Agriculture should be viewed not as an industry but rather as a set of sectors organized around region, commodity, and institution. As such, agriculture adjusts well to a situation of “abundance” (excess supplies of major commodities).Although these sector interests are often referred to as “special interests,” they have effectively used public policy to generate agricultural development, and will continue to have a developmental impulse. Sector interests will, therefore, resist most proposals based on macrosystem perspectives which would reduce government support for (...) agricultural development. These sectors will continue to be quite influential in deciding agricultural policy, though they will find it possible to adjust not only to “abundance” in the market place, but also to such political constraints as may be imposed in pursuit of such goals as consumer health, soil conservation, and environmental preservation. (shrink)

Much of today's communication is carried out through various kinds of humor, and we therefore need to be able to understand its many aspects. Here, two of the world's leading pioneers in humor studies, Alleen and Don Nilsen, explore how humor can be explained across the numerous sub-disciplines of linguistics. Drawing on examples from language play and jokes in a range of real-life contexts, such as art, business, marketing, comedy, creative writing, science, journalism and politics, the authors use their own (...) theory of 'Features, functions and subjects of Humor' to analyze humor across all disciplines. Each highly accessible chapter uses a rich array of examples to stimulate discussion and interaction even in large classes. Supplemental PowerPoints to accompany each of the 25 chapters are available online, taking many of the insights from the chapters for further interactional discussions with students. (shrink)

This report presents the findings of a survey of business ethics education undertaken in the Fall of 1988. The respondents were the deans of colleges and universities associated with the AACSB.Ethics, as a curriculum topic, received significant coverage at over 90 percent of the institutions, with 53 percent indicating interest in increasing coverage of the subject. The tabulations of this survey may prove useful to schools seeking to compare or develop their emphases in business ethics.

ABSTRACT: A popular response to proponents of embryonic stem cell research and advocates of abortion rights alike-summarized by claims such as “you came from an embryo!” or “you were a fetus once!”-enjoys a rich philosophical pedigree in the arguments of Hare, Marquis, and others. According to such arguments from potentiality, the prenatal human organism is morally valuable because every person’s biological history depends on having completed embryonic and fetal stages. In this article I set out the steps of the underlying (...) argument in light of how it has been cast in the philosophical literature and uncover an intriguingly illicit inference.RÉSUMÉ: On répond souvent aux avocats de la recherche sur les cellules souches et à ceux du droit a l’avortement par une argumentation qui se résume à des affirmations comme : «vous provenez d’un embryon!» ou «vous avez déjà été un fœtus!» -- ce genre de réponse appartient à une riche lignée philosophique qui inclut les arguments de Hare, Marquis et d’autres encore. Selon ces arguments fondés sur la potentialité, l’organisme humain prénatal possède une valeur morale parce que l’histoire biologique de chaque personne dépend de l’accomplissement des états embryonnaire et fœtal. Je présente ici les étapes du raisonnement qui se trouve au fondement de cette argumentation telle qu’elle est formulée dans la littérature philosophique. J’y découvre une inférence curieusement invalide. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A popular response to proponents of embryonic stem cell research and advocates of abortion rights alike-summarized by claims such as “you came from an embryo!” or “you were a fetus once!”-enjoys a rich philosophical pedigree in the arguments of Hare, Marquis, and others. According to such arguments from potentiality, the prenatal human organism is morally valuable because every person’s biological history depends on having completed embryonic and fetal stages. In this article I set out the steps of the underlying (...) argument in light of how it has been cast in the philosophical literature and uncover an intriguingly illicit inference.RÉSUMÉ: On répond souvent aux avocats de la recherche sur les cellules souches et à ceux du droit a l’avortement par une argumentation qui se résume à des affirmations comme : «vous provenez d’un embryon!» ou «vous avez déjà été un fœtus!» -- ce genre de réponse appartient à une riche lignée philosophique qui inclut les arguments de Hare, Marquis et d’autres encore. Selon ces arguments fondés sur la potentialité, l’organisme humain prénatal possède une valeur morale parce que l’histoire biologique de chaque personne dépend de l’accomplissement des états embryonnaire et fœtal. Je présente ici les étapes du raisonnement qui se trouve au fondement de cette argumentation telle qu’elle est formulée dans la littérature philosophique. J’y découvre une inférence curieusement invalide. (shrink)

Based upon the proceedings of the First International Conference on the History of General Relativity, held at Boston University's Osgood Hill Conference Center, North Andover, Massachusetts, 8-11 May 1986, this volume brings together essays by twelve prominent historians and philosophers of science and physicists. The topics range from the development of general relativity (John Norton, John Stachel) and its early reception (Carlo Cattani, Michelangelo De Maria, Anne Kox), through attempts to understand the physical implications of the theory (Jean Eisenstaedt, Peter (...) Havas) and to quantize it (Peter G. Bergmann), to elaborations of the theory into a unified theory of electromagnetism and gravitation (Vladimir P. Vizgin, Michel Biezunski), and considerations of its cosmological extensions (Pierre Kerszberg, George F.R. Ellis). This is the first volume to survey many of the most important questions in the history of general relativity, with many of the contributions drawing upon such original resources as the Einstein Archive. It is hoped that it will stimulate much-needed further research in this hitherto neglected area. (shrink)

