Quantum Nonlocality, Misc

We show that the respective oversights in the von Neumann's general theorem against all hidden variable theories and Bell's theorem against their local-realistic counterparts are homologous. When latter oversight is rectified, the bounds on the CHSH correlator work out to be ±2√2 instead of ±2.

The demonstration of a loophole-free violation of Bell's inequality by Hensen et al. (2015) leads to the inescapable conclusion that timelessness and abstractness exist alongside space-time. This finding is in full agreement with the triple-aspect monism of reality, with mathematical Platonism, free will and the eventual emergence of a scientific morality.

A classical probabilistics explanation for a typical quantum effect in Hardy's paradox is demonstrated.

In this essay we take the view that too much reality has been afforded to the notion of ‘particles’ and to ‘flow of supercurrent,’ in the superconducting state. Instead we take the original point of view of Josephson that “ It is clear that intuition is of no great help in understanding the supercurrent as a flow of Cooper pairs “ which is more akin to, and in line with, a “telegraphing of amplitudes” approach. With this conception in mind, we (...) examine the results of Jillie et al and Smith et al. of two Josephson junctions connected in series by a superconducting join. We argue that their results can best be understood in terms of the entanglement of current elements via the interfering of amplitudes. We sketch an approach to calculating the current spanning two entangled Josephson junctions, which reduces to the relation for a single junction when the current is set zero in either of the pair, or the entanglement ceases. We speculate that if this interfering of amplitudes was found to persist, after the separation of the junctions in space, there still remaining a connection in their common past, then this would furnish, at least the possibility, of a new means of signalling without wires. Experiments are suggested. (shrink)

The violation of Bell inequalities by quantum physical experiments disproves all relativistic micro causal, classically real models, short Local Realistic Models (LRM). Non-locality, the infamous “spooky interaction at a distance” (A. Einstein), is already sufficiently ‘unreal’ to motivate modifying the “realistic” in “local realistic”. This has led to many worlds and finally many minds interpretations. We introduce a simple many world model that resolves the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox. The model starts out as a classical LRM, thus clarifying that the (...) many worlds concept alone does not imply quantum physics. Some of the desired ‘non-locality’, e.g. anti-correlation at equal measurement angles, is already present, but Bell’s inequality can of course not be violated. A single and natural step turns this LRM into a quantum model predicting the correct probabilities. Intriguingly, the crucial step does obviously not modify locality but instead reality: What before could have still been a direct realism turns into modal realism. This supports the trend away from the focus on non-locality in quantum mechanics towards a mature structural realism that preserves micro causality. (shrink)

The most part of the debates on Quantum Mechanics (QM) interpretation come out from the remains of a classical language based upon waves and particles. Such problems can find a decisive clarification in Quantum Field Theory (QFT), where the concept of “classical object” is replaced by an interaction networks. On the other hand, it is simpler to discuss about non-locality in QM than in QFT. We propose here the concept of transaction as a connection between theQM and QFT language as (...) well as the possibility to introduce quantum non-locality ab initio.We also mention the cosmological consequence of a non-local archaic vacuum here defined. (shrink)

Algebraic quantum field theory (AQFT) puts forward three ``causal axioms'' that aim to characterize the theory as one that implements relativistic causation: the spectrum condition, microcausality, and primitive causality. In this paper, I aim to show, in a minimally technical way, that none of them fully explains the notion of causation appropriate for AQFT because they only capture some of the desiderata for relativistic causation I state or because it is often unclear how each axiom implements its respective desideratum. After (...) this diagnostic, I will show that a fourth condition, local primitive causality (LPC), fully characterizes relativistic causation in the sense of fulfilling all the relevant desiderata. However, it only encompasses the virtues of the other axioms because it is implied by them, as I will show from a construction by Haag and Schroer (1962). Since the conjunction of the three causal axioms implies LPC and other important results in QFT that LPC does not imply, and since LPC helps clarify some of the shortcomings of the three axioms, I advocate for a holistic interpretation of how the axioms characterize the causal structure of AQFT against the strategy in the literature to rivalize the axioms and privilege one among them. (shrink)

The violation of Bell’s inequality has shown that quantum theory and relativity are in tension: reality is nonlocal. Nonetheless, many have argued that GRW-type theories are to be preferred to pilot-wave theories as they are more compatible with relativity: while relativistic pilot-wave theories require a preferred slicing of space-time, foliation-free relativistic GRW-type theories have been proposed. In this paper I discuss various meanings of ‘relativistic invariance,’ and I show how GRW-type theories, while being more relativistic in one sense, are less (...) relativistic in another. If so, the initial claim that GRW-type theories have a greater compatibility with relativity is unwarranted: both type of theories violate relativity, one way or another. (shrink)

