tzetzes, that are typically taken to be Democritean, arguing that there are prima facie significant differences between the two accounts. The paper then concludes that human beings are not social animals by nature on the Democritean view, but rather that the Democritean account belongs (...) to a different, that is, non-Aristotelian and non-Stoic, tradition of social thought. (shrink)

In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates raises the question whether piety is coextensive with justice, or a part of it (11e4-12a2; cf. 12c10-d3). Euthyphro chooses the latter option, and seeks to determine the part of justice that piety happens to be. Scholars have debated fiercely about whether Socrates shares this view (Calef 1995a; McPherran 1995; Calef 1995b). This paper argues that, if Euthyphro is to remain consistent throughout the dialogue, coextensiveness must be favored over the part-of-justice view. If this is so, then (...) the Euthyphro is also consistent with Socrates’ defense of the unity of the virtues in Plato’s Protagoras. (shrink)