This paper proposes a heterodox reading of Levinas’s Otherwise Than Being by means of a hitherto unacknowledged lineage run-ning from Plotinus through Nietzsche to Levinas. Its claim is two-fold. (1) Throughout Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and especially in its important speech on the “gift-giving virtue,” Nietzsche corporealiz-es and ethicizes Plotinian emanationist metaphysics, borrowing from it the notion of an auto-generosity that is extravagant and non-substantial. (2) Levinas’s late conception of embodied ethical giving in Otherwise Than Being borrows from this borrowing, al-beit in (...) a way that draws more deeply on the logic of emanationism than Zarathustra does. Interpreting Levinas through Plotinus and Nietzsche in this way provides access to a version of his late ac-count of embodied ethical giving that is much stranger than the ul-tra-humanist version typically foregrounded both in the literature and in his self-presentation. (shrink)

In an age where issues like climate change and the unintended consequences of technological innovation are high on the ethical and political agenda, questions about the nature and extent of our responsibilities to future generations have never been more important, yet simultaneously so difficult to answer. This book takes a unique approach to the problem by drawing on diverse traditions of thinking about care (including developmental psychology, phenomenology and feminist ethics) to explore the nature and meaning of our relationship with (...) the future. Demonstrating that many influential perspectives on intergenerational ethics, including positions advanced by John Rawls, Brian Barry, and Ulrich Beck are undermined by problems relating to uncertainty, it shows that an approach based on care ethics can confront the uncertain future successfully and give a viable account of the nature and scope of future-oriented responsibilities. (shrink)

Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...) Call this the "standard" conception. Most theists find the standard conception appealing. Unfortunately, the view seems to conflict with the equally appealing idea — call it "temporal actualism" — that there are no "future" individuals beyond those that already exist in the present moment. For, on this view, for any historical person P, prior to creation, there was no such person as P and hence nothing about P for God to know. Hence, in particular, God couldn't have known that P was to exist. This is of course not a new problem. But past solutions to it are highly problematic. In this paper, after canvassing previous approaches, I will propose a solution that seems to preserve both temporal actualism and a suitably robust form of the standard conception while avoiding the pitfalls of the past. (shrink)

The suicidality hypothesis could be applied to other situations, such as cases in regular military organizations or in “terrorist” groups, where individuals put themselves in circumstances that are directly suicidal. Self-selection in these cases may be motivated by depression or short-term hopelessness. Both violent and charitable acts are over-determined, and a multiplicity of motives should be considered in explaining them.

This commentary proposes experiments to examine connections between the presence of out-group members, neurovisceral reactions, religiosity, and ethnocentrism, to clarify the meaning of the correlational findings presented in the target article. It also suggests different ways of describing religious socialization and of viewing assertions about religion and health or about the human ability to detect pathogens.

Kirkpatrick's contribution is evaluated in the context of historical developments and persistent crisis in the psychology of religion. The field has been characterized by the lack of a unifying theory, as well as by some literature being driven by religious apologetics. Kirkpatrick's approach has been truly theory-driven, always seeking a general psychological framework for analyzing religion and religiosity. His personal odyssey led him to embrace Bowlby's attachment theory, which has had a unique impact of research in academic psychology. But then (...) Kirkpatrick demonstrates his honesty and courage in realizing that the attachment framework was less than adequate for the task of unifying the field. Instead, he invites us to join him in embracing the broader framework of cognitive-evolutionary theory, which should serve as the unifying framework for the field. I concur with his judgment. (shrink)

The universal early experience of all humans, which means being totally dependent on caretakers who attempt to inculcate impulse control, should be considered as the psychological framework for the creation of significant supernatural agents. The same early experiences put us at the center of a moral universe, but there is no necessary connection between the two processes. We do not need disgruntled ancestors to make us behave; disgruntled parents will do.

Christopher Hookway presents a series of studies of themes from the work of the great American philosopher and pragmatist, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1913). These themes center on the question of how we are to investigate the world rationally. Hookway shows how Peirce's ideas about this continue to play an important role in contemporary philosophy.