Entanglement measures quantify the amount of quantum entanglement that is contained in quantum states. Typically, different entanglement measures do not have to be partially ordered. The presence of a definite partial order between two entanglement measures for all quantum states, however, allows for meaningful conceptualization of sensitivity to entanglement, which will be greater for the entanglement measure that produces the larger numerical values. Here, we have investigated the partial order between the normalized versions of four entanglement measures based on Schmidt (...) decomposition of bipartite pure quantum states, namely, concurrence, tangle, entanglement robustness and Schmidt number. We have shown that among those four measures, the concurrence and the Schmidt number have the highest and the lowest sensitivity to quantum entanglement, respectively. Further, we have demonstrated how these measures could be used to track the dynamics of quantum entanglement in a simple quantum toy model composed of two qutrits. Lastly, we have employed state-dependent entanglement statistics to compute measurable correlations between the outcomes of quantum observables in agreement with the uncertainty principle. The presented results could be helpful in quantum applications that require monitoring of the available quantum resources for sharp identification of temporal points of maximal entanglement or system separability. (shrink)

Panpsychism has many sides in common with Jung and Pauli's thinking, and analytical psychology is also a form of panpsychism. In this article we want to lay the foundations for a psychophysics that has an adequate onto-epistemology for the complex phenomenology of the relationship between quantum physics and consciousness. This onto-epistemology is a monism in which an informational-spiritual atemporal dimension, completely entangled in itself and teleologically anthropic, precedes and “informs” instantaneously and constantly matter-energy, space-time and consciousness.

The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case that common sense in fact favors (...) the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal “action at a distance”. Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation. (shrink)

The thesis of this paper is that panpsychism theory is very close to jungian theory, especially thinking of the quantum psychoid aspects of C.G.Jung and W.Pauli theory: a psyche that touches matter and matter with a “latent psyche”. The two theories seem to describe the same reality, an animation of matter in a spiritual sense, as the jungian Self seems to do at a higher level.The complexity theory appears instead to be a description of reality still nomothetic.

Introduction The EDWs perspective, a new general framework of thinking for all physicists! “The present situation in physics is as if we know chess, but we don't know one or two rules.” Richard Feynman In other works (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016; Vacariu and Vacariu 2010, 2016a, 2016b), we have showed that the greatest illusion of human knowledge is the notion of “world”, of “uni-verse”, or as we called it, the “Unicorn-world”, and this notion has survived from (...) the oldest times until today. In these works, we have indicated that the “world”, the “Universe” does not exist, but the “Epistemologically Different Worlds” (EDWs) exist (more specifically, for many EDWs, it is about the entities and the interactions which really exist and only represent these EDWs). We emphasize that the EDWs perspective is a new Copernican revolution in human thinking, the greatest movement in Physics, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Philosophy! During the past 15 years, we have applied the EDW paradigm to the main particular sciences and main theories in physics (quantum mechanics, Einstein’s special and general relativity, and the relationship between them), cognitive science (to the main theories like computationalism, connectionism, and the dynamical system approach), cognitive neuroscience, and biology (just to the relationship between life and organism/cell). Also, we showed that the entire Philosophy since Ancient period until now is totally wrong (just because, all philosophical approaches have been constructed within the “Unicorn-world”). This book closes the circle of great topics concerning the main particular sciences (physics, cognitive (neuro)science, and biology) and philosophy grasped in all our previous books (2008-2016): it is about the relationship between the main theories and concepts of Physics vs. the EDWs perspective! The main theories that we investigate in this and our previous works have been created within the Unicorn-world, therefore, all these approaches have been quite wrong. Some of these theories have been partially re-write in our previous books (Einstein both relativities, thermodynamics, and our EDWs perspective, see Vacariu and Vacariu 2016, 2017, etc.), but even some notions of these theories were wrong. For instance, in our previous book (2016), we indicated that “spacetime” cannot even exist (spacetime cannot have any kind of ontology!). Therefore, in 2017, re-wrote Einstein’s both relativities without “spacetime”. The majority of theories in Physics have been created within the unicorn world and therefore these theories have been quite wrong or at least the authors of these scientific theories have been used wrong concepts. This book is a collections of our previous ideas, but we strongly emphasize that some of these idea are quite developed in this work. Therefore, this book can be labeled as: “a philosopher overwriting Physics within a new paradigm, the ‘Epistemologically Different World’ (EDWs) perspective”! We emphasize that some parts of this book are from our previous works (but even so, these parts are modified, we added new paragraphs or sub-chapters), but some parts are new written. In general, the new details of this book are the results of following Presura’s book about Physics (2014) written in Romanian. His book is a general overview of the main theories in Physics. Presura is a physicist who wrote a book about these theories in a quite easy language for large public (also for philosophers). There are quite many paragraphs from Presura’s book that are quoted in our book. We emphasize that Presura’s paragraphs inserted in our book are our translations. Also, we inserted quite many of his ideas but we mentioned his name each time. We apologize if some notions or ideas are wrong translated. The first Chapter is about the EDWs perspective. In Chapter 2, we introduce more details about the rejection of “spacetime”. In Chapter 3, we insert the ideas from our book Vacariu and Vacariu 2017 about Einstein’s relativity without “spacetime”. However, new paragraphs are introduced in this chapter. In Chapter 4, we are indicating that all alternatives of quantum mechanics have been wrong: parts of this chapter are from our previous works, other parts and paragraphs are new ideas/comments. In Chapter 5, we discuss about the Grand Unified Theory (GUT) and the Theory of Everything (TOE), Big Bang (transformed, according to the EDWs perspective, in many Big Bangs – in this way, we avoid Alan Guth’s empty notion of “inflation” which contradict Einstein’s principle of constant speed of light which cannot be surpassed by anything else). In Chapter 6, we introduce an updated version about the dark matter and the dark energy (in 2016, we published a book about “dark matter/energy, space and time and other pseudo-notions in Cosmology” and in 2020 we published a chapter in a book edited by the physicist Michael Smith - see the bibliography. We mention that, in that book, except our chapter, all the other chapters are written by physicists!). For instance, in section 6.4, we introduce a new alternative to dark energy and dark matter, an alternative that is different even from this updated approach! In Chapter 7, we furnish more details about the non-existence of “hyperspace” and the futility of the “superstring theory”. In Chapter 8 in indicate the clear great distinction between our EDWs and Primas and Atmanspascher’s approach (under Spinoza’s “dual aspects” approach and Bohr’s “complementarity” constructed within the unicorn world). In the last chapter, chapter 9, we analysis Rovelli’s rejection of “spacetime” (based on Einstein’s general relativity) within the unicorn world. We rejected the ontology of “spacetime”, but our argument is totally different than Rovelli’s argument. Moreover, we indicate that Rovelli’s argument is quite wrong, constructed within the unicorn world. As a conclusion, we emphasize that we have overwritten the main theories, ideas and concepts of Physics within the new Copernican framework of thinking, the EDWs perspective. The umbrella under which we have been working indicates that the great problems of Physics are pseudo-problems constructed within the wrong framework, the “Unicorn world” (the Universe/world) which does not really exist. Therefore, we have to replace the unicorn world with the EDWs! At the end of our Introduction, we mention that that have been many physicists, cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers who have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to our ideas long time after our ideas being published!).[ Discovering the EDWs, Gabriel Vacariu HAS CHANGED EVERYTHING in human knowledge! His EDWs is the greatest CHALLENGE in the history of human thinking. Many people have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to our ideas long time after we published and posted our first works on Internet. About the UNBELIEVABLE SIMILARITIES here: academia researchgate philpapers All our main ideas (the mind-brain problem, main problems of cognitive science and quantum mechanics, Einstein’s relativity vs. quantum mechanics, etc.) from my Springer’s book (2016) can be found in my PhD thesis (2007), UNSW (Sydney, Australia, posted on university’s website, free, by the university’s team in 2007) unsworks.unsw.... Nobody discovered the EDWs during 2500 years, Gabriel Vacariu discovered them in 2002 (first publication), 2003 and 2005. Amazing, in the last years, many people also “discovered” the existence of EDWs! Statistically, it is quite impossible, so many people (hundreds!) to “discover” the EDWs! (Don’t forget, we have been working within the Internet’s world, therefore, communication is much faster than 20 years ago...) “I don't care that they stole my idea. I care that they don't have any of their own… The present is theirs; the future, for which I really worked, is mine.” (Nikolai Tesla) What these authors have been missing comparing with Gabriel Vacariu? They have been either physicists or cognitive neuroscientists or philosophers while Gabriel Vacariu is a philosopher working Cognitive Neuroscience and Physics! This is the main reason they have been unable to discover the EDWs and to think and write the “Metaphysics of EDWs” (our book 2019)!] It is not something surprising since the EDWs has changed everything in human knowledge! Therefore, we end this chapter with this paragraph: “The distance between the pioneers and the much smaller followers becomes so great that the latter cannot reach the former; the age of servile imitation begins – yet not of nature, but of the style of the great masters, zealous copyists remove the labels from the elixirs of the Magi and put them on their vials.” (Arnold Gehlen, Images of time). (shrink)

