Este artículo discute el problema de la permanencia y del cambio. Empieza considerando al esencialismo frente al anti-esencialismo contemporáneo, en un segundo momento, la noción de existencia y, en seguida, las de identidad y cambio. Finalmente, se apela a la naturaleza de la predicación para mostrar que, contra el esencialista, la concepción del cambio de su contrincante sí logra resolver el problema de la unidad semántica de la proposición.

Resumen: Este artículo discute la tesis negativa de Hume sobre la religión; en segundo lugar, examina el intento kantiano de refutarlo con un argumento que apela a una supuesta superación del conflicto entre virtud moral y felicidad, y finalmente retoma la tesis humeana con Kierkegaard, para quien el cristianismo auténtico está fundado en la aceptación del absurdo. Esa dialéctica entre los tres pensadores es crucial: primero, la tesis del filósofo escocés de que la religión descansa sobre una paradoja; en seguida, (...) la antítesis kantiana asociada a cierta reinterpretación nouménico-ética del cristianismo, y, por último la restauración kierkegaardiana de la posición de Hume a través de una interpretación existencial del cristianismo.: This paper discusses, first, Hume’s negative thesis about religion; secondly, it deals with Kant’s attempt to refute him with an argument which appeals to a supposed elimination of the conflict between moral virtue and happiness; finally, it revisits Hume’s thesis with Kierkegaard, for whom authentic Christianity is founded on the absurd. This dialectic among the three thinkers is crucial: first, the Scottish philosopher’s thesis that religion rests upon a paradox; then the Kantian antithesis associated with a certain noumenic-ethical reinterpretation of Christianity; and finally Kierkegaard’s restauration of Hume’s position by means of an existential interpretation of Christian faith. (shrink)

Aristotle’s conception of causality and the ones Modern philosophers have bequeathed us have been exhaustively discussed, although the contrast between them has not, in my opinion, been sufficiently highlighted. This paper proposes to fill this gap. I start with Aristotelian causality and his theses that causal explanation requires knowledge of causal laws and that the necessity associated with these laws presupposes the existence of causal powers. I discuss next Locke’s and Leibniz’s attempts to modernize Aristotle’s theses on causality. The third (...) part of the paper presents two paradoxes Hume identified, on the one hand, between Locke’s and Leibniz’s theses about our knowledge of causal laws and, on the other hand, between the Aristotelian thesis that there must be causal powers and the scientific practice of Modernity. Hume’s proposal to eliminate these paradoxes is also discussed. I finish with some critical remarks on the humean model about our knowledge of causal laws as compared with his contribution to the analysis of the concept of causality. (shrink)

En este artículo, discuto la metodología filosófica frente a los límites del sentido y de la racionalidad. Empiezo con la concepción según la cual el filósofo debería resignarse a exhibir el sinsentido de otros filósofos, pero finalmente tendría que callarse, ya que su propio discurso necesariamente sobrepasa los límites de la racionalidad. En seguida, propongo una metodología interpretativa para la filosofía en un intento de caracterizar mejor estos límites y evitar el silencio que inviabilizaría todo el discurso filosófico. Finalmente, busco (...) reconciliar la metodología filosófica interpretativa con la irracionalidad interna del filósofo apelando a una división de su mente entre el sentido común y una segunda agencia que está destinada a sobrepasarlo. Dicha esquizofrenia de la filosofía sería la única manera de entender su tarea recurrente de trazar de manera segura los límites de nuestra comprensión cotidiana del mundo. (shrink)

Does Wittgenstein have a coherent philosophy of mathematics? Here, I will be concerned with showing that the answer is positive. However, given that his life-long philosophical perspective on mathematics tends to be misleading, I focus on the specific problem posed by Paul Benacerraf in ‘Mathematical Truth’, that is: the puzzle about how to reconcile the metaphysics with the epistemology for mathematics. My aim is to show that there is an adequate anti-platonistic solution to that puzzle in the mature writings of (...) the Austrian philosopher. (shrink)