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If (...) they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists. (shrink)

En este artículo se esboza un mapa fenomenológico de la afectividad a partir de la clasificación propuesta por Scheler en la que se distingue el "percibir afectivo" (Fühlen), que es intencional y tiene por objeto los valores, y los "estados sentimentales" (Gefühlszustände), que carecen de la intencionalidad estricta del percibir afectivo. Las clásicas emociones se inscriben en los estados sentimentales divididas en dos grupos: las "respuestas afectivas" y las "meras emociones" (las "reacciones de respuesta emocionales" [emotionale 'Antwortsreaktionen'] y las "emociones" (...) [Affekte], en terminología scheleriana). Las respuestas afectivas carecen de la intencionalidad estricta del percibir afectivo, pero poseen una "intencionalidad secundaria" que es correcta por adecuarse al percibir afectivo; en las meras emociones la intencionalidad secundaria es incorrecta o llega incluso a desaparecer. This article outlines a phenomenological map of affectivity, based on the classification proposed by Scheler. Two faculties are distinguished: "affective perception" (Fühlen) -which is intentional and aims to values- and "emotional states" (Gefühlszustände) -which lack the strict intentionality of affective perception-. Classic emotions are included in emotional states and divided into two groups: "affective responses" and "mere emotions" (emotionale 'Antwortsreaktionen' and Affekte in Scheler's terminology). Affective responses lack the strict intentionality of affective perception but possess a "secondary intentionality" which is "right" due to its adequacy to affective perception; in mere emotions the secondary intentionality is "unright" or even disappears. (shrink)

Este artículo esboza una ontología pluralista que, partiendo de una teoría de todos y partes, busca una clasificación de los todos reales en la que se evite la desmesura del idealismo, pero sin caer en posiciones materialistas, que minusvaloran la importancia de la subjetividad. Tras deslindar lo real, tanto de lo ideal como de lo irreal, se articula la realidad en cuatro tipos de todos materiales, completando para ello el esquema propuesto por el filósofo español X. Zubiri. A continuación, se (...) insiste, frente a Zubiri, en elcarácter peculiar del hombre, que en tanto que dotado de lo que Husserl denominaba un “yo” trascendental, constituye un todo no exclusivamente material. En línea con esta recuperación de lo propiamente subjetivo,se introducen los todos con “realidad en relación”, para dar cuenta del ámbito propio del “mundo de la vida”, donde encontramos la “cosa sentido”, especialmente la “cosa sensible”. Y se plantea finalmente el problema de una ontología del valor al introducir los “todos valiosos”. (shrink)

La tesis defendida en este trabajo es que la “diferencia ontológica” de Martin Heidegger encubre un anti-humanismo nihilista, que disuelve la antropología filosófica como ciencia. Se justifica así la necesidad de ir más atrás de Heidegger, para recuperar la noción de subjetividad propuesta por el fundador de la fenomenología, Edmund Husserl, y por el fundador de la antropología filosófica, Max Scheler. Ellos mostraron que el sujeto ocupa un lugar privilegiado en la totalidad de lo real, como aquél en el que (...) se produce el “aparecer” del ser, la “manifestación” del ser. Esto permite construir una antropología filosófica y no abandonar el humanismo, que ha caracterizado a la filosofía propia de la cultura occidental. (shrink)

This commentary deals with the nonconformity of academics and the ethos of social science. Academics in all fields deviate from majority norms in politics and religion, and this deviance may be essential to the academic mind and to academic norms. The Enlightenment legacy inspires both methods and subject matter in academic work, and severing ties with it may be impossible.

In response to the April 2017 Critical Research on Religion editorial “On a balanced critique:,” the author suggests first that defining religion is possible and helpful, and that even those who claim not to define the subject demonstrate knowledge of its boundaries. Academic research on religion can offer useful generalizations and insights, while having no impact on the fortunes of religion in the real world. When believers perceive academic research as hostile to religion, they are absolutely right. All academic approaches (...) to religion reflect its loss of authority under secularization. Our work is always a critique in the strongest sense, especially when it deals with the psychological foundations of religious beliefs. Even a “balanced” critique undermines belief plausibility and will incur the wrath of true believers. (shrink)

Plato's Utopia Recast is an illuminating reappraisal of Plato's later works, which reveals radical changes in his ethical and political theory. Christopher Bobonich examines later dialogues, with a special emphasis upon the Laws, and argues that in these late works, Plato both rethinks and revises the basic ethical and poltical positions that he held in his better-known earlier works, such as the Republic. This book will change our understanding of Plato. His controversial moral and political theory, so influential in (...) Western thought, will henceforth be seen in a new light. (shrink)