A recent paper from Brun et al. has argued that access to a closed timelike curve would allow for the possibility of perfectly distinguishing nonorthogonal quantum states. This result can be used to develop a protocol for instantaneous nonlocal signaling. Several commenters have argued that nonlocal signaling must fail in this and in similar cases, often citing consistency with relativity as the justification. I argue that this objection fails to rule out nonlocal signaling in the presence of a CTC. I (...) argue that the reason these authors are motivated to exclude the prediction of nonlocal signaling is because the No Signaling principle is considered to a fundamental part of the formulation of the quantum information approach. I draw out the relationship between nonlocal signaling, quantum information, and relativity, and argue that the principle theory formulation of quantum mechanics, which is at the foundation of the quantum information approach, is in tension with foundational assumptions of Deutsch’s D-CTC model, on which this protocol is based. (shrink)

Experiments involving delayed-choice entanglement swapping seem to suggest that particles can become entangled after they’ve already been detected. This astonishing result is taken by some to undermine realism about entanglement. In this paper, I argue that one can offer a fully realist explanation of delayed-choice entanglement swapping by countenancing timelike entanglement relations. I argue that such an explanation—radical though it may be—isn’t incoherent and doesn’t invite paradox. I compare this approach to the antirealist alternative and a more deflationary realist strategy (...) defended by Egg, each of which face certain challenges. The upshot is that we should take seriously the possibility of timelike entanglement and seek to develop a framework for quantum theory which allows for it. (shrink)