En esta nota critico la teoría de la interpretación de Mota Pinto, arguyendo que predice significados donde intuitivamente no debería haberlos. De paso, critico su presentación de la perspectiva comunitarista del significado, distinguiendo entre dos tipos diferentes de hechos semánticos: el que una palabra signifique lo que significa en vez de significar otra cosa, y el que una expresión signifique lo que significa en vez de no significar nada. In this brief commentary, I argue that Mota (...) class='Hi'>Pinto's theory of interpretation predicts meanings where there are none. I also criticize his presentation of the communal perspective on meaning, drawing a distinction between two different kinds of semantic facts: a word meaning what it does rather than meaning something else, and such word meaning what it does rather than not meaning anything at all. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar a trajetória da valorização da cultura no contexto do crescimento e desenvolvimento sustentável desde o encontro das Nações Unidas no Brasil, que ficou conhecido como ECO-92 e, como a cultura teve sua inserção nos comprometimentos apresentados nas Agendas 21 Global e Local tomando, neste caso, o exemplo da cidade de São Paulo. Hoje, mais do que nunca, os países estão percebendo que o reconhecimento da identidade cultural de sua sociedade é elemento fundamental para (...) qualquer tipo de transformação econômica, social ou ambiental, uma vez que a integração destas esferas só será possível quando se olhar para a necessidade da inclusão e da prática da cidadania, para que então se possa respeitar a diversidade. Este artigo aponta também para a importância da tradição cultural dos povos, sociedades, grupos e comunidades e como estes podem se beneficiar das políticas públicas que poderão ser criadas para garantir a liberdade da sociedade em manifestar e expressar sua cultura em tempos de globalização. (shrink)

En el siglo XX, se ha intentado articular el convencionalismo lingüístico de maneras distintas. Uno de los enfoques más prometedores fue el que propuso David Lewis a finales de los años 60 e inicio de los 70. Lewis subsume las regularidades convencionales que subyacen a la actividad de hablar un lenguaje bajo los estados de equilibrio más generales que resultan de cualquier tipo de comportamiento cooperativo racional. En este artículo propongo que, pese a su atractivo, las convenciones lewisianas deberían ser (...) abandonadas a favor del convencionalismo lingüístico del segundo Wittgenstein. Mi motivación para recomendar tal giro es que la propuesta de Lewis no es capaz de ofrecer una respuesta satisfactoria a la objeción de Donald Davidson, de acuerdo con la cual la teoría convencionalista de Lewis no puede explicar la ocurrencia sistemática de malapropismos en nuestro uso ordinario del lenguaje. En las últimas secciones del artículo, me dedico a mostrar cómo las convenciones wittgensteinianas sí pueden explicar el fenómeno de los malapropismos. (shrink)

En este breve comentario, discuto dos aspectos, en mi opinión esenciales, del reciente libro de Atocha Aliseda sobre el razonamiento abductivo (Abductive Reasoning). El primero tiene que ver con la clasificación de la abducción propuesta por Aliseda respecto al tipo de lógica que le subyace. Sobre esto, considero que la mejor opción sería tal vez excluir la abducción de tal clasificación. El segundo se refiere al mecanismo de búsqueda de hipótesis abductivas que nos ofrece Aliseda (el método computacional de los (...) árboles semánti-cos extendidos). Sugiero que queda por establecerse la realidad psicológica de tal mecanismo.I discuss, in this brief commentary, two relevant aspects of Atocha Aliseda’s recent book on abductive reasoning (Abduc-tive Reasoning). The first has to do with Aliseda’s proposed classification of abduction with respect to the sort of logic under-lying it. I contend that perhaps the best option is to exclude abduction from this classification. The second aspect concerns the search mechanism for abductive hypotheses offered by Aliseda (the computational method of extended semantic tableaux). I suggest that its psychological reality has yet to be established. (shrink)

Discuto dos aspectos del reciente libro de Atocha Aliseda sobre el razonamiento abductivo. El primero tiene que ver con la clasificación de la abducción propuesta por Aliseda respecto al tipo de lógica que le subyace. El segundo se refiere al mecanismo de búsqueda de hipótesis abductivas que nos ofrece Aliseda.

