Key works |
One may categorize different concepts of
realization in terms of three basic conceptual traditions. First there is a semantic
tradition whereby “to be realized” names a semantic relation, e.g.,
the satisfaction of a predicate by an object (Lewis 1972). Second there is a mathematical tradition whereby “to be realized” names a mapping or
correspondence relation, e.g., a
one-to-one mapping between the states of an abstract machine and a concrete
physical machine (Putnam 1960; Chalmers 1994). Third there is a metaphysical tradition whereby
“to be realized” names a relation of determination or inter-level production that is explanatory (LePore & Loewer 1989). Much of the interest in philosophy has been focused upon this latter tradition. The metaphysical tradition divides into several different views. To name the most prominent, there is realization by functional roles and
occupation (Lycan 1987; Papineau 1993; Melnyk 1994; Kim 1998), or broader notions of function (Polger 2004). There is realization in terms of parts and wholes or mechanistic systems (Cummins 1983; Gillett 2002, Gillett 2007; Craver 2007; Endicott 2016), and a fusion of part-whole realization with functional role and occupation realization (Endicott 2011, Endicott 2016). There is also realization as determinables and determinates (MacDonald & MacDonald 1986; Yablo 1992; Wilson 2009; Jessica 2017), and realization in terms of sets and subsets of causal powers (Wilson 1999, 2011; Shoemaker 2001, 2007). There is also a distinction between core and total realizations (Shoemaker 1981), realization by contextually sensitive INUS conditions (Endicott 1994), and core realizers within a broader metaphysical contexts (Wilson 2001). Moreover, within this spectrum of views, there are issues about the connection between concepts of realization and subsequent judgments about multiple realizability (Shapiro 2004; Gillett 2003; Aizawa & Gillett 2009; Polger & Shapiro 2016), about whether the relata of realization are particular instances or their properties (Shapiro 2008; Endicott 2010; Gillett 2011), and about whether there are different theoretical roles for different concepts of realization (Gillett 2002; Polger 2007; Endicott 2012). Finally, philosophers have argued that concepts of realization are better at preserving physicalist intuitions over concepts of supervenience (Horgan 1993; Melnyk 1994, 2003; Wilson 1999; Witmer 2001; Morris 2010), and better at explaining inter-level phenomena than some generic grounding relation (Wilson 2014, Wilson 2016). |