"Throughout history, some books have changed the world. They have transformed the way we see ourselves - and each other. They have inspired debate, dissent, war and revolution. They have enlightened, outraged, provoked and comforted. They have enriched lives - and destroyed them. Now Penguin brings you the works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization and helped make us who we are. Plato's retelling of the discourses between Socrates and his friends on such subjects (...) as love and desire, truth and illusion, spiritual transcendence and the qualities of a good ruler, profoundly affected the ways in which we view human relationships, society and leadership - and shaped the whole tradition of Western philosophy."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

This paper reflects on how the possibility of meaningful evidence is to be assumed in view that all our linguistic exercises take place in the context of a discursive horizon where we are situated. To do this, the paper starts distinguishing two phenomena: first, the possibility of meaningful evidence and second, the horizontal character that is inherent to the deployment of linguistic meaning. Furthermore, through a discussion with Husserl and Wittgenstein, the paper considers how those two phenomena are to be (...) consistently assumed within phenomenology. (shrink)

En este artículo se reconstruye la propuesta ética de la “fenomenología clásica” desarrollada por E. Husserl y M. Scheler. En ella la noción de valor queda inscrita dentro del ámbito de la “razón”, pero de una razón ampliada, que es una auténtica “razón afectiva”, en la que se enlazan sentimientos (subjetivos) y valores (objetivos). Para ello se adopta la perspectiva husserliana de una fenomenología subjetivo-trascendental, que se aleja del objetivismo, evitando así una posible lectura objetivista de la teoría de Scheler.

In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical (...) positions has not yet been fully explored. In particular, I argue that the existence of apparent motion is compatible with an account of the nature of temporal experience that involves a version of direct realism. In doing so, I also argue against two other claims often made about apparent motion, viz. that apparent motion is the psychological phenomenon that underlies motion experience in the cinema, and that apparent motion is subjectively indistinguishable from real motion. (shrink)

En este artículo se reconstruye la propuesta ética de la “fenomenología clásica” desarrollada por E. Husserl y M. Scheler. En ella la noción de valor queda inscrita dentro del ámbito de la “razón”, pero de una razón ampliada, que es una auténtica “razón afectiva”, en la que se enlazan sentimientos (subjetivos) y valores (objetivos). Para ello se adopta la perspectiva husserliana de una fenomenología subjetivo-trascendental, que se aleja del objetivismo, evitando así una posible lectura objetivista de la teoría de Scheler.

Para comprender Ser y Tiempo es inevitable preguntar hasta el final cómo articula Heidegger las dos dimensiones de la existencia a las que denomina la propiedad y la impropiedad. Frente a la interpretación habitual, en este artículo se defiende que el discurso heideggeriano se apoya en una bien controlada ambigüedad, tras la que se esconde una fuerte tesis, según la cual la impropiedad es el único modo posible de la existencia. El estado de resuelto no constituye una existencia alternativa a (...) la impropia, sino que es, más bien, el reconocimiento de que la única existencia posible es la impropia. Por ello la cura, esto es, la existencia impropia, es la única definición del Dasein propuesta por Heidegger. En realidad, el titánico intento de Ser y Tiempo no es otro que el de mostrar que el nihilismo o el escepticismo es la única opción aceptable para el pensar. (shrink)

Este ensayo defiende que la ética de los valores desarrollada a partir de la fenomenología clásica incluye una interesante teoría del deber. Desarrollando algunas tesis de Max Scheler, se ofrece aquí una noción fenomenológica de “deber”, que está ligado a un valor muy peculiar: el valor de lo “justo”. Esto permite alejar por completo la ética fenomenológica de los valores de todo tipo de “consecuencialismo” y la sitúa en las cercanías del “deontologismo”. Pero el deber de la ética fenomenológica no (...) es un deber formal, sino fundado en el valor, de modo que podríamos hablar de un “deontologismo material”, que aspira a servir de mediación entre los dos grandes paradigmas clásicos. (shrink)