The appearance of Bayesicin inductive logic lias prompted a renewed op tirrusm about the posstbdity of justification of tnductwe rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finettes theorent) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditmalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the (...) rnentioned conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategnes except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositicms of the Ramsey de Finetti s theorem (for instance, the principie of maximizaticrn of expected utility) themselves demand a justtfication. (shrink)

The appearance of Bayesian inductive logic has prompted a renewed optimism about the possibility of justification of inductive rules The justifying argument for the 'rides of such a logic is the famous Dutch Book Argument (Ramsey-de Finetti’s theorem) The issue winch divides the theoreticians of induction concerns the question of whether this argument can indeed legitimize Bayesian conditionalization rides Here I will be firstly interested in showing that the Ramsey de Finetti's argument cannot establish that the use of the mentioned (...) conditionalization rides is the best option against Dutch Book betting strategies except in special circum stances I suggest secondly that some presuppositions of the Ramsey de Finetti’s theorem (for instance, the principle of maximization of expected utility) themselves demand a justification. (shrink)

En este trabajo intento mostrar, en primer lugar, que el realismo interno de Hilary Putnam no logra explicar filosóficamente la fijación de la referencia de las expresiones del lenguaje cotidiano. En segundo lugar, sugiero una explicación alternativa del mecanismo de fijación de la referencia apelando al concepto de interpretación radical; además, el enfoque interpretativo lo concebiré como una variante del realismo que acepta la relatividad conceptual, pero rechaza la relatividad ontológica.This paper intends to show, first, that Hilary Putnam’s internal realism (...) does not provide a satisfactory philosophical explanation of the fixation of reference of natural language’s expressions. Second, I suggest an alternative explanation of the determination of reference in terms of radical interpretation; besides, the interpretative approach is conceived here as a variant of realism which accepts conceptual relativity while rejecting ontological relativity. (shrink)

Con el descubrimiento de la lógica inductiva bayesiana se ha renovado el optimismo acerca de la posibilidad de justificación de la inferencia inductiva. La justificación de las reglas inductivas bayesianas se conoce como el argumento del libro de apuestas holandés (el teorema de Ramsey-de Finetti). ..

Michael Beaney ha sugerido recientemente que la distinción fregeana entre sentido y referencia fue propuesta para resolver la famosa paradoja del análisis. Casi diez años antes, Michael Dummett ya insistia en que Frege fue uno de los prirneros en buscar una soluci6n satisfactoria de esta paradoja. En esre articulo, discuto algunas sugerencias de Beaney y Dummett de cómo resolver la paradoja al estilo fregeano y tarnbién sus propias contribuciones no fregeanas al debate en torno de la corrección y de la (...) informatividad del análisis. Mi intención en esta discusión es mostrar que ninguna de ellas funciona. Concluyo con una propuesta de inspiración witttgensteiniana --el enfoque de los conceptos abiertos- para apoyar la idea de que la apelación a contertidos abiertos es la rnejor rnanera de disolver la paradoja.Michael Beaney has recently suggested that the Fregean distinction between sense and reference was proposed to solve the famous paradox of analysis. Not as recently, Michael Dummett has insisted that Frege was one of the first to look for a satisfactory solution to this paradox. In this paper, I discuss Beanry’s and Dummett’s various suggestions for solving the paradox in a Fregean style as well as their own non Fregean contributions to the debate around analysis’s correction and informativeness. My intention in this discussion is to show that none of them works. I conclude with a proposal inspired by Wittgenstein’s later work -the open concepts’ proposal- designed to support the idea that the appeal to open contents is the best way to dissolve the paradox. (shrink)

En este artículo, rechazo algunas sugerencias de Michael Beaney y Michael Dummett sobre como resolver la paradoja del análisis: el aparente conflicto entre una explicación de la corrección y de la informatividad del análisis conceptual. Propongo el enfoque de los conceptos abiertos como la mejor manera de disolver la paradoja.

In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account of concepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke’s greatest efforts to convince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach to concepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raises questions about Peacocke’s supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is not able to make sense of the (...) distinction between misapplying a concept one nonetheless possesses and not possessing that concept at all. What I am going to do here is, on the one hand, defend Peacocke’s concept naturalization project from Bermudez’s objection and, on the other hand, show that the latter’s suggestion cannot save the surely crucial distinction between making a mistake in using a concept and being incapable of a mistake or a correct use because of not having the concept. (shrink)

According to Michael Dummett, deductive inference stands in need of justification which must be provided by the theory of meaning for natural language. Such a theory, he insists, should deliver an explanation for the two essential features of deduction: validity and fruitfulness. Dummett claims that only a molecularist theory of meaning could offer the desired justification. In this paper, I will consider and criticize his solution to the problem of the justification of deduction: the so-called molecular verificationist explanation. My aim (...) here will be to show that Dummett's solution does not succeed in reconciling the conflicting demands of the respective explanations of validity and fruitfulness. (shrink)

