This paper develops a new form of metaethical expressivism according to which the normative judgment that X should Φ consists in a decision that X Φ. When the judgment is first-personal—e.g., my judgment that I should Φ—the view is similar to Gibbard’s plan expressivism, though the state I call “decision” differs somewhat from a Gibbard-style plan. The deep difference between the views shows in the account of third-personal judgments. Gibbard construes the judgment that Mary should Φ as a de se (...) plan on the thinker’s part to Φ if she turns out to be Mary (the Subtle View). I construe the judgment as a decision for Mary that Mary Φ (the Simple View). The main argument for Simple Plan Expressivism is that it solves problems for Gibbard’s approach, resonates with a new and interesting moral psychology, and better makes sense of certain independently plausible constraints on normative judgment. In the end I argue that this account of normative judgment has implications for first-order ethics, implying in particular that rational egoism as standardly formulated is incoherent. (shrink)

Desire comes in two kinds: attraction and aversion. But contemporary theories of desire have paid little attention to the distinction, and some philosophers doubt that it is psychologically real. I argue that one reason to think there is a difference between the attitudes, and to care about it, is that attractions and aversions contribute in radically different ways to our well-being. Attraction-motivated activity adds to the good life in a way that aversion-driven activity doesn’t. I argue further that the value (...) of attraction-motivated activity is irreducible to the prudential value of pleasure or desire-satisfaction. Rather it contributes in a distinctive way to the felt meaningfulness of life. In the end I offer a hypothesis: when we are attracted to something, we see it as (non-comparatively) good; and it is only when we pursue the apparent good that we see ourselves as engaged with value that makes our lives and the universe worth maintaining. -/- . (shrink)

Recent work in folk metaethics finds a correlation between perceived consensus about a moral claim and meta-ethical judgments about whether the claim is universally or only relatively true. We argue that consensus can provide evidence for meta-normative claims, such as whether a claim is universally true. We then report several experiments indicating that people use consensus to make inferences about whether a claim is universally true. This suggests that people's beliefs about relativism and universalism are partly guided by evidence-based reasoning. (...) In a final study, we show that the rejection of universalism does not generate a simple subjectivism but is associated with a more moderate relativism on which highly atypical positions are regarded as mistaken. (shrink)

This paper argues that practical reasons are essentially “public” in the following sense: If R is a reason for X to Φ, then R is also a reason for other people not to interfere with X’s Φ-ing. The paper derives the Publicity Thesis from an independently motivated non-cognitivist account of normative judgment that covers both should-judgments and judgments about reasons. This account “explains” the publicity thesis in the sense if the non-cognitivist view is correct, anyone who judges that R is (...) a reason for X to Φ is thereby committed to regarding R as a reason for others not to interfere. Hence practical reasons must be regarded as public by anyone who thinks about them, and so are essentially public, though in a sense somewhat different from Korsgaard’s (1996) or Nagel’s (1970). -/- . (shrink)

Quality of will accounts of moral responsibility hold that ill will is necessary for blameworthiness. But all such accounts are false to ordinary moral practice, which licenses blame for agents who act wrongly from epistemically unreasonable ignorance even if the act is not ill willed. This should be especially concerning to Strawsonians about moral responsibility, who think the genuine conditions of blameworthiness are derived from the standards internal to our practice. In response, I provide a theory of moral blameworthiness on (...) which ill will is not necessary for blameworthiness. On the view I defend, “Rational Capacitarianism,” agents are blameworthy whenever they act wrongly from an unreasonable attitude which is attributable to them, where an attitude is attributable to an agent just in case she has the capacity to assess reasons for and against the attitude and modulate the attitude in light of these assessments. Acting from unreasonable ignorance is just a special case of acting from an unreasonable attitude. My theory contrasts both with both quality of will accounts of blameworthiness and the Capacitarian view, which specifies that agents who act wrongly from ignorance are culpable if they could and should have known better. On Capacitarianism, a variety of awareness-relevant capacities are pertinent, including memory; on my view it is only failures of rational capacities that render the agent culpable, because only failures of rational capacities are attributable to the agent. (shrink)

