Husserl: Social and Political Philosophy

This paper proposes to show an elective affinity between the attempt to construct a transcendence within immanence; both in the writings of Descartes and in the Cartesian strain in the philosophy of Husserl and the revolutionary sensibility, that is, the attempt to render history transparent to itself, delivered from division, conflict, and politics. It views the work of Lukács in History and Class-Consciousness as the link between the two. It concludes by evoking Merleau-Ponty’s critique of both the completed reduction and (...) our class-consciousness as the bearer of the rationality of history. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the relation between phenomenology and philosophical anthropology by analyzing it in the selected, theoretical as well as historical contexts. The author focuses primarily on the problem of Edmund Husserl’s criticism of anthropologism and analyzes the practical meaning of the rejection by him of anthropology as a true foundation of philosophy. The thesis of the paper is that already by rejecting anthropologism in the logic and theory of knowledge, Husserl (...) presupposed some idea of philosophical anthropology in the “foundational” sense he criticized, and that this implicit idea was pursued by him not only from pure theoretical reason. In reference to Leszek Kołakowski and the methodology of the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas, which he applies in his interpretation of the idea of phenomenology, the author of the article attempts, unlike Kołakowski, to reveal not only the “religious”, but also the specific political meaning of this idea. What is argued here is that the only possible reconciliation between anti-anthropologism on the one hand and the outspoken humanism of transcendental phenomenology on the other lies in the adoption by Husserl of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s ideal of humanity as its practical, worldview framework. The practical, if not directly political, motif of Husserl’s radical criticism of anthropologism is, in author’s interpretation, Husserl’s attempt to answer, in the reference to this ideal, to the main political question of his times as consisting in the rising racist and anti-Semitic tendencies in the German naturalistic anthropology. (shrink)

The concept and the logic of the political, the most notable Schmittian ideas, based on the friend/enemy distinction and his thought on political theology have been widely and critically discussed and actively appropriated with various interpretations. On the other hand, we find that there is certain definite momentum piercing through the theoretical structure of Husserl’s phenomenology in general both as a form of metaphysics and as a philosophical movement, which can also be called the political. In this circumstance, we find (...) the Schmittian logic of the political together with his idea of political theology specifically serviceable for an effective visualization of the political characteristically structured in Husserl’s system, particularly in the concepts of transcendental subjectivity and universal critique. This paper argues that Husserl’s phenomenological critical subject is fundamentally a politico-theological subject and is an attempt to show to what extent and in what way Schmitt can be strategically utilized to make manifest the politicality that we discover as something that structurally inheres in Husserlian notion of subjectivity and critique. *. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA number of philosophers within critical race theory use phenomenology to describe the way in which their identities are always already constituted as delinquent within the consciousness of white people, and how their own identity fractures in relation to this white gaze – a fracturing that creates unspeakable ontological, and ultimately physical, violence. Though these philosophers are already doing phenomenology in their work, there is a deeper level of analysis that has yet to be given. Specifically, an account has not (...) yet been provided as regards the production of the white gaze within the consciousness of white people. That is, how is an already racialized world of experience produced prior to any active reflection? In this essay, I engage George Yancy’s famous elevator example, using Edmund Husserl’s concepts of apperception, internal time consciousness and passive synthesis to give a phenomenological description of the production of a pre-reflective racialized world. (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation of trust and betrayal within political communities from the perspective of Husserl’s concept of social communities. I situate the paper amidst Margaret Gilbert’s theory of political obligations, arguing that at least one outside conception of trust fills a gap left in her theory. More specifically, I argue for the supplementary fit that Karen Jones’s conception of trust understood as ‘basal security’ provides for Gilbert. From there, I tie this conception of trust and betrayal to Husserl’s (...) notions of ‘original belief’ and socio-cultural crisis. There is thereby a phenomenological elucidation of features within the social world that allow such crises to occur in the first place. (shrink)