Aquí lo que me interesa es, primero, distinguir dos problemas de justificación con respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por otro lado, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti a favor de las reglas inductivas de la lógica bayesiana no es capaz de proporcionar una justifi-cación persuasiva de estas reglas. Finalmente, propongo una justificación explicativa para (...) las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.Here, I am interested, firstly, in distinguishing two justification problems concerning inductive inference: on the one hand, the problem of a persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, the problem of an explicative justification of this sort of inference. Secondly, I intend to show that Ramsey-de Finetti’s argument in favor of Bayesian inductive rules cannot provide a persuasive justification for these rules. Finally, I propose an explicative justification for Bayesian conditionalization rules in terms of a transcendental argument of Kantian inspiration and Davidsonian style. (shrink)

Aquí lo que me interesa es, primero, distinguir dos problemas de justificación con respecto a la inferencia inductiva: por un lado, el de una justificación persuasiva de este tipo de inferencia y, por otro lado, el de una justificación explicativa de tal inferencia. En segundo lugar, intento mostrar que el argumento de Ramsey-de Finetti a favor de las reglas inductivas de la lógica bayesiana no es capaz de proporcionar una justifi-cación persuasiva de estas reglas. Finalmente, propongo una justificación explicativa para (...) las reglas de condicionalización bayesianas en términos de un argumento trascendental de inspiración kantiana y de estilo davidsoniano.Here, I am interested, firstly, in distinguishing two justification problems concerning inductive inference: on the one hand, the problem of a persuasive justification of induction and, on the other, the problem of an explicative justification of this sort of inference. Secondly, I intend to show that Ramsey-de Finetti’s argument in favor of Bayesian inductive rules cannot provide a persuasive justification for these rules. Finally, I propose an explicative justification for Bayesian conditionalization rules in terms of a transcendental argument of Kantian inspiration and Davidsonian style. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics of the later Wittgenstein is normally not taken very seriously. According to a popular objection, it cannot account for mathematical necessity. Other critics have dismissed Wittgenstein's approach on the grounds that his anti-platonism is unable to explain mathematical objectivity. This latter objection would be endorsed by somebody who agreed with Paul Benacerraf that any anti-platonistic view fails to describe mathematical truth. This paper focuses on the problem proposed by Benacerraf of reconciling the semantics with the epistemology (...) for mathematics. It is claimed that there is a way of solving Benacerrafs problem along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later remarks on mathematics. This will require demonstrating that a satisfactory conception of mathematical objectivity can be extracted from his mature philosophy. (shrink)

The philosophy of mathematics of the later Wittgenstein is normally not taken very seriously. According to a popular objection, it cannot account for mathematical necessity. Other critics have dismissed Wittgenstein's approach on the grounds that his anti-platonism is unable to explain mathematical objectivity. This latter objection would be endorsed by somebody who agreed with Paul Benacerraf that any anti-platonistic view fails to describe mathematical truth. This paper focuses on the problem proposed by Benacerraf of reconciling the semantics with the epistemology (...) for mathematics. It is claimed that there is a way of solving Benacerrafs problem along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later remarks on mathematics. This will require demonstrating that a satisfactory conception of mathematical objectivity can be extracted from his mature philosophy. (shrink)

