Investigates Aristotle's views on the ontological status of artifacts in the Metaphysics, with implications for a variety of metaphysical problems.

ArgumentThe aim of this paper is two-fold: to offer an interpretation that preserves the natural reading ofPhysicsII 1 – that Aristotle is drawing a stark distinction between what is natural and what is artificial; and to show how there is logical room for atertium quid– a category for things that are products of both nature and art. This aim is attained by highlighting two important qualifications Aristotle makes about the products of art in relation to an innate internal principle of (...) change and pointing out that the proper understanding of the significance of the essential-accidental distinction that Aristotle draws must be viewed in the context where he identifies two kinds of nature – form and matter. Based on these analyses, the following three logical categories are shown to be consistent with the passage: 1) purely natural things; 2) essentially artificial objects; and 3) essentially natural things with artificial aspects. (shrink)

By defending the following views – that Aristotle identifies the generator and perhaps the obstacle remover as an essential cause of the natural sublunary elemental motion in Physics VIII 4; that this view is consistent with the view of Physics II 1 that the sublunary simple bodies have a principle of internal motion; and that the sublunary and the celestial elements have a nature in the very same way – I shall offer what has so far eluded Aristotelian commentators: a (...) consistent interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the natural motions of the sublunary and also the celestial elements. (shrink)

Is Aristotle committed, as a theoretical matter, to fixed species in biology? The answer seems to be a resounding no, if we were to infer his theoretical commitments from the actual practice found in his biological works. The answer, however, is far from clear, if we turn to the ‘philosophical discussion of biology’ found in Book 1 of Parts of Animals. In fact, I shall note that its context suggests that, contrary to some recent interpretations put forward, the phrase τὰ (...) ἔσχατα εἴδη at 644a23 is best translated and understood as ‘infima species’, and that such a reading implies that Aristotle favours the methodology that reflects his theoretical commitment to fixed species. (shrink)

In the contemporary discussion of artifacts, philosophers grapple with what is known as the continuum problem – the problem of drawing a clear distinction between what is and what is not artificial. They begin with the standard definition of artifacts (rooted in Aristotle’s distinction between what exists by nature and what exists by what he calls technē found in the opening passage of Physics II.1) as “objects made intentionally, in order to accomplish something”. But this definition turns out to be (...) rather vague and not as useful as it first appears. For example, does it include nonhuman animal products or a political community? The aim of this paper is to explicate how Aristotle would address the continuum problem by examining what he means by the crucial phrase, ‘from technē’ (apo technēs) which is found at Phys II.1.192b18 (casting doubt that the standard definition of artifacts does not really capture Aristotle’s view) and to explain what truly counts as “artificial products” for Aristotle. (shrink)

This essay explores the role of informal logicand its application in the context of currentdebates regarding evidence-based medicine. This aim is achieved through a discussion ofthe goals and objectives of evidence-basedmedicine and a review of the criticisms raisedagainst evidence-based medicine. Thecontributions to informal logic by StephenToulmin and Douglas Walton are explicated andtheir relevance for evidence-based medicine isdiscussed in relation to a common clinicalscenario: hypertension management. This essayconcludes with a discussion on the relationshipbetween clinical reasoning, rationality, andevidence. It is argued that (...) informal logic hasthe virtue of bringing explicitness to the roleof evidence in clinical reasoning, and bringssensitivity to understanding the role ofdialogical context in the need for evidence inclinical decision making. (shrink)

Immunity against SARS‐CoV‐2 that is acquired by convalescent COVID‐19 patients is examined in reference to (A) the Th17 cell generation system in psoriatic epidermis and (B) a recently discovered phenomenon in which Th17 cells are converted into tissue‐resident memory T (TRM) cells with Th1 phenotype. Neutrophils that are attracted to the site of infection secrete IL‐17A, which stimulates lung epithelial cells to express CCL20. Natural Th17 (nTh17) cells are recruited to the infection site by CCL20 and expand in the presence (...) of IL‐23. These nTh17 cells are converted to TRM cells upon encounter with SARS‐CoV‐2 and continue to exist as ex‐Th17 cells, which exert Th1‐like immunity during a memory response. G‐CSF can induce nTh17 cell accumulation at the infection site because it promotes neutrophil egress from the bone marrow. Hence, G‐CSF may be effective against COVID‐19. Administration of G‐CSF to patients infected with SARS‐CoV‐2 is worth a clinical trial. (shrink)