This paper takes up a neglected problem for metaethical noncognitivism: the characterization of the acceptance states for agent-centered normative theories like Rational Egoism. If Egoism is a coherent view, the non-cognitivist needs a coherent acceptance state for it. This can be provided, as Dreier and Gibbard have shown. But those accounts fail when generalized, assigning the same acceptance state to normative theories that are clearly distinct, or assigning no acceptance state to theories that look to be intelligible. The paper makes (...) the case for this and then asks: What should we conclude if the problem cannot be solved? We might conclude that since Egoism is clearly a coherent view, the argument amounts to a refutation of noncognitivism. But we suggest another possibility. There is, on reflection, something incoherent, or at least odd, in standard formulations of Egoism; noncognitivism predicts this and so provides an intriguing explanation for this fact. (shrink)

Dual-systems frameworks propose that moral judgments are derived from both an immediate emotional response, and controlled/rational cognition. Recently Cushman (2013) proposed a new dual-system theory based on model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. Model-free learning attaches values to actions based on their history of reward and punishment, and explains some deontological, non-utilitarian judgments. Model-based learning involves the construction of a causal model of the world and allows for far-sighted planning; this form of learning fits well with utilitarian considerations that seek to (...) maximize certain kinds of outcomes. I present three concerns regarding the use of model-free reinforcement learning to explain deontological moral judgment. First, many actions that humans find aversive from model-free learning are not judged to be morally wrong. Moral judgment must require something in addition to model-free learning. Second, there is a dearth of evidence for central predictions of the reinforcement account—e.g., that people with different reinforcement histories will, all else equal, make different moral judgments. Finally, to account for the effect of intention within the framework requires certain assumptions which lack support. These challenges are reasonable foci for future empirical/theoretical work on the model-free/model-based framework. (shrink)

People draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non-utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this article, we draw on Bayesian learning theory to develop a rational learning account. We argue that the ‘size principle’, which is implicated in word learning, can also explain how children would use scant and (...) equivocal evidence to interpret candidate rules as applying more narrowly than utilitarian rules. (shrink)

Bu araştırma, dijital bağımlılık kavramını ve dijital çağın zararlı etkileri karşısında çocuk, dijital medya ve ebeveyn ilişkisinin sınırlarını tartışmaktadır. Araştırmada 4-6 yaş aralığındaki çocukları günde üç saat ve üzeri dijital medya kullanıcısı olan ebeveynlerin Erken Çocuklukta Dijital Bağımlılıkla Mücadele Seminerlerine katıldıktan sonra çocuklarının dijital medya kullanımına karşı nasıl bir tutum değişikliği göstereceklerine, ebeveyn arabuluculuğu stratejilerinde değişiklik olup olmayacağına cevap aranmaktır. Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Çocukların günlük yaşantılarında dijital medya araçlarını kullanım durumlarının, sürelerinin, sebeplerinin, çocuk ve ebeveyn açısından yaşanan sorunların (...) tespit edilmesi amacıyla 8 ebeveyn ile yarı yapılandırılmış görüşme yapılmıştır. Elde edilen veriler değerlendirilerek seminer programına son hali verilmiştir. 93 ebeveynin katıldığı 5 hafta süren 10 seminer sonrası seminerlerin tamamına katılan 15 ebeveyn ile odak grup görüşmesi yapılmıştır. Araştırmada dijital okuryazarlık ve dijital ebeveynlik merkezli seminerlerin dijital bağımlılıklarla mücadelede önemli bir basamak olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Ebeveynlerin tutum ve davranışları ile çocukların uzun süreli dijital medya kullanımı arasında ilişki olduğu görülmüştür. Ebeveynlerin çocuklarının dijital medya kullanımını denetlemeye başladığı aktif arabuluculuk ve sınırlayıcı arabuluculuk stratejilerini benimsedikleri, teknik arabuluculuk stratejisinin azaldığı, izleme stratejisinden de tamamen vazgeçildiği tespit edilmiştir. (shrink)

