O presente artigo buscará investigar como é possível uma espiritualidade sem Deus em Ferry e Sponville. Passando pelos humanismos renascentistas e iluministas, até a fase da desconstrução com Nietzsche, chegaremos numa terra devastada, sem quaisquer ídolos a se prostrar de joelhos. Em meio aos escombros da terra devastada ainda haveria um algo a se agarrar como profusão de uma experiência com o sagrado: o amor. Não mais um amor abstrato, mas um amor prático, do cotidiano, amor ao próximo, amor aos (...) familiares. (shrink)

O presente artigo busca aproximar Adorno de Nietzsche, não como a exaltar ressentimentos e picuinhas, mas como a dialogar aspectos da crítica de ambos a uma cultura igualitária formadora de uma humanidade decaída e violenta, além de dócil e pouco crítica. Como leitor de Nietzsche, Adorno acertou ao indicar os processos de nivelamento social promovidas pelas sociedades econômicas contemporâneas. Assim como sua racionalização instrumental que culminou na barbárie(1939-1945). Exporemos uma crítica que busque diminuir os esteriótipos dos autores aproximando mais, o (...) social, de Nietzsche, e o sujeito individual, de Adorno. No fim, tentaremos demonstrar como o conceito de solidariedade em Adorno não resolve melhor a questão ética, que a avaliação como valor para a construção de valores, sendo a proposição imoralista de Nietzsche, muito mais um recurso provocativo, que uma assertiva de caráter fundamental. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende fazer uma defesa da matemática, em especial, da matemática pura. Partindo de problemas colocados por Kant no que concerne às condições de um pensamento puro a priori, seguindo por indagações promovidas por Leibniz no sentido da construção de uma linguagem artificial capaz de acessar de forma mais segura o mundo, e atormentados pela desconexão estrutural entre a linguagem humana natural e o mundo, elencada pelo debate da Filosofia da Linguagem promovida pela Tradição Analítica, se quis realizar (...) uma investigação no sentido de procurar um conhecimento que fosse essencialmente a priori. Apesar do projeto logicista de Frege, ainda não foi possível uma linguagem totalmente artificial que expressasse o mundo sem suas ambiguidades. Entretanto, pistas indicam que a matemática pura, que tem como substrato a lógica, é uma linguagem formal poderosamente capaz de construir axiomas. (shrink)

the present article intends to outline feuerbach's humanism in his the essence of christianity in dialogue with the nietzschean notion of the death of god. for it is with the death of god and the fall of all idols that it is possible to glimpse god, not as the absolute transcendent, but as a human creation, all too human. a projection of the self into a safe and magnanimous outside, anchorage of all human desires, from magical and miraculous powers to (...) the rapture of body and soul in a sanctifying and eternal peace. as god, man works the miracle of existing in the comforting fantasy of a supreme being, nothing more than himself. (shrink)

The overcoming of man in the beyond of man is glimpsed in Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, from Memoirs of the Underground and its philosophical translation Genealogia da Moral, to The Idiot and the considerations of The Antichrist. The child reverberates a trait of overcoming resentment, incorporating, philosophically literarily, a deal with life intensified with lightness and vigor, completely ready, without pretensions beyond the world or professions of faith. The beatitude of Jesus takes shape when his childishness as surrender to the present (...) embodies his redemption as attachment and love to men. Love as a practice of forgiveness is only possible when resentment is no longer the most active mark of life. (shrink)

Wesley Salmon is renowned for his seminal contributions to the philosophy of science. He has powerfully and permanently shaped discussion of such issues as lawlike and probabilistic explanation and the interrelation of explanatory notions to causal notions. This unique volume brings together twenty-six of his essays on subjects related to causality and explanation, written over the period 1971-1995. Six of the essays have never been published before and many others have only appeared in obscure venues. The volume includes a (...) section of accessible introductory pieces, as well as more advanced and technical pieces, and will make essential work in the philosophy of science readily available to both scholars and students. (shrink)

While much of semantic theorizing is based on intuitions about logical phenomena associated with linguistic constructions—phenomena such as consistency and entailment—it is rare to see axiomatic treatments of linguistic fragments. Given a fragment interpreted in some class of formally specified models, it is often possible to ask for a characterization of the reasoning patterns validated by the class of models. Axiomatizations provide such a characterization, often in a perspicuous and efficient manner. In this paper, we highlight some of the benefits (...) of providing axiomatizations for the purpose of semantic theorizing. We illustrate some of these benefits using three examples from the study of modality. (shrink)

Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: scientific (...) practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged. (shrink)

Bibliography of works in experimental philosophy.

Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the truth for (...) present purposes. In this paper, we adopt an experimental methodology to begin testing these two theories. When an agent provides a false and practically inadequate answer, both theories predict that people will deny knowledge. But the theories disagree about an agent who provides a false but practically adequate answer: the factivity hypothesis again predicts knowledge denial, whereas the representational adequacy hypothesis predicts knowledge attribution. Across two experiments, our principal finding was that people tended to attribute knowledge for false but practically adequate answers, which supports the representational adequacy account. We propose an interpretation of existing findings that preserves a conceptual link between knowledge and truth. According to this proposal, truth is not necessary for knowledge, but it is a feature of prototypical knowledge. (shrink)

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a (...) robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical (...) challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology. (shrink)

Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands (...) current empirical scrutiny. (shrink)

1. 1735-1738 -- 2. 1738-1743 -- 3. 1743-1754 -- 4. 1755-1765 -- 5. 1765-1775 -- 6. 1776-1786 -- 7. 1787-91.

In recent years, there has been much concern expressed about the under-representation of women in academic philosophy. Our goal in this paper is to call attention to a cluster of phenomena that may be contributing to this gender gap. The findings we review indicate that when women and men with little or no philosophical training are presented with standard philosophical thought experiments, in many cases their intuitions about these cases are significantly different. In section 1 we review some of the (...) data on the under-representation of women in academic philosophy. In section 2 we explain how we use the term 'intuition,' and offer a brief account of how intuitions are invoked in philosophical argument and philosophical theory building. In the third section we set out the evidence for gender differences in philosophical intuition and mention some evidence about gender differences in decisions and behaviors that are (or should be) of considerable interest to philosophers. In the fourth section, our focus changes from facts to hypotheses. In that section we explain how differences in philosophical intuition might be an important part of the explanation for the gender gap in philosophy. The fifth section is a brief conclusion. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well-researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model (...) of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition. Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. — Bertrand Russell, On the Value of Scepticism. (shrink)

It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1–3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral (...) vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the “ought implies can” principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a “blame implies can” principle. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the issue of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy by presenting an account regarding gender differences in philosophical institutions. It begins with an analysis of data on the gender gap in academic philosophy; followed by a discussion about the term “intuition,”as well as the tendency to appeal to intuitions during philosophical arguments. It then presents empirical data about gender differences derived from a series of experiments such as a Gettier-style case study of Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman, (...) a philosophical thought experiment of Geoffrey Holtzman, and one of David Pizarro about moral responsibility and causal deviance, among others; one hypothesis derived from these studies pertains to the distinct differences between women and mens' intuitions regarding philosophy, with the instructors deciding that the mens' are more correct. (shrink)

We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we provide evidence that the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology could be a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.

This article analyses the evolutionist discourses on the senses that emerged in the late 19th century, when theories on the evolution of species were in full sway. Drawing on newspapers, essays and medical literature, this article aims to set face to face the two currents of thought that I have identified regarding sensory evolution: the one that stressed the value of the progressive specialisation of the senses as evidence for human evolution mainly supported by Max Nordau, and the one which (...) regarded the sensory regrouping, exemplified by the phenomenon of synaesthesia, as the true symptom of evolution, strongly supported by Victor Segalen. A close examination of their arguments will provide clues concerning their relative position vis-à-vis the theory that stressed the exceptional nature of humankind among all living beings. Based on newspapers, essays and medical literature, this paper, which straddles several fields (history of science, philosophy, cultural history and aesthetics) aims to set both positions face to face, examining their arguments in detail and establishing their genealogies. This will lead to a better understanding of the scope and range of evolutionist discourses in the fin de siècle culture and on their impact upon artistic practices. (shrink)