Rheumatoid arthritis (RA) may not be a multifactorial disease; it can be hypothesized that RA is developed through a series of events following a triggering event, which is the emergence of a chemokine for neutrophils in the synovium. IL‐17A, secreted by infiltrated neutrophils, stimulates synoviocytes to produce CCL20, which attracts various CCR6‐expressing cells, including Th17 cells. Monocytes (macrophages) appear after neutrophil infiltration according to the natural course of inflammation and secrete IL‐1β and TNFα. Then, IL‐17A, IL‐1β, and TNFα stimulate synoviocytes (...) to produce CCL20, amplifying the inflammation. Varieties of chemokines secreted by infiltrating cells accumulate in the synovium and induce synoviocyte proliferation by binding to the corresponding G protein‐coupled receptors, thus expanding the synovial tissue. CCL20 in this tissue attracts circulating monocytes that express both CCR6 and receptor activator of NF‐κB (RANK), which differentiate into osteoclasts in the presence of RANKL. In this way, pannus is formed, and bone destruction begins. (shrink)

The death of Geoffrey Mure is a greater loss to the world of scholarship than the present-day philosophical community is likely to recognize. He was one of the very few Oxford philosophers who had the courage and steadfastness to stick to his staunch belief in speculative Idealism when the explosion of Logical Positivism and the successive shock-waves of Empiricism and Ordinary Language Philosophy overwhelmed the Oxford schools. Mure’s philosophy was, therefore, not congenial to his colleagues. Nevertheless, throughout the hey-day of (...) the Rylian Empire, Mure remained at Oxford as the Warden of Merton, exerting what influence he could to keep alive the tradition of F.H. Bradley, Harold Joachim and R.G. Collingwood. Had he been appointed to the White’s Chair of Moral Philosophy or the Wykeham Professorship of Logic, the history of recent British philosophy would have been different, but that was hardly to be expected in the philosophical climate of the time. The force of the current against which Mure swam can be judged from the story told in the 1950s that as they walked down the High, students would point him out in incredulous wonder as the sole surviving Hegelian in Oxford. (shrink)

‘One of the guilding thoughts throughout this work’, writes the author, ‘is that G.F.W. Hegel is the philosopher of the modern age’.

With the resurgence in recent years of Hegelian studies a veritable spate of new translations have appeared of that philosopher’s works. For a long time we have had Wallace’s inimitable version of the lesser Logic and the main text of the Philosophy of Mind. We have had also Johnson and Struther’s translation of the greater Logic, Baillie’s Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy done by E. S. Haldane and The Philosophy of History by Sibree, not to mention various fragmentary editions of (...) the Introduction. Besides these there have been Sir Malcolm Knox’s excellent translations of the Rechtsphilosophie and, more recently, of Lectures on Aesthetics. But in the last few years A. V. Miller has given us a new and much improved version of the Science of Logic and the hitherto untranslated Philosophy of Nature as well as a new and revised edition of Wallace’s Encyclopaedia Logic and his Philosophy of Mind with the addition now of the Zusätze in English. At the same time another translation of the Naturphilosophie by Petry appeared, with voluminous historical and explanatory notes. Now attention is being given to the earlier works, and new translations have appeared, under the imprint of the State University of New York Press, of Hegel’s Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophic and Glauben und Wissen, by Walter Cerf and Henry S. Harris, supplementing the Early Theological Writings earlier provided by Knox and Kroner. (shrink)

‘One of the guilding thoughts throughout this work’, writes the author, ‘is that G.F.W. Hegel is the philosopher of the modern age’.

In this essay I try, first of all, to outline the development of Joachim's epistemology from his most significant book, The Nature of Truth (1906), to his posthumous Logical Studies (1948), which gathers together the lectures on Logic delivered by him at the University of Oxford in the years up to his death in 1938. The conception of truth as systematic coherence, upheld by him in his earlier work in a lively polemic against Bertrand Russell's empirical-realist 'correspondence theory of truth' (...) as well as against the intuitionist appeal to immediate self-evidence, shows the thorough- going influence of F.H. Bradley's epistemology in its declaredly idealistic orientation and its 'sceptical' outcome. I then criticise the arguments by which, in the final pages of The Nature of Truth, he supports his denial of truth's reality, pointing out that they are plainly self-refuting. Finally, I examine the further development of his conception of thought and truth in his Oxford lectures, where he subjects the above-mentioned arguments to a careful self-critique, which prompted his pupil Errol E. Harris to vindicate, against contemporary anti-metaphysical thought, the perennial theoretical value and moral significance of metaphysics in general, and of Hegel's Absolute Idealism in particular. (shrink)