We argue that causal decision theory is no worse off than evidential decision theory in handling entanglement, regardless of one’s preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. In recent works, Ahmed and Ahmed and Caulton : 4315–4352, 2014) have claimed the opposite; we argue that they are mistaken. Bell-type experiments are not instances of Newcomb problems, so CDT and EDT do not diverge in their recommendations. We highlight the fact that a Causal Decision Theorist should take all lawlike correlations into account, including (...) potentially acausal entanglement correlations. This paper also provides a brief introduction to CDT with a motivating “small” Newcomb problem. The main point of our argument is that quantum theory does not provide grounds for favouring EDT over CDT. (shrink)

Recent experiments allowed concluding that Bell-type inequalities are indeed violated thus it is important to understand what it means and how can we explain the existence of strong correlations between outcomes of distant measurements. Do we have to announce that: Einstein was wrong, Nature is nonlocal and nonlocal correlations are produced due to the quantum magic and emerge, somehow, from outside space-time? Fortunately such conclusions are unfounded because if supplementary parameters describing measuring instruments are correctly incorporated in a theoretical model (...) then Bell-type inequalities may not be proven .We construct a simple probabilistic model explaining these correlations in a locally causal way. In our model measurement outcomes are neither predetermined nor produced in irreducibly random way. We explain in detail why, contrary to the general belief; an introduction of setting dependent parameters does not restrict experimenters’ freedom of choice. Since the violation of Bell-type inequalities does not allow concluding that Nature is nonlocal and that quantum theory is complete thus the Bohr-Einstein quantum debate may not be closed. The continuation of this debate is not only important for a better understanding of Nature but also for various practical applications of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

What are quantum entities? Is the quantum domain deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) fails to answer these two fundamental questions. As a result of failing to answer the first question, OQT is very seriously defective: it is imprecise, ambiguous, ad hoc, non-explanatory, inapplicable to the early universe, inapplicable to the cosmos as a whole, and such that it is inherently incapable of being unified with general relativity. It is argued that probabilism provides a very natural solution to the (...) quantum wave/particle dilemma and promises to lead to a fully micro-realistic, testable version of quantum theory that is free of the defects of OQT. It is suggested that inelastic interactions may induce quantum probabilistic transitions. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will discuss what it takes for a dynamical collapse theory to provide a reasonable description of the actual world. I will start with discussions of what is required, in general, of the ontology of a physical theory, and then apply it to the quantum case. One issue of interest is whether a collapse theory can be a quantum state monist theory, adding nothing to the quantum state and changing only its dynamics. Although this was one of (...) the motivations for advancing such theories, its viability has been questioned, and it has been argued that, in order to provide an account of the world, a collapse theory must supplement the quantum state with additional ontology, making such theories more like hidden-variables theories than would first appear. I will make a case for quantum state monism as an adequate ontology, and, indeed, the only sensible ontology for collapse theories. This will involve taking dynamical variables to possess, not sharp values, as in classical physics, but distributions of values. (shrink)

We consider essential the need to integrate the causalistic nomothetic scientific approach with an unavoidable acausal finalistic approach. We come to consider too that it is precisely the psychoanalytic sphere that contributes decisively to this redefinition within the epistemology of science.

There is a fallacy that is often involved in the interpretation of quantum experiments involving a certain type of separation such as the: double-slit experiments, which-way interferometer experiments, polarization analyzer experiments, Stern-Gerlach experiments, and quantum eraser experiments. The fallacy leads not only to flawed textbook accounts of these experiments but to flawed inferences about retrocausality in the context of delayed choice versions of separation experiments.

The thesis of the paper maintains it is impossible to disregard a change in the statue of analytical psychology involving the notion of psychoid and its correlation to quantum physics, being psyche not separable from matter. This change finds its most accomplished and impressive epicentre in C.G. Jung and W. Pauli’s theory of synchronicity, in which the Jungian Self becomes the psyche’s quantum psychoid regulatory center, in a Spiritual sense.

Using a quantum logic approach we analyze the structure of the so-called non-signaling theories respecting relativistic causality, but allowing correlations violating bounds imposed by quantum mechanics such as CHSH inequality. We discuss the relations among such theories, quantum mechanics, and classical physics. Our main result is the construction of a probability theory adequate for the simplest instance of a non-signaling theory—the two non-signaling boxes world—in which we exhibit its differences in comparison with classical and quantum probabilities. We show that the (...) question of whether such a theory can be treated as a kind of 'generalization' of the quantum theory of the two-qubit system cannot be answered positively. Some of its features put it closer to the quantum world—on the one hand, for example, the measurements are destructive, though on the other hand the Heisenberg uncertainty relations are not satisfied. Another interesting property contrasting it from quantum mechanics is that the subset of 'classically correlated states', i.e. the states with only classical correlations, does not reproduce the classical world of the two two-state systems. Our results establish a new link between quantum information theory and the well-developed theory of quantum logics. (shrink)

Bellʼs 1964 theorem causes a severe problem for the notion that correlations require explanation, encapsulated in Reichenbachʼs principle of common cause. Despite being a hallmark of scientific thought, dropping the principle has been widely regarded as much less bitter medicine than the perceived alternative—dropping relativistic causality. Recently, however, some authors have proposed that modified forms of Reichenbachʼs principle could be maintained even with relativistic causality. Here we break down Reichenbachʼs principle into two independent assumptions—the principle of common cause proper and (...) factorization of probabilities. We show how Bellʼs theorem can be derived from these two assumptions plus relativistic causality and the law of total probability for actual events, and we review proposals to drop each of these assumptions in light of the theorem. In particular, we show that the non-commutative common causes of Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés fail to have an analogue of the notion that the common causes can explain the observed correlations. Moreover, we show that their definition can be satisfied trivially by any quantum product state for any quantum correlations. We also discuss how the conditional states approach of Leifer and Spekkens fares in this regard. (shrink)