The Qurʾān was taught in the letter method for many years. After the names of the letters in the Arabic alphabet are memorized in this method, the teaching of origins and signs begins. The syllabic method was developed over time as an alternative to this method, and the letters were taught directly with their superior vowel signs without memorizing their names. Unlike these two methods, the sound-based alif ba method has begun to be used in recent years. This method coincides (...) with the primary literacy teaching method based on the sounds thatwere adopted in Turkish teaching since 2005. Basic principles such as teaching the letters one-by-one, following the sound learning stages in teaching each sound, conducting the lessons in class, reading the syllables and words formed with the learned letters from the first day are adopted in both teaching methods. The purpose of the present study was to find out how the Qurʾān can be taught by applying the sound-based alif ba method and to draw attention to the original aspects of this method for learning the Qurʾān with the right sounds. Since the correct teaching of the Qurʾān is closely related to the teacher’s content knowledge and teaching skills, the alif ba that will be used and the method to be applied are important in reaching the target more systematically and faster. The case study design was used in the study in which the qualitative method was employed. The primary data of the study were Sound-Based Alif ba, for which I was the project assistant of, and the book with the title A New Approach in Teaching the Qurʾān: Sound based Alif baand Tajwīd Method, which was an editorial book of which I was one of the authors, and the thirty-episode series We Are Children and We Are Reading the Qurʾān, published on Diyanet TV, for which I was the production coordinator. Also, to see the applicability of the method, interviews were conducted with eight instructors who used Sound-Based Alif ba in their lessons. The study received ethical approval from Ankara Social Sciences University Rectorate Social and Human Sciences Research and Scientific Publication Ethics Committee on 8 July 2021 with the decision no 12450. The main thing in the sound-based alif ba method is the correct vocalization of the Qurʾān. The letters in alif ba are arranged differently from the classical alphabet order and are divided into six groups considering the frequency of occurrence in the Qurʾān and the degree of difficulty of origins. Each letter is taught in a separate lesson with the support of the ḥarakas and the sukūn (such as اَلْ, اِلْ, اُلْ). During the teaching, attention is paid to the sound learning steps, and the student is expected to feel the sound of the letter to be learned, distinguish it from other letter sounds, and then pronounce it from the correct origin as much as possible. In the sound-based alif ba method, the teaching of the shape of the letter is done after the sound of the letter is pronounced. During the teaching of the shapes of the letters, the part of the letter that does not change when written within a word is emphasized, and the writing is used so that the shape of the letter can be placed in the mind of the student. In the sound-based alif ba teaching, reading from the Qurʾān is done in every lesson, starting from the teaching of the first letter. During the teaching of alif ba, educational games, question-answer, and narration methods are used, primarily with the taʿlīm method. In this way, the teaching of Sound-Based Alif ba is spread over a period of 40 lessons. The study findings showed that the sound-based alif ba method has similar characteristics with the sound-based primary literacy teaching method; however, Arabic has its own unique aspects with its language structure. Among these originalities, which is adopted in the teaching of letters, firstly teaching the letter with the sukūn and with the support of movable ا and then showing the shape of the letter is carried out. As a matter of fact, the teachers have the opinion that this vocalization method, which is adopted, facilitates the learning of the correct sounds, and that teaching the letters in line with the sound learning steps increases the efficiency of the lesson. Although most of the instructors pointed out to the positive aspects of teaching tajwīd sounds in alif ba, one of the instructors did not find it necessary. The opinions of the teachers showed that the sound-based alif ba method can be applied efficiently in online lessons, but the teacher-student relation is affected negatively when compared to the classroom setting. All of the instructors said that the materials used in the lessons and demonstration and educational game methods increased the quality of the course, and that the We Are Children We Are Reading the Qurʾān program is an important resource for them. (shrink)