In tribute to Peter A. Bertocci on his retirement from Boston University as Bowne Professor of Philosophy, 15 American and British scholars prepared essays on aspects of idealism, at the request of the editors. These essays, together with an introduction by the editors, a list of Bertocci’s writings, and an index, comprise the present volume. The British contributors are H. D. Lewis of London and W. M. Pittenger of Cambridge. Among the Americans are John N. Findlay, Errol E. Harris, (...) Charles Hartshorne, Richard Hocking, and John E. Smith. (shrink)

Celebrations of the second centenary of Hegel's birth have already begun, and more are planned. The Sixteenth Annual Wheaton College Philosophy Conference, "The Philosophy of Hegel on the 200th Anniversary of His Birth", was held November 6th and 7th at Wheaton, Illinois. Errol Harris of Northwestern delivered the Keynote lecture titled "The Importance of Hegel Today". Other papers read included "Hegel's Dialectic" by William Young of the University of Rhode Island; "Hegel and Contemporary Theology" by Merold Westphal of Yale; (...) "Hegel and the Existentialists on the Nature of the Self" by John C. Pageler of Wheaton College, and "Hegel, Marcuse, and the New Left" by Bernard Zylstra, Institute of Christian Studies, Toronto. * * * The Toronto Chapter of the Conference on Political Thought will sponsor a Symposium on "Hegel's Social and Political Thought" early next May. Interested persons are advised to contact Professor H.S. Harris, Department of Philosophy, Glendon College, York University, Toronto 12, Ontario, Canada. * * *Marquette University will conduct a major international symposium early in June, 1970, devoted to the intellectual legacy of Hegel. Preliminary plans call for a four day conference covering Hegel's influence in social and political philosophy and theory, his influence in philosophy of religion end theology, his influence in philosophy and theory of history, and current and projected efforts in editing and translating his writings. Principal participants include Shlomo Avineri of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Jean-Yves Calvez of L'Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris; Emile Fackenheim of the University of Toronto; J.N. Findlay and Kenley Dove of Yale; Eric Well of L'Universite de Lille; Otto Pöggeler, Director of the Hegel-Archiv; James Doull of Dalhousie University ; Kenneth Schmitz of the Catholic University, and others. The unique format for the program is designed to permit maximum participation and discussion, and the Proceedings will be published. The Owl will give full details in the Winter or Spring issue. Interested persons should contact either Professor Joseph O'Malley or Professor Lee C. Rice, Co-Directors, Department of Philosophy. Marquette University, 62/north 13th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233, * * * A World Hegel Congress is to be held in Berlin in August, 1970, under the auspices of the Internationale Hegel Gesellschaft. More on this will also be provided in forthcoming issues of The 0wl of Minerva. (shrink)

Book Information Aristotle on Artifacts: A Metaphysical Puzzle. By Errol G. Katayama. State University of New York Press. Albany. 1999. Pp. xiii + 202. Paperback.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Harris offers his unique interpretation of Spinoza as a dialectical thinker and addresses other commentators' misunderstandings of some of Spinoza's primary principles. The opening chapters discuss Spinoza's metaphysics and epistemology, the problem of relating finite to infinite in his system, the infinity of the attributes of substance, human nature and the body-mind relation, politics, and religion. The latter part of the book addresses Spinoza's influence on later philosophers and their interpretations of his doctrine. In the course of his discussion, Harris (...) stresses Spinoza's holism and its implication both within and beyond Spinoza's own writings. (shrink)

My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend a novel (...) view about what it is to act and hold attitudes for normative reasons (ch. 4). In Part II--Foundationalism, Deception, and The Importance of Being Rational--I argue that foundationalists about epistemic rationality should think that the foundational beliefs are held for sufficient reasons (ch. 5), argue that my view solves the New Evil Demon problem for externalism (and solves a related and underapprieciated problem) (ch. 6), and argue that my view can vindicate the thought that we ought to be rational (ch. 7). (shrink)

Errol Lord offers a new account of the nature of rationality: what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. Lord defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and dispels doubts about whether we ought to be rational.

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

This sequel to the highly acclaimed Cosmos and Anthropos demonstrates the impact on social, ethical, and theological doctrines of the twentieth-century scientific revolution, particularly the Anthropic Principle. Harris reviews the main arguments put forward in the Western philosophical tradition for the existence of God, as well as the critique of those arguments, and shows that the conflict between religion and science since the seventeenth century has resulted more from the implications of the Copernican-Newtonian scientific paradigm than from any insuperable divergence (...) of dogma or ultimate aim. (shrink)

Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.