On October 24th, 1927, the world's most important physicists met in Brussels for what is known as the fifth edition of the Solvay Conference. The focus of the discussion was the new Quantum Mechanics, to which most of the people present at the meeting had contributed but about which they had contrasting opinions. On the one hand, Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg claimed they had provided the new science with a definite structure, not subject to further modifications, while on the (...) other, eminent figures such as Erwin Schrodinger and Albert Einstein believed that the theories put forward by the so called Copenhagen School, of which Bohr and Heisenberg were the most important exponents, were incorrect or at least incomplete. (shrink)

What we've considered so far about the epistemology of human sciences comes up again as to the concept of "destiny''and human free will: who "must" tell us if we are destined or not? Either Neuroscientists or sociologists? Either Philosophers or biochemists? Has psychology anything to say? Do we need a pool to gather them all? Many other questions come up: what determines us and how much? ls there any sense in talking about destiny? We are a complex system and our (...) conscience is an epiphenomenon of a unitary hierarchical system: would this exclude any possibility of choice? And what does "free choice" mean? And what about the consequences on the ethics? Being Jung and Pauli’s thought a reference point, might we outline a comprehensive reading as regards such problems, even thinking of a sort of quantum psychoid free will? (shrink)

An analysis of the physical implications of abstractness reveals the reality of three interconnected modes of existence: abstract, virtual and concrete, corresponding in physics to information, energy and matter. This triple-aspect monism clarifies the ontological status of subatomic quantum particles. It also provides a non-spooky solution to the weirdness of quantum physics and a new outlook for the mind-body problem. The ontological implications are profound for both physics and philosophy.

This is the first of two papers reviewing and analysing the approach to locality and to mind-body dualism proposed in Everett interpreta- tions of quantum mechanics. The planned companion paper will focus on the contemporary decoherence-based approaches to Everett. This paper instead treats the explicitly mentalistic Many Minds Interpreta- tion proposed by David Albert and Barry Loewer (Albert and Loewer 1988). In particular, we investigate what kind of supervenience of the mind on the body is implied by Albert and Loewer’s (...) Many Minds In- terpretation, and how the interpretation of the related ‘mindless hulks’ problem affects the issue of locality within this interpretation. (shrink)

A mathematical rigorous definition of EPR states has been introduced by Arens and Varadarajan for finite dimensional systems, and extended by Werner to general systems. In the present paper we follow a definition of EPR states due to Werner. Then we show that an EPR state for incommensurable pairs is Bell correlated, and that the set of EPR states for incommensurable pairs is norm dense between two strictly space-like separated regions in algebraic quantum field theory.

The text is a continuation of the article of the same name published in the previous issue of Philosophical Alternatives. The philosophical interpretations of the Kochen- Specker theorem (1967) are considered. Einstein's principle regarding the,consubstantiality of inertia and gravity" (1918) allows of a parallel between descriptions of a physical micro-entity in relation to the macro-apparatus on the one hand, and of physical macro-entities in relation to the astronomical mega-entities on the other. The Bohmian interpretation ( 1952) of quantum mechanics proposes (...) that all quantum systems be interpreted as dissipative ones and that the theorem be thus derstood. The conclusion is that the continual representation, by force or (gravitational) field between parts interacting by means of it, of a system is equivalent to their mutual entanglement if representation is discrete. Gravity (force field) and entanglement are two different, correspondingly continual and discrete, images of a single common essence. General relativity can be interpreted as a superluminal generalization of special relativity. The postulate exists of an alleged obligatory difference between a model and reality in science and philosophy. It can also be deduced by interpreting a corollary of the heorem. On the other hand, quantum mechanics, on the basis of this theorem and of V on Neumann's (1932), introduces the option that a model be entirely identified as the modeled reality and, therefore, that absolutely reality be recognized: this is a non-standard hypothesis in the epistemology of science. Thus, the true reality begins to be understood mathematically, i.e. in a Pythagorean manner, for its identification with its mathematical model. A few linked problems are highlighted: the role of the axiom of choice forcorrectly interpreting the theorem; whether the theorem can be considered an axiom; whether the theorem can be considered equivalent to the negation of the axiom. (shrink)