In this article, the life of Göynüklü Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi will be analyzed. Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efen-di was born in Göynük in the middle of 1294/1878 according to the Rūmī calendar. Since his father was a mudarris, he has become familiar with ʿulamāʾ circles since his childhood. He spent the first years of his education life in Göynük, where he was born. He completed the later stages of the education process in Istanbul. He returned to Göynük after completing his mad-rasa education (...) and obtaining his ijāzāt and he undertook various official duties in his hometown until 1946, the date of his death. He served as the Muftī of Göynük for the longest time among the duties he has undertaken. It is known that he had continued this duty in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the first years of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi is the last muftī of the Ottoman period and the first muftī of the Republic period in Göynük. Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi is the subject of this article because we think that his position is important. According to our findings, there has not been any study on Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi yet. In this respect, the article will enable Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi to known in the light of archive sources and other available information/documents. The article includes informations about his life, family, education, hodjas, scientific background and the duties he undertook. In order to obtain this information, we first applied to the Istanbul Muftī’s Mashīkhat Archive and to the Religious Affairs Presidency Archive. From the aforementioned archives, the registry files of Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi were obtained. In addition, other sources that will contribute to the article have been carefully scanned. Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi took the exam of the lectern sheikhdom and was found successful after his madrasah education. But, since the appointment to the lectern sheikhdom was made ac-cording to a certain hierarchy, his turn did not come. Upon this, Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi returned from Istanbul to his hometown, Göynük and undertook a number of official duties from this date until his death. Court membership, mudarrisship and muftīship are among his official duties that he undertook. His name was chosen and determined by the local units for the duty of muftī and he was appointed to the post with the approval of Shaykh al-Islām. Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi had served as the muftī of Göynük between 1912-1946 without any interruption. His long service as a muftī is enoug to reach a positive opinion about his education, scientific knowledge, personal characteristics, and his position in the eyes of administrators and society. Because the fact that a person has held the same post for thirty-four years is at least a sign of trust in him. However, when he was first appointed as muftī, some objections were raised against him. It is possible to list these objections under the headings such as taking sides in favor of Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi when he was elected as the mufti, ignoring the applications of other candidates and his lack of scientific knowledge. These objections that submitted to the officials were not ignored by the local authorities, on the contrary, they were addressed. Even, these objections were investigated by more than one governmental institution. As a result of the investigations, it was determined that the allegations made against Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi were unfounded. As a result, this amount of information has been identified for Ibrāhīm Ḥaḳḳī Efendi at least for now. It would be appropriate to state that the contents of the article is open to improvement with the information and documents that are likely to be obtained later. (shrink)

David KC Cooper,1 David Ayares21Thomas E Starzl Transplantation Institute, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Pittsburgh, PA, USA; 2Revivicor, Blacksburg, VA, USA: The transplantation of organs and cells from pigs into humans could overcome the critical and continuing problem of the lack of availability of deceased human organs and cells for clinical transplantation. Developments in the genetic engineering of pigs have enabled considerable progress to be made in the experimental laboratory in overcoming the immune barriers to successful xenotransplantation. With regard to (...) pig organ xenotransplantation, antibody- and cell-mediated rejection have largely been overcome, and the current major barrier is the development of coagulation dysregulation. This is believed to be due to a combination of immune activation of the vascular endothelial cells of the graft and molecular incompatibilities between the pig and primate coagulation–anticoagulation systems. Pigs with new genetic modifications specifically directed to this problem are now becoming available. With regard to less complex tissues, such as islets, neuronal cells, and corneas, the remaining barriers are less problematic, and graft survival in nonhuman primate models extends for >1 year in all three cases. In planning the initial clinical trials, consideration will be concentrated on the risk–benefit ratio, based to a large extent on the results of preclinical studies in nonhuman primates. If the benefit to the patient is anticipated to be high, eg, insulin-independent control of glycemia, and the potential risks low, eg, minimal risk of transfer of a porcine infectious agent, then a clinical trial would be justified.Keywords: infection, pigs, genetically-engineered, xenotransplantation, islets, xenotransplantation, organs. (shrink)

This manuscript reports on a landmark symposium on the ethical, legal and technical challenges of xenotransplantation in the UK. King’s College London, with endorsement from the British Transplantation Society (BTS), and the European Society of Organ Transplantation (ESOT), brought together a group of experts in xenotransplantation science, ethics and law to discuss the ethical, regulatory and technical challenges surrounding translating xenotransplantation into the clinical setting. The symposium was the first of its kind in the UK for 20 years. This paper (...) summarises the content of the expert lectures showcasing the progress which has been made in xenotransplantation including—the history of xenotransplantation, advances in gene edited animals and progress towards clinical xenotransplantation. We then set out the ethical and legal issues still to be resolved. Finally, we report the themes of the roundtable discussion highlighting areas of consensus and controversy. While the detail of the legal discussion was directed towards the UK, the principles and summary reported here are intended to be applicable to any jurisdiction seeking to implement clinical xenotransplantation. (shrink)

Çağdaş fizik evrenimizin yaşam için hassas ayarlı olduğunu göstermiştir. Evrenin yaşam için hassas ayarlı olması demek fizik yasaları, başlangıç koşulları ve temel fizik sabitlerinin alabileceği muhtemel değerlerden çok azı yaşama izin vermesi demektir. Bazı teist düşünürler hassas ayarın Tanrı’nın varlığı lehinde geliştirilebilecek Tasarım kanıtlarında öncül görevi görebileceğini iddia etmişlerdir. Diğer taraftan bazı felsefeci ve bilim insanları hassas ayar gözlemenin birden fazla evrenin var olduğunu savunan çok evrenler hipotezini desteklediğini iddia etmişlerdir. Bu iki yaklaşım da hassas ayarın bir açıklamaya muhtaç olduğunu (...) varsayımını yapar. İlk bakışta bu varsayım makul gözükse de bazı felsefeci ve bilim insanları hassas ayarın bir açıklamaya muhtaç olduğu iddiasını reddetmişlerdir. Bu yaklaşımı savunanlar ya evrenin yaşam için hassas ayarlı olmadığını ya da evrenin hassas ayarlı olmasına şaşırmamamız gerektiğini, dolayısı ile hassas ayarın bir açıklamaya ihtiyaç duymadığını iddia etmişlerdir. Bu makalemizde bu iddialarının bir kısmını ele alarak değerlendirecek ve hassas ayarın açıklamaya muhtaç olmadığını temellendirmede başarısız olduklarını göstermeye çalışacağız. (shrink)

This paper raises two problems for plan-expressivism concerning normative judgments about non-corealizable actions: actions which cannot both be performed. First, plan-expressivists associate normative judgment with an attitude which satisfies a corealizability constraint, but this constraint is (in the interpersonal case) unwarranted, and (in the intrapersonal case) warranted only at the price of a contentious normative premise. Ayars (2022) holds that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘B should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can (...) φ while B ψ’s. But this is false. Both Gibbard (2003) and Ayars hold that the pair of judgments ‘A should φ’ and ‘A should ψ’ is coherent only if one believes that A can φ and ψ. But this assumes possibilism. Second, the paper demonstrates, cases involving interpersonal non-corealizability prompt judgments about what multiple agents should do which – contra Gibbard – are not plausibly associated with any planning subject. (shrink)

Passing the Gāhā in review we may note that in composition (i.e., frequent patchwork) and vocabulary it could very well be a part of the Āyāranga, as Schubring suggested — an idea as ingenious as it is probably difficult to prove. Also, if Gāhā originally was the title of Āyār 2, 16, it is strange for a dozen tri $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ubh stanzas to be thus called, for if the end leaves were exchanged, the text would hardly be separated from (...) the title (colophon).I therefore raised the question if Gāhā might mean ‘song praising men.’ N 141ab could support this, though the text is in prose. If, however, the stanzas of Āyār 2, 16 were the 16th lecture of Sūy 1, the itle of Gāhā is only justifiable in view of its being given to all Sūy 1 lectures, as said in Utt 31, 13, but in that case the number 16 must be added, as in fact is done in N 141cd (gāhā-solasa-nāma $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m}$$ ajjhaya $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{n}$$ a $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m}$$ ).This would be a canonical explanation, i.e., with the help of Samav 16 and Utt 31, 13.A post-canonical (Nijjutti) explanation would be to assume Gāhā to be short for Gāhā-solasaga, which would normally mean ‘(the lecture) of the 16 gāthās’, a title as strange for prose as it is for 12 tri $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{t}$$ ubhs.Therefore, is gāhā not equivalent to Sa. gāthā or is Sūy l, 16 as we have it a substitute for a text lost and different from Āyār 2, 16? Or was the title of the prose Sūy 1, 16 lost and somehow substituted by the colophon of the Śrutaskandha? Is there a connection between this problem and the lacuna in the Sūyaga $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ a-Nijjutti after stanza 22? At least this question I would tend to answer in the affirmative. (shrink)