Abstract

Throughout his philosophical writings F.H. Bradley thought that the science of psychology had some relevance for logic and epistemology. This is not a view which contemporary philosophers are very sympathetic to. It is widely held that any attempt to derive conclusions about logic or epistemology from psychological premises is to commit the fallacy of psychologism. It seems obvious that we cannot deduce conclusions about how we ought to think or reason from knowledge of how we actually think or reason. This insight wasn’t always so obvious. Indeed early modern philosophers thought it obvious that we could solve the problem of knowledge by understanding where our ideas came from. Were they innate, as the rationalist thought or acquired, as the empiricists believed? The question of the origin of ideas is surely distinct from questions about validity or truth. The correct answer to origins will not provide solutions to problems in logic or epistemology. The fallacy of psychologism is not that easy to define but its essence appears to be the attempt to reduce logic and epistemology to the psychology of learning.