Non-commuting quantities and hidden parameters – Wave-corpuscular dualism and hidden parameters – Local or nonlocal hidden parameters – Phase space in quantum mechanics – Weyl, Wigner, and Moyal – Von Neumann’s theorem about the absence of hidden parameters in quantum mechanics and Hermann – Bell’s objection – Quantum-mechanical and mathematical incommeasurability – Kochen – Specker’s idea about their equivalence – The notion of partial algebra – Embeddability of a qubit into a bit – Quantum computer is not Turing machine – (...) Is continuality universal? – Diffeomorphism and velocity – Einstein’s general principle of relativity – „Mach’s principle“ – The Skolemian relativity of the discrete and the continuous – The counterexample in § 6 of their paper – About the classical tautology which is untrue being replaced by the statements about commeasurable quantum-mechanical quantities – Logical hidden parameters – The undecidability of the hypothesis about hidden parameters – Wigner’s work and и Weyl’s previous one – Lie groups, representations, and psi-function – From a qualitative to a quantitative expression of relativity − psi-function, or the discrete by the random – Bartlett’s approach − psi-function as the characteristic function of random quantity – Discrete and/ or continual description – Quantity and its “digitalized projection“ – The idea of „velocity−probability“ – The notion of probability and the light speed postulate – Generalized probability and its physical interpretation – A quantum description of macro-world – The period of the as-sociated de Broglie wave and the length of now – Causality equivalently replaced by chance – The philosophy of quantum information and religion – Einstein’s thesis about “the consubstantiality of inertia ant weight“ – Again about the interpretation of complex velocity – The speed of time – Newton’s law of inertia and Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics – Force and effect – The theory of tachyons and general relativity – Riesz’s representation theorem – The notion of covariant world line – Encoding a world line by psi-function – Spacetime and qubit − psi-function by qubits – About the physical interpretation of both the complex axes of a qubit – The interpretation of the self-adjoint operators components – The world line of an arbitrary quantity – The invariance of the physical laws towards quantum object and apparatus – Hilbert space and that of Minkowski – The relationship between the coefficients of -function and the qubits – World line = psi-function + self-adjoint operator – Reality and description – Does a „curved“ Hilbert space exist? – The axiom of choice, or when is possible a flattening of Hilbert space? – But why not to flatten also pseudo-Riemannian space? – The commutator of conjugate quantities – Relative mass – The strokes of self-movement and its philosophical interpretation – The self-perfection of the universe – The generalization of quantity in quantum physics – An analogy of the Feynman formalism – Feynman and many-world interpretation – The psi-function of various objects – Countable and uncountable basis – Generalized continuum and arithmetization – Field and entanglement – Function as coding – The idea of „curved“ Descartes product – The environment of a function – Another view to the notion of velocity-probability – Reality and description – Hilbert space as a model both of object and description – The notion of holistic logic – Physical quantity as the information about it – Cross-temporal correlations – The forecasting of future – Description in separable and inseparable Hilbert space – „Forces“ or „miracles“ – Velocity or time – The notion of non-finite set – Dasein or Dazeit – The trajectory of the whole – Ontological and onto-theological difference – An analogy of the Feynman and many-world interpretation − psi-function as physical quantity – Things in the world and instances in time – The generation of the physi-cal by mathematical – The generalized notion of observer – Subjective or objective probability – Energy as the change of probability per the unite of time – The generalized principle of least action from a new view-point – The exception of two dimensions and Fermat’s last theorem. (shrink)

he paper addresses the issue of the applicability of David Lewis’s possible world semantics of counterfactual conditionals to the explication of some quantum-mechanical phenomena. Three main reasons why counterfactual semantics may be useful for this task are given. It is further argued that two possible semantic approaches to counterfactuals involving spatiotemporal events which satisfy requirements of special relativity should be taken into account. The main problem considered in the article is how to expand both approaches into full semantic systems. The (...) first of the approaches is known to be amenable to a generalization within the Lewis-style semantics. The second one, however, poses a greater challenge, as it has been proven (Bigaj 2004) that it cannot be incorporated into a similarity-based counterfactual semantics. In this article, an alternative method of generalization for the second counterfactual semantics is developed, which goes beyond Lewis’s framework based on the rigid similarity relation between possible worlds. The proposed method of evaluating counterfactuals is then put to the test using an example from the quantum theory. As a result of this test, a small correction of the method turns out to be necessary. (shrink)

In this brief paper, starting from recent works, we analyze from conceptual point of view this basic question: can be the nature of quantum entangled states interpreted ontologically or epistemologically? According some works, the degrees of freedom of quantum systems permit us to establish a possible classification between factorizables and entangled states. We suggest, that the "choice" of degree of freedom, even if mathematically justified introduces epistemic element, not only in the systems but also in their classification. We retain, instead, (...) that there are not two classes of quantum states, entangled and factorizables, but only a single classes of states: the entangled states. In fact, the factorizable states become entangled for a different choice of their degrees of freedom. In the same way, there are not partitions of quantum system which have an ontological superior status with respect to any other. For all these reasons, both mathematical tools utilized are responsible of improper classification of quantum systems. Finally, we argue that we cannot speak about a classification of quantum systems: all the quantum states exhibit a unique objective nature, they are all entangled states. (shrink)

The 1964 theorem of John Bell shows that no model that reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics can simultaneously satisfy the assumptions of locality and determinism. On the other hand, the assumptions of signal locality plus predictability are also sufficient to derive Bell inequalities. This simple theorem, previously noted but published only relatively recently by Masanes, Acin and Gisin, has fundamental implications not entirely appreciated. Firstly, nothing can be concluded about the ontological assumptions of locality or determinism independently of each (...) other—it is possible to reproduce quantum mechanics with deterministic models that violate locality as well as indeterministic models that satisfy locality. On the other hand, the operational assumption of signal locality is an empirically testable (and well-tested) consequence of relativity. Thus Bell inequality violations imply that we can trust that some events are fundamentally unpredictable, even if we cannot trust that they are indeterministic. This result grounds the quantum-mechanical prohibition of arbitrarily accurate predictions on the assumption of no superluminal signalling, regardless of any postulates of quantum mechanics. It also sheds a new light on an early stage of the historical debate between Einstein and Bohr. (shrink)

A Geometrical Approach to Quantum Information.