SENA, Luzia (Org.). Ensino religioso e formação docente . (Religious teaching and teacher qualification) Amauri Carlos Ferreira SANGENIS, Luiz Fernando Conde. Gênese do pensamento único em educação: franciscanismo e jesuitismo na história da educação brasileira. (Genesis of an only thought in education: franciscanism and Jesuitism in the history of Brazilian education) Antônio Francisco da Silva TREVISAN, A. Santo Tomás de Aquino – O Credo: tradução, prefácio, introdução e notas. (Saint Thomas of Aquinas – The Creed: translation, preface, introduction and notes) (...) Ivonei Antônio de Oliveira BENELLI, Sílvio José. Pescadores de homens. Estudo psicossocial de um seminário católico. (Fishers of men. A psycho-social study of a Catholic seminary) João Batista Libanio ESTRADA, Juan Antonio. A impossível teodicéia: a crise de fé em Deus e o problema do mal. (The impossible theodicy: the crisis of faith in God and the problem of evil) Lindomar Rocha Mota USARSKI, Frank. Constituintes da Ciência da Religião: cinco ensaios em prol de uma disciplina. (Constituents of the science of religion: five essays on behalf of a discipline) Roberlei Panasiewicz CONGAR, Yves. Ele é o Senhor e dá a vida. (He is the Lord and bestows life) Roberlei Panasiewicz. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é, primeiro, apresentar e considerar as críticas de Paley com mais detalhes e, em seguida, discutir algumas das aplicações significativas da fenomenologia que muitas vezes foram negligenciadas pelos pesquisadores qualitativos. Como foi amplamente demonstrado ao longo dos anos, a fenomenologia pode não apenas fazer a diferença no manuseio, análise e interpretação dos dados disponíveis, mas também em como os dados são obtidos em primeiro lugar, por exemplo, através de técnicas especiais de entrevista. Consideraremos algumas figuras centrais (...) da psicologia fenomenológica clássica e da psiquiatria fenomenológica e apresentaremos alguns dos desenvolvimentos mais recentes na ciência cognitiva. Em seguida, discutiremos três casos concretos que demonstram como a fenomenologia foi aplicada no trabalho clínico com pacientes com esquizofrenia, paralisia cerebral e negligência hemispatial. (shrink)

Healthcare professionals often face ethical conflicts and challenges related to decision-making that have necessitated consideration of the use of conscientious objection (CO). No current guidelines exist within Spain’s healthcare system regarding acceptable rationales for CO, the appropriate application of CO, or practical means to support healthcare professionals who wish to become conscientious objectors. As such, a procedural framework is needed that not only assures the appropriate use of CO by healthcare professionals but also demonstrates its ethical validity, legislative compliance through (...) protection of moral freedoms and patients’ rights to receive health care. Our proposal consists of prerequisites of eligibility for CO (individual reference, specific clinical context, ethical justification, assurance of non-discrimination, professional consistency, attitude of mutual respect, assurance of patient rights and safety) and a procedural process (notification and preparation, documentation and confidentiality, evaluation of prerequisites, non-abandonment, transparency, allowance for unforeseen objection, compensatory responsibilities, access to guidance and/or consultative advice, and organizational guarantee of professional substitution). We illustrate the real-world utility of the proposed framework through a case discussion in which our guidelines are applied. (shrink)

Accountability is a quality often demanded of the church and its leaders today, and especially so within the Roman Catholic Church. But how should accountability itself be understood, and how might a more accountable church be achieved? This essay explores these questions from a new angle by offering a detailed ethical analysis of how accountability operates within broad-based community organizing (BBCO), a form of democratic politics with a highly developed theory and practice of accountability in which many churches already participate. (...) In dialogue with BBCO, the essay develops a constructive framework for conceptualizing accountability. It makes a case for understanding accountability principally as a property of reciprocal relationships between persons, and stresses the need to proactively cultivate and sustain relationships of accountability through ongoing democratic practices of accountability. It also highlights the role played by moral authority, power, and virtue in these relationships and practices. The essay concludes by using this framework to propose a new interpretation of the Catholic Church’s accountability crisis. It suggests a more accountable church may only be achieved when the whole people of God begin organizing themselves to build it. (shrink)

Etnofiction essay, between anthropology and philosophy.

Summary In the period between the two World Wars, the Portuguese Geological Survey (Serviços Geológicos de Portugal: PGS) was legally dependent on the General Directorate of Mines and Geological Survey (Direcção Geral de Minas e Serviços Geológicos: GDMGS). Portugal was then living through troubled times, and the PGS struggled with financial problems and a lack of technical personnel. This situation did not allow the PGS to work properly as a scientific institution, and achieve its main function: the making and publication (...) of geological maps and research papers. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar algumas considerações sobre a noção da experiência no âmbito da filosofia da educação. Na transposição dos ideais formativos iluminista e romântico para os sistemas escolares ocorre a marginalização da experiência, a centralidade das noções modelares hegemônicas (a cientifica-especializada e a crítica-reflexiva) e o problema da redução da experiência ao empírico. Na contemporaneidade, indicamos caminhos alternativos para a retomada da experiência no campo de estudos da filosofia da educação.