Frente a la confusión que encontramos en la literatura, debemos distinguir con claridad la sensación y el sentimiento para poder decidir en qué ámbito se inscribe el dolor. El artículo defiende la tesis de Stumpf y Husserl de que el dolor es fundamentalmente sensación. Pero, ya no en línea con Stumpf, sino con Scheler, se sostiene que además del dolor-sensación, existen sentimientos sensibles, a los que se propone denominar «displacer» y «desagrado». Entre los sentimientos de desagrado hay algunos con intencionalidad (...) trascendente, que son los ligados a las sensaciones exhibitivas. Pero también hay un sentimiento de «desagrado» ligado al dolor-sensación, que tiene una intencionalidad inmanente. El desagrado y el displacer ligados al dolor-sensación pueden ser denominados dolorsentimiento, pero han de distinguirse claramente del dolor-sensación. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia las variaciones del “percibir afectivo” (Fühlen) del dolor, al que denominamos “dolorsentimiento” por ofrecernos la “cara valorativa” del “dolor-sensación”. En él consideramos el percibir afectivo del dolor como un acto cognoscitivo, de modo que sus variaciones constituyen estrictos “engaños (Täuschungen) afectivos”, que, a nivel formal, podrían ir desde el sufrir por exceso hasta la indiferencia o el disfrute. Pero el artículo defiende que, en realidad, los únicos engaños que se producen de hecho son engaños por exceso, en (...) los que el dolor se sufre más de lo debido (engaños ligados al hedonismo). Y el disfrute del dolor o la indiferencia, que se dan respectivamente en el masoquismo y en las leucotomías prefrontales, se sitúan ya en el ámbito de las “respuestas afectivas” al dolor, que en el artículo se distinguen con claridad del nivel previo del percibir afectivo. A su vez, las variaciones del percibir afectivo se diferencian de las variaciones del “umbral del dolor-sensación”, estudiadas desde la psicofísica. (shrink)

En este artículo se estudia la intencionalidad afectiva en Max Scheler, mostrando que la fenomenología de los valores no se ocupa sólo del valor, sino que cuenta con una completa teoría del bien. En dicha teoría, Scheler hace un análisis genético que parte de la Sache para obtener las nociones de Ding y Gut, entendido como Wertding. Esto permite mejorar las descripciones clásicas del bien y puede ofrecer una alternativa interesante a las propuestas “pragmaticistas” actuales.

Resumen Este artículo se ocupa de dos escritos de Max Scheler posteriores a El formalismo, en los cuales afirma la prioridad del valor, frente al ser teórico o neutral, pero aclara que dicha prioridad no debe confundirse con la negación de la tesis clásica de la fundamentación del valor en dicho ser teórico. Para ello, Scheler entiende la prioridad del valor como prioridad de la donación, frente a la prioridad ontológica del ser teórico. En el artículo, recurro a la noción (...) de conciencia actual, de Edmund Husserl, para mostrar que la prioridad del valor lo es de la actualidad de la donación, debida a la capacidad del valor para centrar el interés del sujeto. Luego, señalo que esta posición de Scheler puede rastrearse ya en El formalismo, lo cual permite interpretar de modo más interesante esta obra central del autor. Finalmente relaciono la prioridad del valor con la prioridad del amor, también defendida por Scheler.This article deals with two essays written by Max Scheler after Der Formalismus in which he affirms the priority of value over theoretical being, but clarifies that this priority should not be confused with the denial of the classical thesis of the foundation of value in theoretical being. To this end, Scheler understands the priority of value as a priority of givenness versus the ontological priority of theoretical being. In this article, I use Edmund Husserl’s notion of focused consciousness to show that value priority is a priority of focused givenness, due to the ability of value to focus the subject’s interest. Then, I show that Scheler’s position can already be traced back to Der Formalismus, which makes it possible to interpret this author’s central work in a more interesting way. Finally, I relate the priority of value with the priority of love, also advocated by Scheler. (shrink)

La reducción trascendental introdu-cida por Husserl en Ideas I le permite a nuestro autor, ya en Ideas II, definir la “actitud perso-nalista”, donde el “objeto intencional” abre paso a una nueva noción clave que es la de “motivación”. Dada la importancia que tiene la motivación para entender cualquier vida y también, por tanto, la vida moral, mi ponencia busca obtener una clasificación rigurosa de los distintos tipos de motivación que Husserl describe. Su objetivo es mostrar que aunque Husserl concede a (...) la motivación “racional” toda la importancia que merece, no por ello identifica motivación con racionalidad. En la motivación, que cubre por completo el ámbito personalista, Husserl incluye, en efecto, una motivación “prerracional” o asociativa, que nos lleva al terreno de la fenomeno-logía genética.The transcendental reduction introduced by Husserl in Ideas I allows him, in Ideas II, defining the "personalistic attitude" where the "intentional object" gives way to a new key notion, "motivation." Given the importance of motivation to understand any life and, therefore, moral life, my paper seeks a rigorous classification of the different types of motivation that Husserl describes. Its aim is showing that although Husserl gives importance to "rational" motivation, he does not identify motivation with rationality. In the motivation, that covers completely personalistic level, Husserl includes, in effect, a "pre-rational" or associative motivation, which leads us to the field of genetic phenomenology. (shrink)