Neutron matter-wave optics provides the basis for new quantum experiments and a step towards applications of quantum phenomena. Most experiments have been performed with a perfect crystal neutron interferometer where widely separated coherent beams can be manipulated individually. Various geometric phases have been measured and their robustness against fluctuation effects has been proven, which may become a useful property for advanced quantum communication. Quantum contextuality for single particle systems shows that quantum correlations are to some extent more demanding than classical (...) ones. In this case entanglement between external and internal degrees of freedom offers new insights into basic laws of quantum physics. Non-contextuality hidden variable theories can be rejected by arguments based on the Kochen-Specker theorem. (shrink)

I present a discussion of some open issues in the philosophy of space-time theories. Emphasis is put on the ontological nature of space and time, the relation between determinism and predictability, the origin of irreversible processes in an expanding Universe, and the compatibility of relativity and quantum mechanics. In particular, I argue for a Parmenidean view of time and change, I make clear the difference between ontological determinism and predictability, propose that the origin of the asymmetry observed in physical processes (...) is related to the existence of cosmological horizons, and present a non-local concept of causality that can accommodate both special relativity and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

Quantum theory offers mathematical descriptions of measurable phenomena with great facility and accuracy, but it provides absolutely no understanding of why any particular quantum outcome is observed. It is the province of genuine explanations to tell us how things actually work—that is, why such descriptions hold and why such predictions are true. Quantum theory is long on the what, both mathematically and observationally, but almost completely silent on the how and the why. What is even more interesting is that, in (...) some sense, this state of affairs seems to be a necessary consequence of the empirical adequacy of quantum descriptions. One of the most noteworthy achievements of quantum theory is the accurate prediction of phenomena that, on pain of experimental contradiction, have no physical explanation. It is the purpose of this essay to make clear why quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are complete physical descriptions that describe the metaphysical incompleteness of the physical world, then to press the negative implications of this fact for naturalistic metaphysics. (shrink)

А necessary and sllmcient condilion that а given proposition (о Ье provable in such а theory that allows (о Ье assigned to the proposition а Gödеl пunbег fог containing Реanо arithmetic is that Gödеl number itself. This is tlle sense о[ Martin LöЬ's theorem (1955). Now wе сan рut several philosophpllical questions. Is the Gödеl numbег of а propositional formula necessarily finite or onthe contrary? What would the Gödel number of а theorem be containing Реanо arithmetic itself? That is the (...) case of the so-called first incolnpleteness theorem (Gбdеl 1931). What would the Gödеl питЬег of а self-referential statement be? What w'ould the Gödеl пumbег оГ such а proposition Ье (its Реanо arithmetic expression after encoding contains itself as ап operand)? What is the Gödеl numbег оГ Gödеl's proposition [R(q); q] that states its ргоper imргоvаbility? It is the key statement for his proving of the first incompleteness theorem. Is Реапо arithmetic available in it (ог in the ones similar to it) as а single symbol, Ьу which actual infinity would bе introduced, ог as а constructively infinite set of primary signs? Jn fact, the Gödel number оГ the first incompleteness theorem should Ье infinite in that last case. If the Gödеl number of а statement is infinite, then сап it bе accepted as а theorem? What would the Gбdеl numbeг of its negation bе? Is the infinite Gбdеl numbeг of а statement equivalent to its irresolvability? Respectively, is Ihe following statement valid: irresolvable pгopositions with finite Gбdеl numbers (еуеп in anу encoding) do поl exist? (shrink)

How much of philosophical, scientific, and political thought is caught up with the idea of continuity? What if it were otherwise? This paper experiments with the disruption of continuity. The reader is invited to participate in a performance of spacetime (re)configurings that are more akin to how electrons experience the world than any journey narrated though rhetorical forms that presume actors move along trajectories across a stage of spacetime (often called history). The electron is here invoked as our host, an (...) interesting body to inhabit (not in order to inspire contemplation of flat-footed analogies between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ worlds, concepts that already presume a given spatial scale), but a way of thinking with and through dis/continuity – a dis/orienting experience of the dis/jointedness of time and space, entanglements of here and there, now and then, that is, a ghostly sense of dis/continuity, a quantum dis/continuity. There is no overarching sense of temporality, of continuity, in place. Each scene diffracts various temporalities within and across the field of spacetimemattering. Scenes never rest, but are reconfigured within, dispersed across, and threaded through one another. The hope is that what comes across in this dis/jointed movement is a felt sense of différance, of intra-activity, of agential separability – differentiatings that cut together/apart – that is the hauntological nature of quantum entanglements. (shrink)

This brief paper argue about a possible philosophical description of the implicate order starting from a simple theoretical experiment. Utilizing an EPR source and the human eyes of a "single" person, we try to investigate the philosophical and physical implications of quantum entanglement in terms of implicate order. We know, that most specialists still disagree on the exact number of photons required to trigger a neural response, although there will be many technical challenges, we assume that neural response will be (...) achieved in some way. The objective of paper is to investigate possible links between: quantum mechanics, quantum cognitive science, brain and mind. At the moment, the questions are more than the answers. We argue that we are perennially immersed in the implicate order and that the "real path" of quantum entanglement process is from the implicate order towards explicate order, not vice versa. Finally, we speculate about the common ground between the implicate order and chitta. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the existence of joint probabilities for the Bell-type and GHZ entangled states. We then propose the usage of nonmonotonic upper probabilities as a tool to derive consistent joint upper probabilities for the contextual hidden variables. Finally, we show that for the extreme example of no error, the GHZ state allows for the definition of a joint upper probability that is consistent with the strong correlations.