One recent trend in contemporary epistemology is to study the way in which the concept of knowledge is actually applied in everyday settings. This approach has inspired an exciting new spirit of collaboration between experimental philosophers and traditional epistemologists, who have begun using the techniques of the social sciences to investigate the factors that influence ordinary judgments about knowledge attribution. This paper provides an overview of some of the results these researchers have uncovered, suggesting that in addition to traditionally considered (...) factors like evidence and justification, a number of important non-truth-conducive factors play significant roles in determining when people ascribe knowledge. The present review focuses on four non-traditional factors: pragmatic load (in relation to contextualism and interest-relative invariantism), moral judgment, performance errors, and demographic variation. (shrink)

Research in experimental epistemology has revealed a great, yet unsolved mystery: why do ordinary evaluations of knowledge ascribing sentences involving stakes and error appear to diverge so systematically from the predictions professional epistemologists make about them? Two recent solutions to this mystery by Keith DeRose (2011) and N. Ángel Pinillos (2012) argue that these differences arise due to specific problems with the designs of past experimental studies. This paper presents two new experiments to directly test these responses. Results vindicate previous (...) findings by suggesting that (i) the solution to the mystery is not likely to be based on the empirical features these theorists identify, and (ii) that the salience of ascriber error continues to make the difference in folk ratings of third-person knowledge ascribing sentences. (shrink)

We report two experiments exploring the perception of how contemporary philosophy is often conducted. We find that (1) participants associate philosophy with the practice of conducting thought experiments and collating intuitions about them, and (2) that this form of inquiry is viewed much less favourably than the typical form of inquiry in psychology: research conducted by teams using controlled experiments and observation. We also found (3) an effect whereby relying on intuition is viewed more favorably in the context of team (...) inquiry than in individual inquiry and (4) that greater prior exposure to philosophy lowered one’s opinion of inquiry driven by intuitions and thought experiments. Finally with respect to participant gender, we found that (5) women favored observation over intuition more than men did, and (6) tended to view a question pursued by a research team as more important than men viewed it. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity (...) to which those experiential states are attributed. In two experiments, we demonstrate that ordinary attributions of subjective experiences (of smell and felt emotions) to a simple robot are not sensitive to valence, but instead respond to functional assumptions about the entity to which the states are (or are not) attributed. (shrink)

When and why do we need the indexical ‘I’? Perry (1979) thinks that ‘I’ is an essential ingredient to the explanation and prediction of action. We need ‘I’ to classify the kind of belief that causes an agent to produce a new action. In his view, classifying the agent’s belief in terms of ‘I’ makes sense because, when asked to explain her behavior, the agent will be disposed to say ‘I’. Here, we argue that this dispositional assumption is problematic. The (...) disposition to act according to an essential indexical and the disposition to make a speech act that contains ‘I’ are two very different things that are not always related. The most common circumstances in which we need to say ‘I’ to explain ourselves involve other agents: when we coordinate in joint actions or when we engage in self-talk to save face before the eyes of potential witnesses. Finally, we revisit Perry’s famous messy shopper anecdote to offer a better story about why its main character is disposed to say ‘I’. (shrink)

O ingresso na universidade acarreta mudanças na vida dos estudantes universitários, fato que pode levar à adoção de hábitos não saudáveis que podem resultar em impactos negativos na saúde e na qualidade de vida (QV) desses jovens. Nessa perspectiva, o presente estudo teve como objetivo investigar os efeitos da prática de Yoga na QV de estudantes universitários participantes do programa de extensão universitária intitulado “Yoga: Awaken ONE”. O estudo caracterizou-se como pré-experimental, do tipo antes e depois. Os participantes foram submetidos (...) a aulas práticas de Yoga duas vezes por semana durante 12 semanas. As aulas tiveram duração de 60 minutos. Para avaliação da QV pré e pós intervenção foi utilizado o questionário WHOQOL-bref. No que diz respeito aos Domínios da QV e QV global, não houveram diferenças significativas em nenhuma das variáveis investigadas (p>0,05). Com base nos achados do presente estudo, conclui-se que duas práticas semanais de Yoga não tiveram efeito significativo na QV dos estudantes investigados. Dessa forma, encoraja-se novos estudos com maior tempo de intervenção e com número maior de participantes. (shrink)

We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...) distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics. (shrink)

According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May et al (2010), (...) and Buckwalter (2010)--which cast doubt on folk stakes sensitivity, and a second wave of empirical studies--due to Pinillos (2012) and Sripada & Stanley (2012)--said to vindicate it, as well as new studies of our own. We conclude that the balance of evidence to date best supports Folk stakes insensitivity, or that all else equal, stakes do not affect knowledge ascription. (shrink)

Many have argued we have a moral obligation to assist others in need, but given the scope of global suffering, how far does this obligation extend? According to one traditional philosophical view, the obligation to help others is limited by our ability to help them, or by the principle that “ought implies can”. This view is primarily defended on the grounds that it is a core principle of commonsense moral psychology. This paper reviews findings from experimental philosophy in cognitive science (...) demonstrating that “ought implies can” is rejected by moral psychology. Researchers find that moral obligations are ascribed to agents who cannot fulfill them, suggesting that moral requirements do sometimes extend beyond what we are able to do. This research furthers our understanding of moral obligation, identifies an important need for further cross-cultural work in moral psychology, and demonstrates a way in which scientific experimentation can be applied to improve upon the conceptual analysis of important philosophical concepts in normative ethics. (shrink)

Through his S–R model of statistical relevance, Wesley Salmon offers a solution to the scientific explanation of objectively improbable events.

We give a new Esakia-style duality for the category of Sugihara monoids based on the Davey-Werner natural duality for lattices with involution, and use this duality to greatly simplify a construction due to Galatos-Raftery of Sugihara monoids from certain enrichments of their negative cones. Our method of obtaining this simplification is to transport the functors of the Galatos-Raftery construction across our duality, obtaining a vastly more transparent presentation on duals. Because our duality extends Dunn's relational semantics for the logic R-mingle (...) to a categorical equivalence, this also explains the Dunn semantics and its relationship with the more usual Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logics. (shrink)

Not since Ernest Nagel’s 1939 monograph on the theory of probability has there been a comprehensive elementary survey of the philosophical problems of probablity and induction. This is an authoritative and up-to-date treatment of the subject, and yet it is relatively brief and nontechnical. Hume’s skeptical arguments regarding the justification of induction are taken as a point of departure, and a variety of traditional and contemporary ways of dealing with this problem are considered. The author then sets forth his own (...) criteria of adequacy for interpretations of probability. Utilizing these criteria he analyzes contemporary theories of probability, as well as the older classical and subjective interpretations. (shrink)

A central theoretical motivation for epistemic contextualism is that it can explain something that invariantism cannot. Specifically, contextualism claims that judgments about “knowledge” are sensitive to the salience of error possibilities and that this is explained by the fact that salience shifts the evidential standard required to truthfully say someone “knows” something when those possibilities are made salient. This paper presents evidence that undermines this theoretical motivation for epistemic contextualism. Specifically, it demonstrates that while error salience does sometimes impact “knowledge” (...) judgments as contextualism predicts, it does so in ways that are consistent with invariantism and does not require positing any additional contextualist semantics to explain. These results advance our understanding of the pathways by which error possibility affects “knowledge” judgments, answer a major challenge to invariantism, and suggest several methodological improvements for the study of knowledge attribution. (shrink)

A finales del siglo XIX, la economía capitalista y las nuevas formas de consumo que trae implícitas tratando de seducir al individuo urbano con multitud de estímulos suponen un cambio en el modo en que este experimenta la ciudad. Esto conlleva la aparición de nuevas patologías, como la neurastenia, producto de un supuesto exceso de demanda del cerebro. Estos efectos fueron abordados en la época por Georg Simmel, quien se interesó por la reacción que sobre el individuo produce la urbe (...) capitalista ligada a la “intensificación de la vida nerviosa”. En el presente artículo se indaga en la lectura que Simmel plantea de los efectos que la ciudad moderna ejerce en el ciudadano. Me centro particularmente en la cuestión de la saturación de estímulos para tratar de entender no solo cómo creía que la ciudad afectaba al ciudadano en la época sino también el novedoso papel que otorga a la sensibilidad como intermediaria del vínculo entre individuo y ciudad. (shrink)

The ethical question is whether university mask mandates should be relaxed. I argue that the use of face masks by healthy individuals has uncertain benefits, which potential harms may outweigh, and should therefore be voluntary. Systematic reviews by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Cochrane Acute Respiratory Infections concluded that the use of face masks by healthy individuals in the community lacks effectiveness in reducing viral transmission based on moderate-quality evidence. The only two randomized controlled trials of face masks published (...) during the pandemic found little to no benefit. Without high-quality evidence, it is difficult to justify a requirement rather than a recommendation. Notwithstanding, one might argue that the precautionary principle justifies mask mandates. If the precautionary principle can justify implementing mask mandates due to the risk of forgoing possible benefit, then it might also be able to justify not implementing mask mandates due to the risk of potential harm caused by the intervention. It is commonly thought that there is little to lose from the use of face masks, but this is not necessarily true. It is possible that masks have done more harm than good. (shrink)

Ana Mae Barbosa presenteia o leitor com uma palestra que descobriu nos arquivos de Arte-Educação da Miami University, dirigida a professores de Arte e Trabalhos Industriais. Um belo exemplo da visão de Dewey sobre a importância da Arte no desenvolvimento humano.

The belief norm of academic publishing states that researchers should believe certain claims they publish. The purpose of this paper is to defend the belief norm of academic publishing. In its defense, the advantages and disadvantages of the belief norm are evaluated for academic research and for the publication system. It is concluded that while the norm does not come without costs, academic research systemically benefits from the belief norm and that it should be counted among those that sustain the (...) practice of academic publishing. (shrink)

Epistemic contextualism is the theory that “knows” is a context sensitive expression. As a linguistic theory, epistemic contextualism is motivated by claims about the linguistic behavior of competent speakers. This chapter reviews evidence in experimental cognitive science for epistemic contextualism in linguistic behavior. This research demonstrates that although some observations that are consistent with epistemic contextualism can be confirmed in linguistic practices, these observations are also equally well explained both by psychological features that do not provide support for contextualism and (...) by rival theories that are inconsistent with contextualism. I conclude that the motivation for epistemic contextualism is underdetermined by existing experimental evidence, yielding little reason to accept it as an account of our actual linguistic practices. (shrink)

A Filosofia Política de Arendt afunda raízes no pensamento existencial de Heidegger e Jaspers. Este trabalho tenta mostrar a apropriação crítica que Arendt faz dos seus mestres, salientando a aproximação e o distanciamento do pensamento arendtiano em relação à filosofia existencial na formação de sua original filosofia política.

This work has its origin in a master's research about Brazilian Education. The approach that we present in this text reveals the perspectives of caring perceived in a five-year-olds classroom in the daily life in a municipal center for Early Childhood Education in Fortaleza. The theoretical discussions on the theme involved a dialogue between Pedagogy and Philosophy of Education based on the contributions of Kramer, Pagni, Foucault, Rancière, Kohan and Boff. It was a qualitative research of phenomenological inspiration, which method (...) of data creation was participant observation. The analysis revealed that: in the interactions occurred in pedagogical practices, teachers and children take care of each other; the meaning of caring for children can be perceived in the minutia of their daily actions, as well as in affective involvement, in playing together, in speaking and listening to others, in sharing life on a daily basis; as for the meaning of caring for the adults, it is influenced by the way they were cared for, by their subjectivation and their choices in their way of being; caring humanizes teaching practices, inspiring emancipation; the policy on results that has aimed at "improving educational indices" may represent a danger to Early Childhood Education by minimizing the sharing of specific childhood experiences to training in order to achieve expected results. The study emphasized the need to reflect on the meaning of education and therefore proposes that caring be valued as an ethical decision and as an option for reflection on the way of living and interacting. (shrink)

Em Ser e Tempo, Heidegger argumenta que o conhecimento primordial do Dasein se dá no manuseio de entes mundanos. Merleau-Ponty, por sua vez, descreve na Fenomenologia da Percepção que o conhecimento é, antes de tudo, uma intencionalidade corporal intraduzível em termos proposicionais. Mais tarde, em What Computers Can’t Do, Hubert Dreyfus usa a obra de ambos para apontar os equívocos do paradigma cognitivista, isto é, a abordagem dominante do então nascente campo da inteligência artificial. Finalmente, em The Embodied Mind: Cognitive (...) Science and Human Experience, a noção de enativismo - elaborada por Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson e Eleanor Rosch - surge como uma tentativa de tomar do cognitivismo e do conexionismo a hegemonia nas ciências cognitivas. Dito isso, o objetivo do artigo consiste em descrever o enativismo e apontar sua herança fenomenológica. (shrink)