Antinomy basically as an inherent structural tension from within the reason between rational willing toward the unconditioned and rational thinking necessarily conditioned by the rule of understanding plays a negative role in and for Kant's system to critically compass reason in limiting itself within the possibility of real experience. In Husserl, under the banner of one all-encompassing reason, antinomy takes a modified form of an ontological incommensurability between two essentially separable regions of being, i.e., between the ideal and the real; (...) such ontological antinomy now takes up the place of an apriori condition for the possibility of meaning for Husserl. Representing a peculiar hierarchical ontological relation through which a lawful power flows, Husserlian antinomy plays an essentially affirmative-political function. In this paper, I will analyze the constructive antinomic structure of phenomenological being relation in contrast to Kantian restrictive antinomy and discuss its political implication. (shrink)

“정치적인 것” 또는 “정치적임”(the political)은 칼 슈미트 정치이론에서 핵심적 역할을 하는 개념이다. 친구와 적을 실존적으로 구분하는 것을 이 개념논리의 핵심으로 간주하고, 모든 서구 근대 국가정치이론의 권력개념의 근간을 서구신학에서 찾고 있는 슈미트의 정치신학적 사유는 많은 논란과 함께 오랫동안 널리 논의되고 다양하게 해석되어 왔다. 한편, 우리는 자칭 최고형태의 형이상학이자 철학운동의 한 형태인 후썰현상학 체계 전반을 관통하는 일종의 “구조적 정치성”이 있음을 발견한다. 특히 후썰식 현상학적 주체와 비판 개념의 형이상학적 이론구조는 “정치적”이라는 개념으로 표상되고 파악되는 특성을 분명히 보이고 있다. 이러할 때, 우리는 슈미트식 정치 개념과 (...) 논리가 우리가 후썰현상학의 형이상학적 움직임을 구조적으로 동기적으로 추동하고 있는 것으로 보고 있는 그 정치성을 드러내게 하는데 유용한 관찰과 분석의 도구적 틀을 제공할 수 있음을 본다. 이 논문은 후썰이론 전반에 걸쳐 중심적인 이론적 역할을 담당하는 현상학적 주체-원험(原驗)적 초월자 주체(transcendental ideal subject) — 에 존재론적 ․ 구조적으로 내재하고 있는 일종의 분명한 정치적성(politicality)을 가시화하고자 하며, 그 작업에서 슈미트를 어떻게 전략적으로 유용할 수 있는지 보여주고자 한다. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes four senses of naturalism: reductive physicalism; a naturalism that departs from what Thompson calls “natural-historical judgments”; a naturalism that recognizes that physical nature is located within the space of reasons; and a phenomenological naturalism that shifts the focus to the “natural” experiences of subjects who encounter the world. The paper argues for a “phenomenological neo-Aristotelianism” that accounts both for the internal justification of our first-order moral experience and the need for a broader grounding in a universalistic account (...) of the goods of agency. (shrink)

This article considers the possibility of articulating a renewed understanding of the principle of political idealism on the basis of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. By taking its point of departure from one of the most interesting political applications of Husserl’s phenomenological method, the ordoliberal tradition of the so-called Freiburg School of Economics, the article raises the question of the normative implications of Husserl’s eidetic method. Contrary to the “static” idealism of the ordoliberal tradition, the article proposes that the phenomenological concept of (...) political idealism ought to be understood as a fundamentally dynamic principle. As opposed to the classical understanding of political idealism as the implementation of a particular normative model—political utopianism—the phenomenological reformulation of this idea denoted a radically critical principle of self-reflection that can only be realized on the basis of perpetual renewal. In order to illustrate this point, the article considers Husserl’s distinction between two types of ideals of perfection, the absolute and the relative, and argues for their relevance for political philosophy. (shrink)

This paper explores the political import of Husserl’s critical discussion of the epistemic effects of the formalization of rational thinking. More specifically, it argues that this discussion is of direct relevance to make sense of the pervasive processes of ‘technization’, that is, of a mechanistic and superficial generation and use of knowledge, to be observed in current contexts of governance. Building upon Husserl’s understanding of formalization as a symbolic technique for abstraction in the thinking with and about numbers, I argue (...) that processes of technization, while being necessary and legitimate procedures for the reduction of complexities, also may give rise to politically unresponsive and ultimately dysfunctional ‘economies of thinking.’ This paper is structured in three parts. In the first part I outline Husserl’s account of the formalization and technization of thought and knowledge. In the second part I make my case for the political import of this account, departing in this context from positions that (a) regard Husserl’s discussions of formalization and its effects as merely epistemological, or that (b) try to mobilize Husserl for a one-sided critique of instrumental reason. In the final part I address a major shortcoming of Husserl’s account, namely its neglect of the concrete and historically evolving technological infrastructures of processes of formalization/technization. (shrink)

What types of unity and disunity belong to a group of people sharing a culture? Husserl illuminates these communities by helping us trace their origin to two types of interpersonal act—cooperation and influence—though cultural communities are distinguished from both cooperative groups and mere communities of related influences. This analysis has consequences for contemporary concerns about multi- or mono-culturalism and the relationship between culture and politics. It also leads us to critique Husserl’s desire for a new humanity, one that is rational, (...) cooperatively united, and animated by a universal philosophical culture. Reflecting on culture, a spiritually shaped and shared domain of the world, draws us to reflect also on ourselves as social and rational animals, and to ask, what should we reasonably hope for—and aim for—in a human culture that expresses and supports our shared lives of reason? Aristotle is used for occasional comparisons and contrasts. (shrink)

I experience the world as comprising not only pluralities of individual persons but also interpersonal communal unities – groups, teams, societies, cultures, etc. The world, as experienced or "constituted", is a social world, a “spiritual” world. How are these social communities experienced as communities and distinguished from one another? What does it mean to be a “community”? And how do I constitute myself as a member of some communities but not of others? Moreover, the world of experience is not constituted (...) by me alone, nor am I myself the final arbiter of what is true or false about it, of what is good or bad about it, etc. Constitution is an intersubjective achievement: “we” – I with others – constitute the world. Thus, the world is not only constituted as including interpersonal communal unities, but it is also constituted by these communities: groups, teams, societies, cultures, etc. are themselves "we-subjects”, Husserl says, communally constituting the world of their common engagement. But what is communal, as opposed to individual, constitution and how is it achieved? And what sense is to be made of the notion of plural, collective, "we-subjects", communally constituting a common world? (shrink)

El artículo que aquí se presenta intenta, de entrada, cuestionar y am-pliar la relación misma entre fenomenología y política. En contra de acercamientos temáticos, “naturalmente” legitimados, proponemos abordar dicha relación desde dos perspectivas complementarias: primero, establecemos la necesidad de poner en cuestión la “política interpretativa” que ha dominado en los estudios husserlia-nos y que consiste en excluir la praxis de escritura de los textos para concentrarse sencillamente en el contenido teórico de los mismos; seguidamente, establecemos lo que llamamos la “política (...) descriptiva” del texto husserliano, que consiste, a su vez, en determinar cómo se describe la evidencia y la verdad en el detalle mismo de tales textos.This paper attempts to both question and enlarge the very relation be-tween phenomenology and politics. Against standard readings of Husserl, “natu-rally” focused on thematic approaches, I suggest to approach the said relation from two complementary perspectives: firstly, by questioning the mainstream “interpre-tative policy” in Husserl studies neglecting the “praxis of writing” and focusing in-stead on the “theoretical content” of the texts; secondly, by establishing what I call the “descriptive policy” of Husserl’s texts determining how evidence ant truth are specifically described in those same texts. (shrink)

"Renewal" is the expression Edmund Husserl used for the social, political, and ethical transformation of human culture (1922-1924). Considering the concept of renewal in the "generative" becoming of a culture, I first explain the phenomenological background in which Husserl approached the enterprise of renewal. I then describe Husserl's concept of renewal as an ethical task. Next, I take up the process of renewal as accomplishing "the best possible." Following this, I discuss the concept of critique advanced in the "Kaizo" articles. (...) My conclusion interprets Husserl's emphases on the urgency of critique and renewal in relation to the generation of a culture. (shrink)

Husserl’s philosophy of culture relies upon a person’s body being expressive of the person’s spirit, but Husserl’s analysis of expression in Logical Investigations is inadequate to explain this bodily expressiveness. This paper explains how Husserl’s use of “expression” shifts from LI to Ideas II and argues that this shift is explained by Husserl’s increased understanding of the pervasiveness of sense in subjective life and his increased appreciation for the unity of the person. I show how these two developments allow Husserl (...) to better describe the bodily expressiveness that is the source of culture. Husserl’s account of culture is thoroughly intentionalistic, but it does not emphasize thought at the expense of embodiment. Culture originates not in an abstract subjectivity, but by persons’ expressing themselves physically in the world. By seeing how Husserl develops his mature position on bodily expressiveness, we can better appreciate the meaningfulness and the bodily concreteness of cultural objects. (shrink)

O artigo investiga a relação Husserl-Heidegger, para além de suas contribuições à fenomenologia e hermenêutica como novos métodos em filosofia, articulando ontologia e subjetividade, através de um paradigma semânticolingüístico, de forma a delinear qual seria a tarefa hodierna de uma fenomenologia da justiça. The article investigates the Husserl-Heidegger relationship, beyond their historical contributions to both phenomenology and hermeneutics as new methods in philosophy, by articulating ontology and subjectivity through asemantic, linguistic paradigm, so as to delineate the task of a phenomenology (...) of justice. (shrink)

Can a phenomenologically-founded sociology contribute to the understanding of social change? By reference to the structure of the lifeworld as it has been analyzed by Husserl and Schutz, I argue that human action is formed by temporal, spatial, and social dimensions. These are objectified by a social semantics through which they gain their intersubjective cultural shape. From this perspective, I investigate changes in the temporal, spatial, and social dimensions of this semantics, as they occur in the present transformation of post-socialist (...) societies. Finally, I consider whether these changes mark a return to Western patterns and whether they confirm the thesis of the end of history. (shrink)

How can phenomenology describe an object as "the political"? The article endeavours to show how it is possible to apprehend such a theme from a _transcendental<D> perspective. After going through the methodic difficulties of the Cartesian way, which involves an egology intersubjectively extended to the monadology, the essay analyzes the non-Cartesian ways. Indeed, both of them pave the way for a political based on a plural structure. The way through the life-world as well as the way through psychology succeed in (...) depicting the political, either as living sociality or as the play between ethical co-attitudes. In each case, the reduction operates in a specific manner, either as a pure Cartesian bracketing, as a retrocession to social originality or as a nonparticipating in the world-interests. Nevertheless, only the way through psychology reaches the political at a strict transcendental level, whereas the way through the life-world always runs the risk of falling back. (shrink)

Three distinctive traits may be emphasized in Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity. First, the unity pervading a multiplicity of subjects is considered as the outcome of a process of unification, that is, the result of the constitutive processes of a plmality of subjects. According to Husserl, all supra-individual unities must be explained as grounded on the single subjectivities. This point is stressed in both books, particularly by K. Schuhmarm (pp. 4849, 62). Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the unification (...) is conceived of as the unfolding of the “horizon of others” belonging to each single subjectivity. This explication can be accomplished in a diversity of strata involving different levels of intersubjectivity, such as empathy, social action, higher order personalities and the final end of the universe of monads. Iribame has underlined and attempted to make clear the unfolding of inte. (shrink)

Abstract Following Hubert Dreyfus, this paper takes up the debate over the limits on what can be articulated by means of intentional analysis. Section 1 reviews the contrast between Husserl's position and Heidegger's position. Husserl's is an ?inexhaustibility theory? of the inarticulable, according to which, although it is in principle impossible to articulate everything, there is not anything that it is in principle impossible to articulate. Heidegger's is a genuine ?inarticulability?in?principle theory? of the inarticulable, according to which it is, in (...) principle, impossible to articulate the whole of what makes human understanding possible. On this view, it is, in principle, impossible to articulate the background of skills and practices presupposed by and taken for granted in all our everyday human activities. Whereas Dreyfus has been largely interested in this debate for the sake of its parallels to developments in cognitive science, this paper aims, in Section 2, to consider the political importance of this debate. It is argued that the debate between the inexhaustibility theorist and the inarticulability theorist is misdirected. The two sides in this debate share a pair of questionable assumptions, which lead them to treat the problem of the inarticulable as though the participants in the practices that constitute the ?taken?for?granted background of everyday understanding? are all situated in equivalent positions in those practices. But the everyday phenomena of ostracism and marginalization show that there are political and social concerns that must be addressed as part of the study of constituting practices. ?Who gets to articulate what, and to whom?? is a question that should be asked before ?Is there anything that cannot be articulated?? (shrink)