Teller argued that violations of Bell’s inequalities are to be explained by interpreting quantum entangled systems according to ‘relational holism’, that is, by postulating that they exhibit irreducible (‘inherent’) relations. Teller also suggested a possible application of this idea to quantum statistics. However, the basic proposal was not explained in detail nor has the additional idea about statistics been articulated in further work. In this article, I reconsider relational holism, amending it and spelling it out as appears necessary for a (...) proper assessment, and application, of the position. †To contact the author, please write to: FB Philosophie‐Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Universitätstraße 10, 78464, Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: matteo.morganti@uni ‐konstanz.de. (shrink)

The contention discussed here, is that one might be able to get around the puzzle contained in the results of Kim and Chan:— That a quantity of inertial mass is effectively lost, (a so called non-classical-rotational inertia NCRI,) but that being a “supersolid” there is no path for the normal fraction to slip past the 1 – 2 % supersolid fraction, which (it is supposed) remains stationary within the annulus. As a solution we argue that the effective loss of inertial (...) mass might be a real loss of inertial mass– that it might be intrinsic to a supersolid or superfluid “pool,” (a portion which has gone supersolid or superfluid.) In this way the puzzle would be resolved because the normal part and the supersolid part do not need to slip past each other in order to produce the experimental results. (shrink)

Hofer-Szabo, Redei and Szabo (Int. J. Theor. Phys. 39:913–919, 2000) defined Reichenbach’s common cause of two correlated events in an orthomodular lattice. In the present paper it is shown that if logical independent elements in an atomless and complete orthomodular lattice correlate, a common cause of the correlated elements always exists.

It so happens that classical physical theories can be interpreted as a representation of local interactions between systems with determinate properties. Orthodox quantum mechanics, which is one of our most experimentally well-confirmed theories, is notoriously resistant to being interpreted in terms of the above framework. Bell-type theorems and Bell-type experiments have made such an interpretation impossible. In the early sixties, John Bell demonstrated that any theory that represents its domain in terms of the above framework satisfies a set of inequalities, (...) the so-called Bell inequalities. Experiments on quantum phenomena violate Bell-type inequalities. By a simple modus tollens, the upshot is that no theory that includes all the elements of the above framework can recover all statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. Philosophers have been trying to interpret this result, that is, to understand what the world might be like if it is true that physical interactions between systems are non-local, or that physical systems do not possess determinate properties. This line of thought found its climax in program of Òexperimental metaphysicsÓ that developed after the violation of Bell-type inequalities was observed. Experimental metaphysics consists in deriving metaphysical conclusions from the Bell-type experimental results. The mainstream interpretation within experimental metaphysics is that Bell-type experiments force us to accept the existence of a form of non-locality at the ontological level, but a form that we can consider benign because it is of a non-causal type. In my dissertation, I assess to what extent philosophical investigation can help us decide what the world is like on the basis of our best physical theories, from the point of view of the quantum domain and with an emphasis on Bell-type phenomena. My conclusions point to a more modest view on the possible achievements of philosophy of physics than the experimental metaphysics program would have us believe. In the first part of my dissertation, I investigate what role philosophy of physics can legitimately hope to play in the development and evaluation of various accounts of quantum phenomena. I claim that it is not the role of philosophy of physics to impose criteria of acceptability on physical theories, in addition to coherence and empirical adequacy. By contrast, I take in my dissertation that the legitimate role of philosophy of physics is to clearly determine what is imposed by the phenomena and our best theories from what is a matter of preference on the basis of the structural analysis of the phenomena and theories. In the second part of my dissertation, I turn to the more specific case of the interpretation of Bell-type theorems and Bell-type phenomena. I undertake a systematic examination of the mainstream interpretation. I show that the mainstream interpretation includes three claims, one about locality, another one about causation and a last one about holism. I utilize theories of locality and causation in order to assess these three claims. On the one hand, the upshot of my analysis is that the claim about locality can be supported by a rigorous theory of locality. On the other hand, no theory of probabilistic causation can support the claims of the mainstream interpretation about causation when it is construed as a strong program of experimental metaphysics yielding conclusions about the ontology of the world. That said, weakened versions of the mainstream interpretation, those that do without conclusions about the ontology of the world, can be made compatible with some theories of probabilistic causation. In particular, the mainstream interpretation can be rigorously supported if its claims are restricted to the empirical level. (shrink)

If a specific question has meaning, it must be possible to find operations by which an answer may be given to it. It will be found in many cases that the operations cannot exist, and the question therefore has no meaning. —Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics..