The purpose of this article is to provide a multi-perspective examination of one of the most important contemporary security issues: weaponized, and especially lethal, artificial intelligence. This technology is increasingly associated with the approaching dramatic change in the nature of warfare. What becomes particularly important and evermore intensely contested is how it becomes embedded with and concurrently impacts two social structures: ethics and law. While there has not been a global regime banning this technology, regulatory attempts at establishing a ban (...) have intensified along with acts of resistance and blocking coalitions. This article aims to reflect on the prospects and limitations, as well as the ethical and legal intensity, of the emerging regulatory framework. To allow for such an investigation, a power-analytical approach to studying international security regimes is utilized. (shrink)

International Relations's intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider context. This paper contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field's discursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategy of problematization to analyse the emergence and disciplinary trajectories of Constructivism in IR, this paper argues that Constructivism has been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart through a (...) process of normalization, and investigates how it was possible for Constructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical and practical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration of Constructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science: the choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequential as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies of Constructivism, showing how its overall normalization occurred in two stages, each revolving around particular practices and events. The second part concentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatory practices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted the distillation and immunization of Constructivism – and thus of the rest of the mainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with – against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third part focuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstruct and reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralization practices such as the elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutralization such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in Constructivism's normalization. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aim to ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but their successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralize calls for greater openness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is this complex process of reading and producing that counts as ‘Constructivism’, which explains both the normalization of Constructivism and the continued marginalization of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstream IR's infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power. (shrink)

International Relations's intellectual history is almost always treated as a history of ideas in isolation from both those discursive and political economies which provide its disciplinary and wider context. This paper contributes to this wider analysis by focusing on the impact of the field's discursive economy. Specifically, using Foucaultian archaeologico-genealogical strategy of problematization to analyse the emergence and disciplinary trajectories of Constructivism in IR, this paper argues that Constructivism has been brought gradually closer to its mainstream Neo-utilitarian counterpart through a (...) process of normalization, and investigates how it was possible for Constructivism to be purged of its early critical potential, both theoretical and practical. The first part of the paper shows how the intellectual configuration of Constructivism and its disciplinary fortunes are inseparable from far-from-unproblematic readings of the Philosophy of Social Science: the choices made at this level are neither as intellectually neutral nor as disciplinarily inconsequential as they are presented. The second and third parts chart the genealogies of Constructivism, showing how its overall normalization occurred in two stages, each revolving around particular practices and events. The second part concentrates on older genealogies, analysing the politics of early classificatory practices regarding Constructivism, and showing how these permitted the distillation and immunization of Constructivism – and thus of the rest of the mainstream scholarship which it was depicted as compatible with – against more radical Postmodernist/Post-structuralist critiques. Finally, the third part focuses attention on recent genealogies, revealing new attempts to reconstruct and reformulate Constructivism: here, indirect neutralization practices such as the elaboration of ‘Pragmatist’ Constructivism, as well as the direct neutralization such as the formulation of ‘Realist’ Constructivism, are key events in Constructivism's normalization. These apparently ‘critical’ alternatives that aim to ‘provide the identity variable’ in fact remain close to Neo-utilitarianism, but their successful representation as ‘critical’ help neutralize calls for greater openness in mainstream IR. Rather than a simple intellectual history, it is this complex process of reading and producing that counts as ‘Constructivism’, which explains both the normalization of Constructivism and the continued marginalization of Postmodernist/Post-structuralist approaches in mainstream IR's infra-disciplinary balance of intellectual power. (shrink)

This article reflects on securitization efforts with respect to ‘killer robots’, known more impartially as autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Our contribution focuses, theoretically and empirically, on the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a transnational advocacy network vigorously pushing for a pre-emptive ban on AWS. Marking exactly a decade of its activity, there is still no international regime formally banning, or even purposefully regulating, AWS. Our objective is to understand why the Campaign has not been able to advance its disarmament agenda (...) thus far, despite all the resources, means and support at its disposal. For achieving this objective, we challenge the popular assumption that strong stigmatization is the universally best strategy towards humanitarian disarmament. We investigate the consequences of two specifics present in AWS, which set them apart from processes and successes of the campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and laser-blinding weapons: the complexity of AWS as a distinct weapons category, and the subsequent circumvention of its complexity through the utilization of pop-culture, namely science fiction imagery. We particularly focus on two mechanisms through which such distortion has occurred: hybridization and grafting. These provide the conceptual basis and heuristic tools to unpack the paradox of over-securitization: success in broadening the stakeholder base in relation to the first mechanism and deepening the sense of insecurity in relation to the second one does not necessarily lead to the achievement of the desired prohibitory norm. In conclusion, we ask whether it is not the time for a more epistemically-oriented expert debate with a less ambitious, lowest common denominator strategy as the preferred model of arms control for such a complex weapons category. (shrink)

The name the “Prague school of Brentano” refers to three generations of thinkers who temporarily or permanently lived in Prague, bound together by teacher/student relationships, and who accepted the main views of Franz Brentano’s philosophy. This chapter discusses central aspects of the philosophical work done in the School.

The discovery of dietetics -- Philosophy of the nature of man -- Therapy of body and soul -- The philosophical legacy of On regimen.

This book explores the differences and similarities between Sartrean existentialism and French poststructuralism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Politické myšlení Davida Huma. Základní otázky, východiska a inspirace pro americké otce zakladatele by Adéla RádkováHynek JanoušekAdéla Rádková. Politické myšlení Davida Huma. Základní otázky, východiska a inspirace pro americké otce zakladatele [The Political Thought of David Hume. Basic Questions, Premises, and Inspiration for America’s Founding Fathers]. Prague: Togga, 2019. Pp. 201. Paperback. ISBN 978-80-7476-169-0, $10.00.The work of David Hume has never been a major focus of interest in (...) the Czech lands. Recently, however, a certain shift has been taking place. Hume’s Treatise has been translated into Czech for the first time, a new translation of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion has been published to replace the archaic nineteenth-century translation, and the archaic translation of the second Enquiry will soon be replaced by a new one as well. Texts are also being published that attempt to show the wider scope of Hume’s work. The book reviewed here is one of them. Adéla Rádková’s text is the first Czech book to introduce Hume as a political thinker to the Czech public. The book itself consists of two relatively separate parts, which seem to be different in content and intent. While the first part, along with the preface, summarizes Hume’s life and work and includes a brief introduction to the basic ideas of Hume’s moral and political philosophy, the second part contributes to the interpretation of the influence of Hume’s political philosophy on the American Founding Fathers, especially on James Madison.In the introduction, the book first presents a history of overall interpretations of Hume’s work, beginning with Thomas Edward Ritchie and Dugald Stewart, who, in agreement with their teacher Reid, saw Hume as a radical skeptic. A significant change comes with Norman Kemp Smith’s well-known interpretation, according to which the theory of moral sentiment forms the basis of Hume’s project, which Hume adapted to his conception of belief. Once we stress that the investigation of emotion- and passion-based human nature is to be based on the experiential method of observation, we arrive, according to Rádková, at the common element of the otherwise very different naturalistic interpretations of David Hume’s philosophy to which she herself subscribes.Two more recent interpretations of Hume’s philosophy are also mentioned, namely Paul Russell’s interpretation of Hume’s work in terms of his critique of religion, and James Harris’s view that the attempt to see Hume as a systematic philosopher who, in his works, pursues the project of the science of man announced in the Treatise, is a misunderstanding of the role of a man of letters in the eighteenth century.Rádková finds Russell’s interpretation interesting but hard to reconcile with some of Hume’s political essays and with his History of England, in which Hume advocates [End Page 181] a pragmatic politics that is so bound up with religious considerations that it is hard to defend the view that Hume was trying to push religion out of the public sphere.Harris’s point about Hume not being a systematic thinker and about Hume’s abandonment of the Treatise in his advertisement needs to be set in the context of Hume’s life. Hume published this advertisement only a year before his death, and he used it to discourage readers from reading the Treatise because he though the book was stylistically clumsy and unsatisfactory in certain respects. He does not mention abandoning his philosophical project. Harris’s assertion (viii) that Hume was a free intellectual who did not want to be intellectually constrained in the wide range of his research flies in the face of Hume’s willingness to be constrained at least twice—if only he had been given the professorship he sought first in Edinburgh (1745) and then in Glasgow (1751). Rádková also holds that Hume, in his later writings, does not abandon his intention to give an account of human nature with regard to the general principles of morals, politics, and criticism, which he announced in the Preface to... (shrink)

Článek analyzuje původní verzi Husserlovy kritiky Brentanova pojetí časového vědomí, která je obsažena v Husserlových Přednáškách k fenomenologii vnitřního časového vědomí, a Husserlovu snahu vyřešit Brentanův argument nekonečně nekonečného regresu v rukopisném textu O primární modifikaci paměti. Z Husserlovy kritiky si všímá jen dvou bodů. Za prvé kritiky Brentanova prezentismu, tj. názoru, že časové vědomí je založeno v bodu přítomnosti, v němž jsou psychické fenomény, které názor času konstituují, dány současně. Za druhé Husserlovy výtky, že Brentano nepoužívá pro výklad vědomí (...) času schéma počitkový obsah – pojetí počitkového obsahu. Za tímto účelem rekonstruuje text Brentanovu teorii v podobě, v které ji znal Husserl, a vykládá jak Brentanovy důvody pro odmítnutí časové povahy vnitřního vnímání, tak nedořešené problémy Brentanova hlediska. Následně se pokouší dokázat, že Husserl Brentanův prezentismus podcenil a že věcné problémy, které s jeho odmítnutím souvisely, musel řešit zavedením absolutně „kvazi-prezentního“ vědomí a odmítnutím schématu obsah – pojetí pro výklad konstituce imanentních časových jednot. Oba zvolené body Husserlovy kritiky Brentana se tak v pozdějších vrstvách přednášek ukazují jako částečně neoprávněné.The article discusses the original version of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s concept of time consciousness, which forms a part of Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Next, it gives an overview of Husserl’s attempt to solve Brentano’s argument from the infinitely infinite regress against the consciousness of internal time. Two points of Husserl’s critique of Brentano are analyzed. The first point concerns Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s presentism. Brentano holds that consciousness of time is contained in the time point of the present now, in which psychical phenomena constituting our time consciousness are given simultaneously. The second point concerns the lack of content – apprehension scheme in Brentano’s explanation of the time consciousness. The article reconstructs Brentano’s position in the form known to Husserl and explains Brentano’s reasons for refusing the internal consciousness of time as well as problems connected with this refusal. An analysis of Husserl’s text proves that Husserl underestimated Brentano’s presentism and that he was forced to introduce a concept of the absolute time consciousness to solve the problems connected with his refusal of Brentano’s position. Since Husserl had to eventually give up the content – apprehension scheme in his explanation of immanent time unities, his original critique of Brentano is shown to be partly unjustified. (shrink)

Následující text vydal v roce 1930 Oskar Kraus pod názvem Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins v časopisu Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 75, n. 1-2, s. 1-22. Obsahuje výňatky z korespondence Franze Brentana a pražského profesora Karlo-Ferdinandovy univerzity Antona Martyho z roku 1895 a část Martyho přednášky o Brentanově teorii časového vědomí z téhož roku. Tématem textu je zdůvodnění přechodu od modelu časového vědomí, který pracuje s časovou modifikací předmětů představování, k modelu, který pracuje s časovou modifikací intencionálního vztahu k předmětu. (...) Ve verzi, která je zde zachycena, jde o přechod ke kontinuální modifikaci aktů souzení, které předmět „kladou“. Čtenáře, který by se zajímal o popis a hlubší zdůvodnění vývoje a povahy Brentanových teorií časového vědomí, bych odkázal na následující texty: Chisholm, R. (1981): „Brentano’s Analysis of the Consciousness of Time“. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1), 3-16, a Chrudzimski, A. (2005): Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität, Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden, Ontos, Frankfurt. V češtině pak na Janoušek, H. (2017): „Brentanova teorie času a časového vědomí“. Pro-Fil, 18, no. 1, (v tisku), dostupné online na stránkách časopisu Pro-Fil. (shrink)

The concept ofmimēsiswas ‘shared by most authors, philosophers and educated audiences in the classical period, in antiquity as a whole, and even later’, although it has probably never been developed into a well-articulated theory. As far as we can judge from the extant evidence, the meaning of the expressions μίμησις and μιμέομαι differs from author to author and sometimes even from passage to passage. Ancient Greek views onmimēsishave often been discussed in modern scholarship, mainly within the field of history of (...) art, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that the traditional English translation ‘imitation’ is not always appropriate for the ancient texts and that in many contexts it is rather misleading. In the following study I aim to focus on this concept as it was employed in the oldest Greek cosmological and philosophical theories. As a rule, the study of these theories is complicated by their fragmentary state of preservation and by their distortion through the specifically Platonic views that were dominant among the later doxographers. I shall suggest that the Platonizing tendency still prevalent today, which tends to translate and interpretmimēsisas ‘imitation’ or ‘copy’, should be carefully revised in the light of the Hippocratic evidence and specifically in view ofDe victu, probably the oldest authentic, non-fragmentary, and non-Platonic document attesting the concept ofmimēsis. (shrink)

Nik Byle argues that Dietrich Bonhoeffer theologically adapts Heideggerian concepts about human existence such as temporality. Bonhoeffer is thus able to provide a positive account of Christ’s relation to time and history moving, Bonhoeffer beyond impasses found in both dialectical and liberal theology.

Heidegger scholarship has done an admirable job accounting for Luther’s influence on key Heideggerian concepts such as his method of destruction and anxiety. Yet given Heidegger’s statements concerning Luther’s immense personal and philosophical importance, it is likely that Luther’s influence extends further and deeper than might first appear. I argue that this influence also manifests in Heidegger’s concept of authentic existence. In particular, I argue that Luther’s understanding of Christian freedom and servitude form ontic material from which Heidegger draws to (...) come to his general ontological understanding of Dasein’s freedom as power over its existence and servitude to its communal involvements. As Luther understands the freedom of a Christian, everything comes to aid the Christian in salvation, much like Dasein gains power over its existential possibilities in coming to authenticity. Yet this newly created freedom also creates additional ontological or existential connections with one’s community. The consequence of such connections is the addition of new responsibilities, or form of servitude, to one’s community wherein one aids others in coming to faith or authenticity, respectively. (shrink)

This paper deals with the possibilities of using the ethical considerations of Baruch Spinoza in a psychotherapeutic context. I begin the interpretation by defining the basic features of Spinoza’s ethics and their connection with the whole of his philosophical system. The core of the study is the interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of affectivity and especially his concept of the transformation of passive affects into active, and what role philosophical knowledge plays in this transformation. The third part of the study then (...) tries to show how selected points of Spinoza’s introduced ideas can be useful for psychotherapeutic work. As much as the connection between philosophical ethics and psychotherapy seems obvious to many non-experts, most professionals on both sides are vehemently opposed to it. I believe that Spinoza’s thinking is an example of how the boundaries of these disciplines can be meaningfully bridged. (shrink)

Článek aktualizuje úvahy Sigmunda Freuda o pudových kořenech válečného násilí, zejména jak je předložil ve spisku Proč válka. K zachycení významu současných proměn na poli destruktivity je navržen koncept destruktivní revoluce, jehož terminologické zachycení má poukazovat na analogii s procesem známým jako sexuální revoluce. Klíčovým aspektem hypotetické probíhající destruktivní revoluce má být zvědomění skutečnosti, že destrukce může způsobovat slast a že mezi základní destruktivní projevy patří autoagrese. Smyslem předložených úvah je nabídnout perspektivu, z níž se válečné násilí jeví jako kontraproduktivní (...) odvedení energie našich pudových snah od jejich adekvátních cílů. (shrink)

1. The aim of the present article is not to compare Hume’s and Husserl’s philosophy or to trace Hume’s influence on Husserl’s phenomenology in detail. Such tasks would clearly exceed the limits of...

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version.

This paper focuses on Aristotle’s methodology of science and its application to the study of the human soul. My aim is to contrast two significantly different methodological approaches and to formulate two pairs of premises that Aristotle employs in two clearly differentiated and independent fields of study, namely in his zoological works and in the works of practical philosophy. Acknowledging these principles, as I suggest, may shed a new light on the methodological difficulties that Aristotle indicates in the introductory chapters (...) of his De anima. (shrink)

The conceptualization of the vital force of living beings as a kind of breath and heat is at least as old as Homer. The assumptions that life and living things were somehow causally related to 'heat' and 'breath' would go on to inform much of ancient medicine and philosophy. This is the first volume to consider the relationship of the notions of heat, breath, and soul in ancient Greek philosophy and science from the Presocratics to Aristotle. Bringing together specialists both (...) on early Greek philosophy and on Aristotle, it brings an approach drawn from the history of science to the study of both fields. The chapters give fresh and detailed interpretations of the theory of soul in Heraclitus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Diogenes of Appolonia, and Democritus, as well as in the Hippocratic Corpus, Plato's Timaeus, and various works of Aristotle. (shrink)

The paper discusses the sharp semantic shifts of the Greek expressions psychê and sôma between the Archaic and Classical era. Concerning the documentary evidence of the medical, rhetorical and philosophical literature at the end of the 5th century BC, I argue that speculations on human health and disease attested in some of the Hippocratic treatises involved a specificnotionofthebody-souldistinctionandalsothatthisnotionprovides an important contrast to the definitionofphilosophyasatherapyofsoul.