Throughout his philosophical writings F.H. Bradley thought that the science of psychology had some relevance for logic and epistemology. This is not a view which contemporary philosophers are very sympathetic to. It is widely held that any attempt to derive conclusions about logic or epistemology from psychological premises is to commit the fallacy of psychologism. It seems obvious that we cannot deduce conclusions about how we ought to think or reason from knowledge of how we actually think or reason. This (...) insight wasn’t always so obvious. Indeed early modern philosophers thought it obvious that we could solve the problem of knowledge by understanding where our ideas came from. Were they innate, as the rationalist thought or acquired, as the empiricists believed? The question of the origin of ideas is surely distinct from questions about validity or truth. The correct answer to origins will not provide solutions to problems in logic or epistemology. The fallacy of psychologism is not that easy to define but its essence appears to be the attempt to reduce logic and epistemology to the psychology of learning. (shrink)

Long a widespread and comfortable assumption in medieval studies, the notion of “courtly love” has come under considerable attack in recent years. Beginning in the 1960s, American scholars such as D. W. Robertson, Jr., E. Talbot Donaldson, and John F. Benton sharply criticized the whole concept, suggesting that it is a “myth” of rather recent origin, that it is an impediment to understanding medieval texts, and that it ought to be banned from scholarly discourse. Being rather crude and unrefined by (...) modern intellectual standards, the original theory of courtly love was very vulnerable to such criticism. By calling it into question the Robertsonians performed a useful and salutary service to scholarship, launching a much-needed reassessment which is still going on. And yet, because these revisionist scholars accepted at face value some of the most questionable assumptions underlying the theory, their critique of it often presents a view of medieval literature and society just as distorted as that which it seeks to replace. The total effect of their intervention has thus been to confuse the issue thoroughly rather than to clarify it. (shrink)

Politics is full of people who don’t care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...) of bullshit (Section 1), I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters (Section 2). I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives (Section 3). I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable (Section 4). (shrink)

Robert Elliot (Inquiry, Vol. 25 [1982], No. 1) argues that the naturalness of a ?natural environment? is itself of value, and that a restored or ?artificial? environment, consequently, lacks a value that the original possessed. Against this it is argued that (i) Elliot has illicitly concluded that x has a valuable property F from the fact that someone values x because it is F, and (ii) it is unnecessary to seek environmental values the existence of which are independent of the (...) emotional responses of rational agents. (shrink)

Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.

The network approach to psychopathology is becoming increasingly popular. The motivation for this approach is to provide a replacement for the problematic common cause perspective and the associated latent variable model, where symptoms are taken to be mere effects of a common cause (the disorder itself). The idea is that the latent variable model is plausible for medical diseases, but unrealistic for mental disorders, which should rather be conceptualized as networks of directly interacting symptoms. We argue that this rationale for (...) the network approach is misguided. Latent variable (or common cause) models are not inherently problematic, and there is not even a clear boundary where network models end and latent variable (or common cause) models begin. We also argue that focusing on this contrast has led to an unrealistic view of testing and finding support for the network approach, as well as an oversimplified picture of the relationship between medical diseases and mental disorders. As an alternative, we point out more essential contrasts, such as the contrast between dynamic and static modeling approaches, that can provide a better framework for conceptualizing mental disorders. Finally, we discuss several topics and open problems that need to be addressed in order to make the network approach more concrete and to move the field of psychological network research forward. (shrink)

Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us--force us, I think--not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis's theory of events. Similar problems about the temporary properties of properties motivate us--though this time they probably don't force us--to give up this theory as well, (...) and to identify properties with functions from ⟨world, time⟩ pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on--the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self -locating. (shrink)

This essay is an introductory overview of the considerations in favor of epistemic infinitism, the view that the demands of justification are that one must have non-terminating series of reasons for one's beliefs if they are to be knowledge.

Background: Informed consent is regarded as a contract between autonomous and equal parties and requires the elements of information disclosure, understanding, voluntariness and consent. The validity of informed consent for critically ill patients has been questioned. Little is known about how these patients experience the process of consent.Objective: The aim of this study was to explore critically ill patients’ experience with the principle of informed consent in a clinical trial and their ability to give valid informed consent.Design: 11 stroke patients (...) who had been informed about thrombolytic treatment and had been through the process of deciding whether or not to participate in a thrombolysis trial went through repeated qualitative semistructured interviews.Results: None of the patients had any clear understanding of the purpose of the trial. Neither did they understand the principles of randomisation and voluntariness. Reasons for giving or not giving consent were trust, conceptions of benefits and risks and altruism. Several patients found it immoral to involve patients in the consent procedure and argued that this was the doctors’ responsibility. Others argued that it is a duty to question patients and perceived it as a sign of being treated with respect and dignity. A majority of the patients found the consent process vague and ambiguous.Conclusions: The results indicate that the principle of informed consent from critically ill patients cannot be seen as a contract between equal and autonomous parties. Further studies are needed to explore critically ill patients’ experiences with the process of informed consent. (shrink)